THE RESURGENCE OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY

THREE KEYS TO THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Randy E. Barnett ................................................................. 1

IS THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CURE FOR PROTECTIONISM WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?
Roderick Hills ................................................................. 13

THE PERILS OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE
Erik Luna ........................................................................... 23

ECONOMIC LIBERTY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Beth A. Colgan ................................................................. 31

TURNING ENTREPRENEURS INTO OUTLAWS
Christina Sandefur .......................................................... 45

BITCOIN’S NATURE AND ITS FUTURE
John O. McGinnis ............................................................ 59

THE CONSTITUTIONAL BEDROCK OF DUE PROCESS
Allan Ides ........................................................................... 67

ARE STATES PROTECTING ECONOMIC LIBERTY?
Dana Berliner ................................................................. 77
ARTICLES

ARE CRIMINALS BAD OR MAD? PREMEDITATED MURDER, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND KAHLER V. KANSAS
    Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & GianCarlo Canaparo .............................................. 85

THE CONSCIENCE OF CORPORATIONS AND THE RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK
    William E. Lee ......................................................................................... 155

CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A CONSTITUTIONAL NORM THAT THE COURT SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ENFORCE
    David Schoenbrod .................................................................................... 213

NOTE

COUNTERACTING MARBURY: USING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE TO OVERRULE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
    Brian Kulp ................................................................................................... 279
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PREFACE

The recent trade war between the United States and China has highlighted arguments between free-market principles and protectionism nationally. At the state and local level too, judges, lawmakers, and scholars have debated the proper balance between individual economic liberty and governmental interests on issues like civil asset forfeiture, licensing, and home-sharing laws. Consideration of these issues, however, is not a recent invention. The quest for economic liberty in response to tyrannical restrictions on trade and taxes was central to the American Revolution and to debates leading to the Constitution’s ratification. In a similar vein, the theme of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Federalist Society Student Symposium was inspired by Frédéric Bastiat’s maxim: “Life, liberty, and property do not exist because men have made laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life, liberty, and property existed beforehand that caused men to make laws in the first place.” Many of the nation’s finest scholars and judges came together at the Symposium to discuss how factions, relations among the states, congressional powers, and constitutional structure affect economic liberty.

We have the honor of presenting eight Essays from the Symposium in this Issue of the *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy*. In the first, Professor Randy Barnett analyzes three key historical data points to determine the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause. Next, Professor Roderick Hills examines whether economic protectionism is a legitimate state interest. In three thought-provoking Essays, Professor Beth Colgan, Professor Erik Luna, and Christina Sandefur discuss the interplay between criminal justice and individual economic liberty. Then, Professor John McGinnis remarks on the nature of Bitcoin and its future as a currency. Finally, Professor Allan Ides and Dana Berliner each explore the contributions of federalism and constitutionalism to economic liberty.

Additionally, we are pleased to present three Articles addressing current constitutional issues. The first Article of this Issue, by Paul Larkin and GianCarlo Canaparo, considers the case *Kahler v. Kansas*, currently pending before the Supreme
Court. They argue that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires criminal law to offer an insanity defense. Next, Professor William Lee analyzes the Supreme Court’s struggle with corporate identity through an in-depth look at the Justices’ papers in First Amendment cases over the past forty years. He argues that government efforts to fine-tune the flow of information by compelling private speech should be rejected because they promote government-defined orthodoxy. Finally, Professor David Schoenbrod argues that Congress and the Supreme Court should enforce the consent-of-the-governed norm, more broadly known as the nondelegation doctrine.

We are happy to close this Issue with a Note from one of our own. Brian Kulp argues that the Constitution grants Congress near-plenary power to curb the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, but this power should only be used with bipartisan support after attempting to use the amendment process.

This Issue would not have been possible without the hard work and dedication of the Journal and Symposium editors. I cannot thank them enough. In particular, Deputy Editor-in-Chief R.J. McVeigh revitalized our editing process and provided wise counsel. Articles Chair Jacob Thackston has been irreplaceable in managing our submissions and article selection process. Hugh Danilack served as National Symposium Editor and Managing Editor, excelling at both. Aaron Gyde, also a Managing Editor, put in countless hours doing exceptional editing work. Dylan Soares, our Chief Financial Officer, generously undertook the time-consuming work of managing the Journal’s business affairs. Aaron Hsu made himself available every day to help in the final rounds of editing, answering all my tricky editing questions. And Dallin Earl was always around to listen and brainstorm ideas to improve the Journal. These individuals—and all those who worked on this Issue—exemplify the Journal’s excellence.

Nicole M. Baade
Editor-in-Chief
The Federalist Society

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THREE KEYS TO THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

Randy E. Barnett*

Establishing the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause requires a wealth of evidence. But three key data points are crucial to identifying the core of its meaning. First, Supreme Court Justice Washington’s explanation of the meaning of “privileges and immunities” in Corfield v. Coryell; second, the rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866; and third, Michigan Senator Jacob Howard’s speech explaining the content of the Privileges or Immunities Clause when introducing the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Senate in 1866. Any theory of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and its original meaning that cannot comfortably accommodate these three items is highly questionable.

I. Corfield v. Coryell

We begin with data point number one. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, provides, “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” This clause protected the rights of citizens of one state when traveling in another state. Although it was generally taken by courts to bar discrimination against out-of-staters, antislavery activists insisted that it guaranteed to every American citizen the

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* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center; Director, Georgetown Center for the Constitution. This Essay is based on remarks delivered at the Federalist Society National Student Symposium at the Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, on March 15, 2019. I am grateful to Evan Bernick, with whom I am coauthoring a series of articles and a book on the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Permission to distribute for classroom use is hereby granted.

2. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
protection of a set of fundamental rights when traveling in another state.³

For example, the imprisonment of free black sailors from Northern states by Southern authorities while in Southern ports became a cause célèbre in the North.⁴ Antislavery activists protested this denial of privileges and immunities under Article IV, Section 2, despite the Southerners’ assertion that they were treating out-of-state blacks in the same manner as they treated their own free blacks and hence were not discriminating against them.⁵ For the Northerners, the issue was not how a state treated its own citizens, but whether a fundamental right of all citizens was being denied to an out-of-state citizen.⁶

What were the fundamental rights to which all citizens were entitled under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV? In 1823, Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, George Washington’s nephew, was called upon as a Circuit Judge to address the scope of the rights protected by Article IV, Section 2.⁷ He began by identifying the “fundamental” privileges and immunities protected by the clause. He explained:

We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty,

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4. See, e.g., David R. Upham, The Meanings of the “Privileges and Immunities of Citizen” on the Eve of the Civil War, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117, 1133 (2016); see also, e.g., Philip M. Hamer, Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seamen Acts, 1822–1848, 1 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 3, 21 (1935) (“The enforcement of the Negro seaman acts was a grievance against which northerners . . . protested.” (footnote omitted)).
5. See Upham, supra note 4, at 1141–48.
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.8

For Justice Washington, “privileges and immunities” are rights that (1) “are, in their nature, fundamental”; (2) “belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments”; and (3) can be found in the positive law in the states, which included common law rights.9 Justice Washington then proceeded to list some examples, such as the rights to travel, to claim the writ of habeas corpus, to maintain lawsuits, and others.10

In the highlighted passage of Justice Washington’s description of these privileges and immunities, he included nearly verbatim the canonical formulation of natural rights penned by George Mason for the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was replicated in four state constitutions. In his May 27, 1776, committee draft, Mason wrote: T[hat] all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; among which are, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.11

Mason’s description of “natural rights” are the same words used by Justice Washington in Corfield.12

It was upon similar language in Article I of the Massachusets Constitution that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts based its 1783 ruling that slavery was unconstitutional

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8. Id. at 551–52 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 551.
10. Id. at 552.
12. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52.
in that state: “All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”

If, therefore, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided federal protection to the same set of fundamental rights to which the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV refers, then these privileges or immunities include, inter alia, the natural right to “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the [natural] right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”

II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866

Data point number two: On April 9, 1866, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, officially styled as an act “to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication.” Commonly known as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the act was passed pursuant to Congress’s enumerated power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on involuntary servitude. It began by declaring “That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States . . . .” It then proceeded to guarantee that all such persons:

shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. 19

After its passage, President Andrew Johnson vetoed the bill as beyond the power of Congress to enact under the Thirteenth Amendment.20

Congress responded by overriding the veto with a supermajority vote,21 but some members were concerned about whether such a measure really was within congressional power.22 Others had a different concern. What would happen to this statutory guarantee once the Democrats from the Southern states resumed their seats in Congress? Democrats were loudly proclaiming that it was their intent to repeal the bill as soon as they got the chance.23 Who could say if they might one day have the votes to do so? In addition, what would the courts say about Congress trying to reverse, by a mere statute, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford24 denying the descendants of African slaves could ever be citizens of the United States?25

For all of these reasons, many in Congress supported a parallel effort to adopt a constitutional amendment to make the freedmen United States citizens and to protect the fundamental rights of all United States citizens from being abridged by state

19. Id. (emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 80 (1986) (describing how Representative John Bingham argued that Congress lacked the power to pass the 1866 Civil Rights Act before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 361 n.131 (2006).
25. Id. at 404 (“We think [African slaves] are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.”).
governments, as Southern states were commonly violating the rights of both freed blacks and white Republicans. Which fundamental rights were protected? At least the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act, including the rights “to make and enforce contracts, . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property”—rights that correspond to the description of natural rights by Justice Washington in *Corfield*. If it was the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that protected these rights, then these rights are among “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”

III. **Senator Jacob Howard’s Speech to Senate**

This leads us to data point number three: Senator Jacob Howard’s speech to the Senate explaining the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause during the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment. Six weeks after passing the Civil Rights Act, on May 23, 1866, Michigan Senator Jacob Howard introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate as its designated sponsor. On that day, he delivered a comprehensive and widely reported address in which he explained the meaning of the amendment.

Howard began with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which he described as “very important.” By this clause, he said, citizens of the United States “are, by constitutional right, entitled to these privileges and immunities, and may assert this right and these privileges and immunities, and ask for their

26. See Gregory E. Maggs, *A Critical Guide to Using the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment to Determine the Amendment’s Original Meaning*, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1069, 1084 (2017) (“[A]fter the Civil War, the Southern States were systematically denying civil rights to former slaves.”); see also Mark Anthony Frassetto, *The Law and Politics of Firearms Regulation in Reconstruction Texas*, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 95, 99–100 (2016) (discussing post-Civil War violence against and murders of Texan blacks and white Republicans that went largely unpunished).


enforcement whenever they go within the limits of the several States of the Union.”31 In other words, no state shall abridge the fundamental rights of a citizen of the United States. The question then becomes: What are these fundamental rights?

According to Howard, the privileges or immunities—or in his words the “fundamental guarantees”32—of United States citizenship can be found in two textual sources in the Constitution. The first source was “the privileges and immunities spoken of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution,”33 that is, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Howard noted that he was “not aware that the Supreme Court have ever undertaken to define either the nature or extent of the privileges and immunities thus guarantied.”34 Nevertheless, he said, “we may gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary by referring to a case adjudged many years ago in one of the circuit courts of the United States by Judge Washington”35—referring to our first data point: Justice Washington’s opinion in *Corfield v. Coryell*.

Howard then read “what that very learned and excellent judge says about these privileges and immunities of the citizens of each State in the several States”36 including the language I highlighted above: “protection by the Government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.”37 In his handwritten notes for his senate speech, Howard described all of these *Corfield* privileges and immunities as “these fundamental civil rights of citizens”38

31. Id.
32. Id. at 2766.
33. Id. at 2765.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
38. Handwritten Notes, Jacob Howard, Senator, U.S. Senate, Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause 3 (1866) [hereinafter Handwritten Notes] (emphasis on second word added), http://www.tifis.org/sources/Howard.pdf [http://perma.cc/V6HA-X2YK]. On page “2” of his notes, Howard discussed *Corfield*. On page “3,” which presumably originally followed immediately after page “2,” he described them as “these fundamental civil rights of citizens, whatever may be their nature or extent.” At some point in advance of his
which connects this passage of his speech to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. But Howard was not yet finished.

He then located a second source of fundamental rights: “To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution . . . .”39 After reading a list that included most of the rights listed in these amendments, Howard then summarized his understanding of these two textual sources of privileges or immunities.40 “Now, sir, here is a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of them secured by the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which I have recited, some by the first eight amendments of the Constitution . . . .”41

It is important that Howard did not indicate that these were two distinct categories of rights to be protected in different ways. For example, he did not privilege the enumerated rights in the first eight amendments at the expense of the Corfield rights. Rather, he described them all as “a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights” to which the text of the Constitution already refers.42 In addition, although he relied on the text of the Constitution for authority, he did not rely solely on the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights. The fundamental rights to which the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV refers are not themselves “enumerated” in the text.

Howard then explained that a constitutional amendment was necessary to protect all these rights because, at present, “[t]hey do not operate in the slightest degree as a restraint or prohibition upon State legislation.”43 So “[t]he great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain the

speech, Howard inserted pages “2a” and “2b”—after page 2 and before page 3—which referred to the rights in the first eight amendments.

39. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). Howard apparently added his reference to the rights in the first eight amendments as pages “2a” and “2b” of his notes. See Howard, Handwritten Notes, supra note 38.

40. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).

41. Id.

42. Id. (emphasis added).

43. Id.
power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees.”

In a speech delivered three years later, Howard offered this summary of the Privileges or Immunities Clause:

The occasion of introducing the first section of the fourteenth article of amendment into that amendment grew out of the fact that there was nothing in the whole Constitution to secure absolutely the citizens of the United States in the various States against an infringement of their rights and privileges under the second section of the fourth article of the old Constitution. That section declares that—“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.”

On this occasion, Howard did not feel the need to make special reference to the first eight amendments presumably because, along with Corfield rights, these too were among the privileges and immunities of United States citizens to which, he believed, Article IV, Section 2 referred. Chief Justice Taney had made the same assumption in Dred Scott when he wrote that Southern states would never have agreed that free blacks could be citizens of the United States, because that would entail that Article IV, Section 2 “would give them the full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”

CONCLUSION

We can summarize the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that is derived from these three key data points in a single run on sentence:

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge

(1) those privileges and immunities (a) which are, in their nature, fundamental; (b) which belong, of right, to the citi-
zens of all free governments; and (c) which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign,

(2) such as the protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, and

(3) the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property as well as

(4) the personal guarantees contained in the first eight amendments.

The idea that Congress and the federal courts can protect this “mass of privileges, immunities, and rights” from abridgment by state governments may seem like a radical proposition. And there is no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment did alter the nature of our federalism by design. But it is not nearly as radical as it sounds.

Recall that Justice Washington added that “the enjoyment of life and liberty” and “the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety” was “subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.” In other words, states have the just power to regulate the exercise of these rights—which is called the police power—provided that such regulations are actually adopted to serve an end to which legislators are competent—such as the protection of the health and safety of the public.

As Justice Bradley explained in his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, “The right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is undoubtedly a very broad and extensive one, and not to be lightly restricted,” but still, “there are certain fundamental rights which this right of regulation cannot infringe.” He then made the following distinction: “It may

47. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866).
49. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
50. Id. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
prescribe the manner of their exercise, but it cannot subvert the rights themselves.” Prescribing “the manner of their exercise” is regulation; subversion is violation and abridgment.

Under this approach, identifying the rights, privileges, or immunities of citizens is of less significance than identifying the proper basis for regulating them and ensuring a fit between a proper end and the means adopted to achieve it. After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, this was accomplished by the development of a theory of the police power of states. Evan Bernick and I discuss this theory elsewhere in great detail. But the bottom line of our analysis is that regulations are proper if they rationally relate to an end within the competence of state legislatures.

Astute readers will recognize this test as “rational basis scrutiny,” and it is what rationality review was until the New Deal Court. As the Court said in United States v. Carolene Products:

no pronouncement of a legislature can forestall attack upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act, and that a statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in judicial proceedings of all facts which would show or tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or property had a rational basis.

This type of rationality review is not the conceivable basis scrutiny that was adopted by the Warren Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., which only requires judges to imagine why a legislature “might” have restricted liberty.

52. Id.
54. See id.
55. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
56. Id. at 144 (emphases added); see also id. at 153 (“Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, and the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
58. See, e.g., id. at 487 (“The legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses.”); FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 309 (1993) (“The question before us is whether there is any conceivable ra-
Rather the traditional rationality review articulated by the Court in Carolene Products was the approach employed by the three-judge lower court panel in Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Williamson, which the Supreme Court reversed. The careful analysis conducted by that panel demonstrated that, if there is the will to restore the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause’s protection of fundamental rights, there is also a feasible way.


60. Id; see Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845 (2012).
IS THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CURE FOR
PROTECTIONISM WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?

RODERICK HILLS*

I have three points that I will try to make as quickly as possible about whether or not the federal judiciary should become involved in the effort to end state and local protectionism.

First, certainly the best view of the doctrine is that protectionism is not a legitimate state interest as an end in itself. But it is a legitimate state mechanism by which it can accomplish other ends. So you have to distinguish between protectionism as a means and protectionism as an end. That is the first point—the definitional point.

Second, and less certainly, having federal courts try to figure out whether protectionist means are actually protectionist ends is a fool’s game. It probably is a game not worth the candle because the costs of the inquiry are probably greater than the benefits. And such federal judicial efforts could conceivably lead to even worse regulation.

And third, the solution, therefore, is federalism and separation of powers. I will give a few examples of why I think Professor Todd Zywicki is absolutely wrong to say that the political process is so hopelessly infected with special interest capture that you cannot trust institutions like the Federal Trade Commission, like Governor John Kasich of Ohio, or like the SEC to deregulate and to get rid of protectionist legislation. I will give you a few examples of deregulatory innovations that have been far more effective than anything that can likely be delivered by the federal courts.

First, why do I say that protectionism is a legitimate means but not a legitimate end? This assertion requires a definition of “protectionism,” which I will stipulate is the providing of a subsidy to a private party by means of limiting competition

* William T. Comfort III Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
against that party.\textsuperscript{1} Is that sort of subsidy legitimate as a means? Of course it is. Protecting businesses with legally conferred monopolies as a way of subsidizing those businesses to serve the public interest has been used since the founding of the republic. Alexander Hamilton created the First Bank of the United States, giving it an exclusive right to serve as the federal government’s fiscal agent.\textsuperscript{2} Nicholas Biddle was president of the Second Bank of the United States.\textsuperscript{3} Both had legally protected monopolies. Every bridge company, every grist mill company, every corporation before 1838—when New York enacted the free corporation law and the free banking law—had some sort of monopoly.\textsuperscript{4} The bar association of this state and New York State and every other state enjoys a legally protected monopoly. Every zoning regulation creates noncumulative zones in which industrial users do not have to bid against residential users for the purpose of subsidizing the former with cheaper rents.\textsuperscript{5} The medallion system in New York City is a legally protected monopoly,\textsuperscript{6} and every union’s collective bargaining agreement is a legally protected monopoly.

If you are going to strike those things down, you are going to be very busy, indeed. And you will not have troops behind you, because the people you offend will greatly outnumber the people who you please, depriving you of political support. And so the notion that a federal court is going to go around striking down those protectionist devices is ludicrous. Those

\textsuperscript{1} I think that my definition is superior to the more general definition of protectionism as any effort to limit competition, even if the limits do not provide the competitors so protected with any benefit. See, e.g., Protectionism, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (desk ed. 2012) (“Protectionism is the use of tariffs, import controls, or other import regulations, or the use of subsidies in some forms, to limit foreign competition in a domestic market for goods or services.”). Implicit in the idea of protectionism, after all, is that someone is protected.

\textsuperscript{2} BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 114 (1957).

\textsuperscript{3} Id. at 291.


\textsuperscript{5} Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 249 (2010) (“[A]reas that are zoned non-cumulatively allow only manufacturing uses and bar any residential (and sometimes even commercial uses) of property.”).

protectionist devices, of course, are always justified as a means to an end. What is the end? The end is something like “protecting workers from exploitation,” or “providing a reliable fiscal agent for the United States” as a justification for the Bank of the United States, or simply, “providing a subsidy for consumer welfare.” The medallion system in New York City is an abomination, but it is justified as a way of ensuring that taxi cab drivers have revenue sufficient to “hack up”—that is to say, to spend a lot of money to bring their cabs up to the Taxi and Limousine Commission standards. The official justification for the medallion system is that we give taxis a subsidy to serve the public, not by appropriating tax money for that purpose but simply by giving them a monopoly through which they can charge higher rates. If you do not like that idea, then you must strike down the copyright and patent laws, because they use exactly the same mechanism of exchanging an exclusive right for a public benefit.

Copyright and patent laws give somebody a monopoly, usually for a limited time, in order to put money in the pockets of the copyright or patent owners so that these owners have incentive to benefit the public. Is there a deadweight cost associated with it? Of course. And my colleague here, Yaron Brook, will explain what that deadweight cost is. But you know what taxes do? They also impose a deadweight cost. Property taxes deter sales of property. Sales taxes have inefficiently discouraged sales. Income taxes have discouraged people from working. There is no way you can avoid the deadweight cost of a public subsidy except through revenue measures that are almost never used—a lump-sum head tax charged to every person regardless of their actions or inaction. Is the deadweight cost of the “monopoly tax” bad? Sure. But it is an economic question about whether it is worse than the deadweight costs of the income tax—an economic question that no judge will feel comfortable answering. At a certain level, I much prefer the medallion system than, say, another layer of absurdly structured property of taxes in New York City. And you would

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7. See id. (“By inflating fares and limiting the availability of taxis, expensive licenses likely harm taxi consumers . . . .”).

need to have a Ph.D. in economics to figure out which measure imposes more excess burden.

So as a means, protectionism is perfectly acceptable if what you mean by protectionism is a limit on competition to secure other ends. As an end in itself, however, it has always been forbidden. And this is where I disagree with Professor Paul Bender. Since long before Griswold\(^9\) and its protection of privacy, long before Brown v. Board of Education\(^10\) and its prohibition on race discrimination, the courts have always recognized that class legislation—laws that have the sole goal of taking from A to give to B—serve only a forbidden state interest.\(^11\) Such an end is forbidden either under the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause or perhaps the Privileges and Immunities Clause (the particular textual hook being practically unimportant). So it hardly is a wild innovation, to say that taking from A merely for the purpose of giving to B is forbidden by the Constitution. To say otherwise is to essentially cast doubt on virtually every interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause from the mid-nineteenth century forward. From 1868 until the turn of the twentieth century, all the major Classical Liberal constitutional treatise writers—John Dillon, Christopher Tiedeman, and Thomas Cooley—agreed that to take assets from A merely to subsidize B because you prefer B when you have no other reason in benefiting the public, is unconstitutional.\(^12\) That ban on class legislation existed

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12. See 1 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, at vii–viii (1900) (describing the purpose of the treatise as an “attempt to awaken the public mind to a full appreciation of the power of constitutional limitations to protect private rights against the radical experimentations of social reformers” who are proponents of the redistribution of private property); John F. Dillon, *Property—Its Rights and Duties in Our Legal and Social Systems*, 29 AM. L. REV. 161, 173 (1895) (“But when taxes, so-called, are imposed, not as mere revenue measures, but . . . as a means of distributing the rich man’s property among the rest of the community—this is class legislation of the most pronounced and vicious type . . . . Such schemes of pillage are . . . violative of the constitutional rights of the property owner . . . .”); Robert Allan Olender, *From Commonwealth to Constitutional Limitations: Thomas Cooley’s Michigan*, 1805–1886, at 230, SJD DISSERTATIONS (2014), https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=sjd
ons (in constitutional terms) before anybody dreamed of privacy’s being a fundamental right.

Furthermore, it is no good to say that this ban on class legislation cannot be found in the text of the Constitution. The same can be said for the prohibitions on regulation of speech and racial discrimination. Neither of these prohibitions are in the text of the Constitution as far as state governments are concerned. The First Amendment says Congress shall make no law. It is a purely non-textual inference, far younger than the inference against protectionism, that the First Amendment should be incorporated against the states. So I disagree with Professor Bender that protectionism is a legitimate state interest as an end. Protectionism has never been a legitimate state interest.

Which brings me to my second point. Can courts get rid of protectionism as an end in itself? Well, in theory, yes. But in practice, I think the game is just not worth the candle.

There are two difficulties that federal courts face in enforcing a prohibition on protectionism as an end in itself. First of all, you’re going to have to make decisions about when protectionism is a means rather than an end. And that involves casting stones, in a way that is likely to be politically polarizing in an era where we can ill afford more polarization.

Let me give you an example from my own experience. A group of N.Y.U. law professors went to the New York State Court of Appeals and said the third year of law school is a protectionist waste of money. It serves no purpose whatsoever, except to protect New York lawyers from more competition. So let the students take the law school exam in the third year, before they finish their third year of law school classes.

perma.cc/ZJW7-52MP] (“Cooley then held to principles requiring limited government that did not have the power to redistribute wealth.”).


14. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding for the first time that “[f]or present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States”).

Our effort was a dismal failure. We were roundly drowned out by the county bar associations, especially from upstate. Now, did our opponents say, well, we just cannot stand the influx of more competition? No. They said, “the third year is critical for law students’ education. How can they be confident lawyers? How can consumers be protected from poor legal counsel unless they take yet one more seminar from Professor Hills?” Now, I was flattered. But although insincere, such flattery is legally effective. The patently pretextual justification being offered in defense of the third year of law school would easily survive review in any federal court. There is zero chance that any federal court would ever strike down as unconstitutionally pretextual the third year of law school, even if we filed in a federal court a lawsuit citing Professor Zywicki’s scholarship and even got an amicus brief from him. And part of that likely response from federal judges is simply—I am going to say this in the nicest possible way, because Judge Jones is in the room—federal judges’ natural class interest. Federal judges are part of a scholarly profession the members of which expect to be swaddled in layers and layers of protective education. We require a four-year liberal arts degree in most states, in addition to three years of law school. Do you realize that by that American standard, every lawyer in Germany and, indeed, in continental Europe is unqualified to practice law, because most of them earn their law degree in an undergraduate college? If they do not need to go through four years of college unrelated to law before they earn a law degree, then why do we? Why cannot students just go right to law school as an undergraduate?

Judges are likely, in short, to tolerate obviously protectionist regulation to benefit the legal profession. How, then, can they with a straight face strike down occupational licensing for beauticians as protectionist? Of course, such licensing is obviously protectionist—but no more so than rules for bar admission. So are federal judges really entitled to draw such distinctions between different types of protectionist legislation on the ground that some such rules protect members of a scholarly profession? How could anybody not see that that drawing such distinctions is outrageous class bias? Why would we put federal judges in the position of picking and choosing among occupational licensing like that? They cannot do it and sustain their political legitimacy, and so they should not try.
Is it possible to strike down at least some very narrowly defined types of protectionist laws without engaging in such professional favoritism? Yes, but this brings me to another danger of judicial review aside from manifesting class bias: judges could actually make things worse.

It is possible for federal judges to strike down laws so underinclusive in their pursuit of non-protectionist ends that those ends are plainly pretextual. My favorite example is provided by the judge for whom I had the honor of clerking, Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. He is a great judge, was a great lawyer, and wrote a great opinion in *St. Joseph’s Abbey.*¹⁶ *St. Joseph’s Abbey* held that no conceivable non-protectionist purpose could be attributed to a state law regulation that required casket sellers to be licensed funeral home directors.¹⁷ Why could not the state law be justified as a way to insure that casket sellers were properly trained to serve customers buying caskets? The funeral homes argued that people who purchase caskets need grievance counseling to make sure they do not make a rash decision in a very vulnerable moment of grief. The problem with this argument, however, was that the state licensing scheme for funeral home directors did not require them to be trained in grievance counseling. The underinclusive character of the law branded the law’s non-protectionist purpose as obviously pretextual.

But, of course, striking down laws because their underinclusive nature indicates pretext gives lawmakers an incentive to make such laws less underinclusive. *St. Joseph’s Abbey* incentivized state lawmakers seeking to benefit state funeral home directors to require funeral home directors to undergo grievance counseling, for instance. Eliminating underinclusiveness, however, simply makes such laws even more expansive and inefficient, by layering on extraneous educational or other licensing requirements. Let me give you an example from New York, my last example. And then of course, I will end with a moral of the story, which is blessedly brief.

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¹⁷. *id.* at 226.
In New York City, we have noncumulative industrial zones.\textsuperscript{18} That is to say, you can only have manufacturing in these zones. You cannot have residential or commercial uses. You cannot have hotels. You cannot have all sorts of uses that don’t impose any harm such as noise or excessive traffic or odors on anyone. Now, what justification is offered for these zones? Well, the usual justification in New York City is that such noncumulative zones provide cheap land for manufacturing, and manufacturing provides good union jobs.\textsuperscript{19} If you don’t have residential real estate developers bidding on the lots in noncumulative zones, the elimination of bidders radically lowers the prices of the lots, allowing manufacturers to use the land.

One could imagine an argument that such laws are too underinclusive to be justified as bona fide means for protecting union jobs, because manufacturers do not have to provide good union jobs as a condition for enjoying the benefits of land exclusively zoned for manufacturing. Actually, many of these manufacturing jobs in New York City stink. Warehouses count as manufacturing uses in these zones, but warehouse workers need not be unionized.\textsuperscript{20} Striking down noncumulative manufacturing zones because they are underinclusive, however, just encourages the City Council to amend the Zoning Resolution to permit only unionized industrial uses in these zones, an amendment that would make these zones even more obstructive to sensible land use. The dilapidated industrial zones that used to plague New York City’s waterfront, before Mayor Bloomberg’s Administration rezoned them, would be all over the place and there would not be anything in them, because permitted uses would have to be not only industrial but also unionized.

\textsuperscript{18} Hills & Schleicher, \textit{supra} note 5, at 250 (“Since 1961, the city’s zoning resolution has barred residential uses from manufacturing zones, and 30 percent of the city’s shoreline is presently zoned for industrial use.”).

\textsuperscript{19} Id. at 251.

So I really think there are grave dangers to federal judges getting involved in this area, because judicial review is likely affected by class bias and because review for underinclusiveness encourages even more burdensome regulation. But fortunately, the moral of the story—this is my third and final point—is that there are other institutions that can be involved. Rather than rely on federal judges, consider relying on federal agencies, state politicians, and even state courts.

Federal agencies play an important deregulatory role. St. Joseph’s Abbey critically relied on Federal Trade Commission regulations. The FTC has already eliminated many of the most outrageous protectionist funeral home practices. Likewise, between 1975 and 1980 the federal government deregulated brokers, truckers, airlines, and telecommunications—all through initiatives from people who were chairing agencies allegedly captured by the industry. Apart from federal agencies, one can rely on state politicians. Governor John Kasich has, for instance, launched as one of his last initiatives a major effort to limit occupational licensing. Governor Kasich’s reform requires that the state must check out the commissions that provide these monopolies every six years and decommission them.

Sometimes critics of agencies claim that they are inevitably captured by the industries that they regulate. This is untrue. My father, in fact, was chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission at the time that the SEC undertook a major initiative to deregulate brokers’ commissions. So the idea that, somehow, agencies cannot deregulate industries because they will be captured by those industries strikes me as false: Dad was never captured by the brokers.

Assume, however, that you think that my dad was captured by the brokerage industry: why do you think federal judges are 21. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of America’s Infrastructure, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1151, 1179 (2012); Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 325 n.2 (1990).


not going to be captured? If you distrust the political process because of the influence of regulated businesses on politicians, then it strikes me as ludicrous to rely on federal judges as our salvation, because judges are appointed by politicians.

So trust in politics. We have federalism and separation of powers for many reasons; one of which is that they can be used to solve many of these problems that centralized judicial review is not well suited to solving. I think, at the margin, the federal courts probably will not reduce protectionist laws very much and might make them a lot worse by making them more consistent. Because federal courts have to accept protectionism as a means and cannot practically distinguish between means and ends, their efforts to strike down underinclusive means may very likely induce lawmakers to amend the law to make them more inclusive—and that could make the regulations even worse than they already are.

Thanks.
My presentation will focus on civil asset forfeiture, which is the law enforcement seizure of private property suspected of involvement in criminal activity and the use of civil or administrative proceedings to forfeit such property to the government. Typically, the actions are brought against the property in rem rather than against the owner in personam, which, combined with the civil classification, allows the government to dispense with a number of rights that are typically provided to defendants in criminal proceedings.

Over the years, this type of forfeiture has generated a series of troubling cases. Let me tell you about one such incident, the case of poor Tina Bennis. One evening, her husband, John Bennis, failed to return home as expected, prompting his worried wife to call a missing persons line. As it turned out, Tina’s husband had gone on a forbidden frolic. Police officers had observed a woman flagging down motorists from a street corner until John stopped to pick her up. Further surveillance found the two involved in a sex act, and John Bennis was subsequently convicted of gross indecency.
For Tina, it was bad enough that she had been betrayed by her husband, caught with a prostitute in the family car.9 But then law enforcement sought to take Tina Bennis’s secondhand 1977 Pontiac—a car purchased primarily through Tina’s babysitting earnings—because it was the site of her husband’s illicit sex act.10 To the state courts, it did not matter that Tina was patently innocent, as the relevant statute did not require any showing with respect to her knowledge of criminal activity.11

In a 1996 case, Bennis v. Michigan,12 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Tina’s claim that the forfeiture of her interest in the car was unconstitutional in light of her acknowledged innocence.13 While recognizing the considerable appeal of Ms. Bennis’s claim, the Court reasoned that, “a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner’s interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use.”14 In effect, the Court placed its imprimatur on a type of strict vicarious liability where an innocent individual can be penalized for the wrongs of someone else. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that “[t]he logic of the Court’s analysis would permit the States to exercise virtually unbridled power to confiscate vast amounts of property.”15

As it turns out, the long line of cases referenced by the Bennis majority was based on, among other things, the ancient common law fiction of “deodand,” the idea that property itself can be guilty.16 In a 1974 case, the Supreme Court described this history as follows:

At common law the value of an inanimate object directly or indirectly causing the accidental death of a King’s subject was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand. The origins of the deodand are traceable to Biblical and pre-Judeo-Christian

9. Id.
10. Bennis, 516 U.S. at 443–45; Brief for Petitioner at 2, Bennis, 516 U.S. 442 (No. 94-8729).
11. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d. at 495.
13. Id. at 443.
14. Id. at 446.
15. Id. at 458 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. See id. at 472 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
practices, which reflected the view that the instrument of
death was accused and that religious expiation was re-
quired. The value of the instrument was forfeited to the
King, in the belief that the King would provide the money
for Masses to be said for the good of the dead man’s soul, or
insure that the deodand was put to charitable uses.17

Under the deodand fiction, the property—not the property
owner—is considered liable.18 Now, I am a fan of history as
much as anyone in this room, but judicial reliance on this par-
ticular fiction offers a dubious historical rationale for forfeiture
law in the United States. After all, the English Crown’s passion
for seizing property caused American colonists to view forfei-
ture with great suspicion.19

Worse yet, the deodand fiction allows forfeitures to be char-
acterized as civil remedies rather than criminal penalties. La-
beling forfeitures as civil in nature certainly promotes govern-
ment expedience by freeing the state from the substantial bur-
burdens of typical criminal cases. Forfeiture proceedings need
not provide property owners many of the constitutional guar-
antees afforded criminal defendants,20 including, for instance,
the right to counsel and the protection against double jeop-
ardy.21

Perhaps the most important consequences stem from dis-
pensing with individual culpability and the government’s obli-
gation to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.22 With re-
spect to culpability, as the Bennis decision showed, it is
acceptable to hold a property owner strictly liable for the acts
of others.23 As for the burden of proof, forfeiture statutes histor-
ically provided a mere preponderance of the evidence as the

omitted) (citation omitted).
19. See James R. Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law—Banished at Last?, 62
20. Note, How Crime Pays: The Unconstitutionality of Modern Civil Asset Forfeiture
as a Tool of Criminal Law Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2395–96 (2018) [here-
inafter How Crime Pays].
21. Id. at 2395.
22. Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83 J.
legal standard. To be clear, many of the property owners targeted may, in fact, have been guilty of a crime. But some have done nothing more than carry a lot of cash while traveling through a particularly pro-forfeiture jurisdiction.

None of this is to say that individual law enforcement officers are the problem—almost to a person, police and prosecutors are well-intentioned public servants who are trying to do their best to promote public safety. Instead, the issue is one of incentive structures of a government institution, encouraging federal, state, and local agencies to confiscate billions of dollars in cash, cars, jewelry, real estate, and other private property over the past several decades through the practice of civil asset forfeiture.

Many statutes allow law enforcement agencies to keep all—or a substantial portion—of those proceeds, a practice that is now described as “policing for profit” and has resulted in the vast increase in forfeitures. As detailed in a study by the Institute for Justice, the U.S. Department of Justice took in $93.7 million

27. See John W. Huber, Opinion, Civil forfeiture is a useful tool in fighting crime, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/opinion/commentary/2018/09/30/commentary-civil/ [https://perma.cc/V2M2-4DP7].
29. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(e) (2012) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of the law . . . the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service, as the case may be, is authorized to retain property forfeited pursuant to this section . . . .”).
from federal forfeitures in 1986. Three decades later, that number climbed to $4.5 billion in forfeitures. In fact, between 2001 and 2014, the Justice Department and the Treasury Department combined to take in almost $29 billion through the forfeiture program.

Information from individual states is a little more difficult to come by, but the same Institute for Justice report found that fourteen jurisdictions had a combined forfeiture revenue of more than $250 million in 2013. Interestingly, state and local law enforcement sometimes work with the federal government to forfeit property. Through a process known as equitable sharing, the federal government can “adopt the seizure” made by state and local officials and then seek to forfeit those proceeds back to the seizing agency through federal law—thus avoiding state and local laws that might be more restrictive than their federal analogs. The federal government takes a cut of those proceeds and gives the rest back to the relevant law enforcement agency.

All this forfeited property can distort police behavior. By allowing agencies to keep the property they seize, law enforcement can circumvent the processes of legislative budgeting and thereby avoid a primary check wielded by state and local law-enforcement agencies. This type of forfeiture can also encourage police misconduct and lead to the unethical behavior of officers.

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32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 11 (compiling criminal forfeiture data from Arizona, California, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington).
35. Id. at 25.
36. See Jefferson E. Holcomb, Tomislav V. Kovandzic & Marian R. Williams, Civil asset forfeiture, equitable sharing, and policing for profit in the United States, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 273, 274 (2011); see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 30, at 51–52.
37. Holcomb et al., supra note 36, at 274.
makers.\textsuperscript{40} This self-funding, as Professor Beth Colgan has written, allows law enforcement agencies to set priorities that counter or impede the goals of those democratically elected officials.\textsuperscript{41} On a tangible level, the financial gain from civil asset forfeiture may encourage police departments to shift their practices, as is best seen in the war on drugs.\textsuperscript{42} Rather than the conventional drug sting, where an undercover officer poses as a potential buyer of drugs, law enforcement now frequently opts for “reverse stings,” where the undercover officers act as drug dealers who can then seize and seek to forfeit the cash they obtain during the controlled drug buy.\textsuperscript{43}

In a somewhat similar fashion, law enforcement agencies have admitted to focusing their interdiction efforts on the southbound lanes of freeways rather than the northbound lanes.\textsuperscript{44} Why, you ask? Well, drug traffickers heading north will


\textsuperscript{41} Beth A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, CRIMINOLOGY CRIM. JUST. L. \\& SOC’Y, Dec. 2017, at 22, 24 (“Allowing law enforcement and prosecutors to retain funds . . . set[s] priorities that may contradict or interfere with crime-control aims of the legislative branch or the public at large.”); see also Nick Sibilla, Civil Forfeiture Now Requires A Criminal Conviction In Montana And New Mexico, FORBES (July 2, 2015, 8:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2015/07/02/civil-forfeiture-now-requires-a-criminal-conviction-in-montana-and-new-mexico/#62aca9d45ee3 [http://perma.cc/5H35-DU65].

\textsuperscript{42} Benson, supra note 40, at 306–07 (“[L]aw enforcement agencies focused more resources on drug control because of the financial gains for the agencies arising from forfeitures. . . . [A]gencies focus on confiscations as opposed to criminal convictions . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{43} See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 30, at 67 (“The shift in law enforcement priorities, from crime control to funding raids, is perhaps best revealed by the advent of the ‘reverse sting,’ a now common police tactic that rarely was used before the law began channeling forfeited assets to those who seized them.”); see also J. Mitchell Miller & Lance H. Selva, Drug Enforcement’s Double-Edged Sword: An Assessment of Asset Forfeiture Programs, 11 JUST. Q. 313, 325 (1994) (“This strategy [reverse stings] was preferred by every agency and department . . . because it allowed agents to gauge potential profit before investing a great deal of time and effort.”).

\textsuperscript{44} See Richard Miniter, Ill-Gotten Gains, REASON, Aug. 1993, at 34 (quoting former New York City Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy that police have “a financial incentive to impose roadblocks on the southbound lanes of I-95, which carry the cash to make drug buys, rather than the northbound lanes, which carry the drugs. After all, seized cash will end up forfeited to the police department, while seized drugs can only be destroyed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
be carrying drugs for distribution while those heading south will be in possession of cash proceeds from the drug sales.\(^45\) For law enforcement, any seized drugs must be destroyed, but the cash may be kept pursuant to forfeiture proceedings.\(^46\) More generally, as Professor Colgan and others have argued, the financial benefit from seizing and forfeiting cash and property related to the drug trade may encourage law enforcement to prioritize drug crimes, both big and small, over crimes of violence.\(^47\) This, in turn, may undermine public safety and the community’s belief in the legitimacy of law enforcement efforts.\(^48\)

Let me close on a positive note: in the new millennium, civil asset forfeiture has been an area of sustained bipartisan reforms.\(^49\) A majority of U.S. jurisdictions have modified their forfeiture statutes.\(^50\) A few states have abolished civil asset forfeiture altogether,\(^51\) while others now require criminal convictions to precede any civil asset forfeiture actions.\(^52\) Other states have raised the burden of proof in civil asset forfeiture.\(^53\) Here in Arizona, for instance, the burden of proof was increased

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46. Minter, supra note 44, at 34.

47. See Colgan, supra note 41, at 24.


51. Id. at 9.

52. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11470.1(c) (West Supp. 2020); see also Anne Teigen & Lucia Bragg, Evolving Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES LEGISBRIEF, Feb. 2018, at 2, https://www.ncsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=F0TZDb4j1Ys%3d&tabid=32059&portalId=1 [https://perma.cc/MW4Z-BFZ7].

53. SNEAD, supra note 50, at 5–7.
from preponderance of the evidence to the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. Today, most jurisdictions have also adopted an innocent owner defense, with some shifting the burden of proof to the government when property owners raise claims of innocence.

In addition, some jurisdictions provide a degree of transparency through law enforcement reporting requirements for seizures and forfeitures. A handful of jurisdictions have also passed laws limiting the practice of equitable sharing, at least when it is done by the process of adoption by federal law enforcement. A few jurisdictions, such as New Mexico, require that the forfeiture proceeds go to the state’s general fund rather than to the seizing agency, thereby blunting much of the incentive to police for profit.

All told, however, most jurisdictions have charted a middle course, adding some procedural protections for property owners while retaining civil asset forfeiture as a tool for law enforcement. But if nothing else, the people and their governments are trying to strike a balance in this area, which I believe to be a worthwhile endeavor.

Thank you for having me. I’m going to be talking about non-forfeiture economic sanctions and just to make sure we are all on the same page, I am going to give a quick overview of the basic types of economic sanctions that are most prevalently used around the country.

So, obviously, a statutory fine is the most common type of economic sanction, although we also have what are called surcharges in many jurisdictions. Surcharges are essentially fines on top of fines that are typically targeted at particular funds. For example, if you are ticketed for a traffic violation, you might pay a surcharge to fund night court, to fund teen court, or to fund public services like public parks. Often, a surcharge funds things that have literally nothing to do with the criminal justice system.

In addition to those fines and surcharges, there is a common use of administrative fees, sometimes called user fees. For example, you might have to pay more if you opt for a jury trial, you might have to pay for the cost of your pretrial incarceration.

* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.


2. Id.


5. See Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 3, at 35–36.

6. See Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, supra note 1, at 286.
tion, or you might have to pay for your post-conviction incarceration.\textsuperscript{7} You might have to pay for things like—and this one usually surprises people—the cost of the public defender you only qualify for because you are too indigent to pay.\textsuperscript{8} As a result, these fees get tacked on and add up, and at times can surpass the amount of the fine in question.\textsuperscript{9}

Another type of economic sanction that is in use in some but not all cases is victim restitution,\textsuperscript{10} which has a very different purpose that creates some interesting policy and constitutional questions that I'm happy to talk about.

Taken together, those are the general forms of economic sanctions we use. And we use them at all levels of cases, from traffic and low-level ordinance violations all the way up to the most serious of felonies. And we use them in juvenile courts as a form of punishment as well.\textsuperscript{11}

What happens if you cannot pay economic sanctions? For those who cannot pay immediately, the consequences can result in more debt. Oftentimes you have to pay collections costs and interest costs, and in many jurisdictions you have to pay a fee to be set up on a payment plan.\textsuperscript{12} There can be additional fees if you cannot pay in the form that is preferred. If you are late on a payment, the fees may be so high that it effectively doubles the principal at stake.\textsuperscript{13} There are also other sanctions that can occur if you are unable to pay immediately. Your pro-

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\textsuperscript{8} See Colgan, \textit{Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause}, supra note 1, at 286–87; see also Helen A. Anderson, \textit{P}

\textsuperscript{9} See Colgan, \textit{Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause}, supra note 1, at 286, 288–89.

\textsuperscript{10} Id. at 285.


\textsuperscript{12} Colgan, \textit{Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause}, supra note 1, at 288–91.

\textsuperscript{13} Id. at 289, 291.
\end{flushleft}
bation and parole might be extended and therefore the fees accompanying being on probation and parole increase as well. You may lose your driver’s license in many states, which has serious repercussions for people’s financial well-being. In some places, if you have been disenfranchised because of the nature of the conviction, the inability to vote is extended because you cannot pay. In many places, the response to non-payment is incarceration.

Now, all of those responses are arguably, and in some cases flatly, unconstitutional, but they are very prevalent across the United States.

The reality is that many people cannot pay. To give you a picture of what we are talking about here, the 2017 Supplemental Poverty Measure showed that fourteen percent of people in the United States are living below the federal poverty line. Even if they are earning minimum wage, in most states the minimum wage rate is so low that even adjusted for the earned income tax credit, a family of three would be unable to meet their basic needs.

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14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-62 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-915 (Supp. 2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (Supp. 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-702(3) (Supp. 2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 559.100 (2016); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 420.10(3) (McKinney Supp. 2019); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.03(a) (West 2018).


17. Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55 (2019); Karin Martin & Anne Stuhldreher, These people have been barred from voting today because they’re in debt, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/08/they-served-their-time-but-many-ex-offenders-cant-vote-if-they-still-owe-fines/ [https://perma.cc/SA7C-FLBA].


19. See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text.


the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017 is that about a quarter of adults cannot pay their monthly bills, so they are skipping things like basic necessities, food, housing, hygiene, etc. About a quarter are skipping necessary medical needs, so they are not able to access medication or other types of care. Nearly half of adults in the United States—four out of ten—would be unable to pay an unexpected $400 expense without having to either sell off personal property or take out loans. Because nine million households in the United States are unbanked, that means going to more expensive options like payday loans. If you cannot pay, you end up in a Kafkaesque position—costs continue to stack up pushing you further into a hole and the cycle of not being able to pay and the risks that creates continues on.

This is particularly difficult for people with felony convictions or who are returning from periods of incarceration. Now, why might that be? You heard in the last panel a little bit about occupational licensing restrictions. In many states, one of the collateral consequences of a conviction is restrictions on occupational licensing. For instance, you might not be able to

23. Id. at 23.
24. Id. at 21.
25. Id. at 25.
26. Id.
get a driver’s license that allows you to operate commercial vehicles, you might not be able to become a barber, and you might not be able to engage in all sorts of occupations that have literally nothing to do with the crime of conviction. In many jurisdictions, that marginalization continues until you complete your sentence. Therefore, if you can’t complete probation and parole because you can’t pay off the economic sanctions that are a condition of your probation and parole, you are still excluded from the economy.

Of course, there are also other limitations on occupations for people coming out of incarceration, including straightforward employer reluctance to hire. But also employer reluctance may be in part because in many states, one of the collection mechanisms is garnishment, which creates another hurdle because employers have to deal with the administrative hassle of garnishment processes. Of course, this is particularly bad for

35. See, e.g., BANNON ET AL., supra note 15, at 11, 27 (mentioning garnishment as a collection tool for criminal justice debt); Randall J. Groendyk, Garnishments: A
people of color who are more likely to be returning to communities with stagnant economies.36

There are strong arguments that the imposition of unmanageable criminal debt is incompatible with criminal justice goals in the United States. One of the main goals of criminal justice is equality in sentencing.37 But one of the things we know is that in the context of economic sanctions, we’re effectively punishing not just the individual who committed the offense, but the entire family. It is often family members who are paying the debt rather than the person who was incarcerated.38 If you are incarcerated, if you are lucky enough to be able to get a job in prison—which is not true for most people—your wages could be cents per hour.39 That’s not going to make much of a dent in these kinds of bills, and so families end up paying. It’s not obvious that we’re getting to the criminal justice goal that people convicted of the same offense should be treated equally if people who haven’t been convicted at all are paying.

Another criminal justice goal is deterrence. There are some studies that investigate the effect of recidivism with respect to the use of fines. As a general matter, what we see is that this research indicates that the imposition of higher rates of economic

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37. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, *Race and Gender as Explicit Sentencing Factors*, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 127 (2010) (positing that the United States has a commitment to equality in sentencing regardless of a defendant’s race or gender).


sanctions or imposition of sanctions beyond a manageable amount leads to recidivism. That result is found in studies that aren’t attending to just unmanageable sanctions, but the use of economic sanctions overall. For example, a recent study analyzing the use of economic sanctions in juvenile court found that both imposing restitution and increasing the overall sanction amounts contributed to recidivism. The study also found that the continuation of the debt beyond the scope of the juvenile court—because in many jurisdictions the debt rolls over into adulthood even if you can otherwise not be under juvenile court jurisdiction—significantly contributed to later recidivism.

A few additional recent studies, based on self-reporting, focus on people with unmanageable criminal debt. What these studies show is that a significant percentage of people are engaging in criminal activity for the specific purpose of paying past criminal debt. This usually involves crimes like drug sales, prostitution, and theft. It is not unsurprising that, in many cases, unmanageable criminal debt is criminogenic because of the consequences I was talking about earlier. It makes it less likely that you’re going to have a driver’s license that allows you to drive to work, it makes it less likely you’ll be employed, it makes it less likely that you’ll have housing, and it

40. See COLGAN, supra note 27, at 9–11 (summarizing research on the implications of economic sanctions for deterrence).
42. Id.
44. ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR LAW & JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 43, at 31.
45. See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.
even interrupts family connections. That is all criminogenic; studies routinely tie those circumstances to increased recidivism.46

One note of caution about relying on deterrence is that, as a theory, deterrence depends on the concept that people are making a choice about whether or not to behave within the confines of the law. But many of the offenses that we are talking about here are crimes of poverty.47 A common punitive response, for instance, to people who are sleeping outdoors because they’re homeless, and therefore are convicted of trespass is a fine. The idea that that person had the choice not to engage in the criminal activity is illusory. This undermining of deterrence and all of these other problems I’ve discussed create a massive problem with respect to system legitimacy.48 This, of course, blew up in the public consciousness after Ferguson,49 but the idea that there are municipal and county and state governments that prize revenue generation over fairness in the criminal justice system has legitimacy consequences, both for people who are criminal justice involved and the broader community.50 Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, we’ve seen a bipartisan pushback to these kinds of practices.51


48. Colgan, supra note 27, at 11.


50. See Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 3, at 57–61.

51. Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 53, 60 n.46 (2017) [hereinafter Graduating Economic Sanctions] (docu-
At the same time, we’re seeing that many municipalities and even state governments are dependent on these economic sanctions for funding all kinds of public services.\footnote{See, e.g., Mike Maciag, \textit{Addicted to Fines: Small towns in much of the country are dangerously dependent on punitive fines and fees}, \textit{GOVERNING} (Sept. 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addicted-to-fines.html [https://perma.cc/5P2Y-K3UZ].} Interestingly, even cities that are not particularly dependent—in other words, that the money generated does not make up a significant part of their budget—heavily employ economic sanctions. One recent study has shown that the use of economic sanctions increases along with the percentage of the community that’s African American.\footnote{Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, \textit{Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation and Exploitative Revenue Sources}, 79 J. Pol. 1090, 1090 (2017).}

What about outside of the criminal justice system? What are the consequences of these practices? Well, as I mentioned, there’s decreased economic stability for both debtors and their families.\footnote{See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.} There have been, for instance, studies that suggest that these practices result in decreased child support payments.\footnote{See \textit{Rachel L. McLean & Michael D. Thompson, Council of State Gov’ts Justice Ctr., Repaying Debts} 2 (2007), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/repaying_debts_summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNM9-RJWG]; see also Tonya L. Brito, \textit{Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families}, 15 J. Gender Race & Just. 617, 645 (2012) (discussing how incarceration, penalties, and fees lead to an accumulation of child support arrearages that are inevitably not paid off).} There is also a recent study in Alabama that showed that eighty-three percent of the respondents had to skip basic needs for themselves and their families.\footnote{\textit{ALA. Appleseed Ctr. for Law & Justice et al., supra} note 43, at 4.} All of this, of course, affects credit records, which, in turn, makes it harder to find stable housing and employment, trapping people and their families in a cycle of punishment and poverty.\footnote{\textit{Bannon et al.}, supra note 15, at 27; Applebaum, \textit{supra} note 34.}

There are all of these problems with this system, and so we need to think about solutions and I’m going to throw a handful of both policy and constitutional law issues out, and if you want to talk about these things in Q and A, I’m happy to do so.
The first one I think you’re going to love and it’s raise taxes. Now, I know, I know, you’ve let a progressive into the room, and this is what happens. Okay, so here’s the deal: we have grossly underfunded our court systems, our law enforcement, our prosecutors, and especially our public defenders over time. That has real consequences including that there are no attorneys in the room to make the kinds of constitutional arguments I’m going to talk about in a moment. Now, one way to begin fixing these problems is to raise taxes—that’s just the honest answer. And keep in mind, these economic sanctions are regressive taxes.

Of course, if fewer things were crimes, then we would have fewer expenses related to collections of criminal debt, incarceration, probation, and parole. So another potential reform is legalization. And I’m not just talking about marijuana; there are all sorts of crimes on the books that are arguably more about social control than public safety. We have to talk about that.


59. See John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2011, at 18; see also Maura Dolan & Victoria Kim, Budget cuts to worsen court delays; Extended waits for suits to reach court, longer custody fights and lengthy traffic ticket battles are seen, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2011, at A1.

60. See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text.


We need to talk about graduating economic sanctions according to ability to pay.63 Now, this is something that’s increasingly used.64 I’m happy to talk about institutional design,65 but it’s something that people on the right are really getting behind. So, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), for example, passed a resolution not long ago calling for this policy response.66

We can talk about things like reforming collateral consequences, including through strict limitations on occupational and driver’s license restrictions that I was talking about earlier.67

We need to have a conversation about the scope of probation and parole. In the last panel, the panelists were talking about arbitrary bureaucracy.68 If you want arbitrary bureaucracy, you should look at the way probation and parole are managed in the United States.69 If any of you are looking for a law review comment to write, present a conservative approach to reforming that practice. That would be incredible.


65. See Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions, supra note 51, at 73–103 (discussing key institutional design concerns including artificial inflation, consideration of income sources, and statutory maximum caps).

66. Resolution on Criminal Justice Fines and Fees, AM. LEGIS. EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/resolution-on-criminal-justice-fines-and-fees [https://perma.cc/DVR9-LRA9] (“Therefore Be It Resolved that when imposing fines and fees the offender’s ability to pay should be taken into account as one factor . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).

67. See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.

68. See supra note 28.

We also need to talk about alternative methods of responding to what are now criminal justice issues. We don’t have to incarcerate everyone, we don’t have to put everyone on probation and parole, and we don’t have to fine people into poverty. There are alternative responses, and I’m happy to talk about some examples of that in Q and A.

Now, one of the problems here is because of the economic dependence that many lawmakers have on these practices, they may not be willing to move forward without a push and so that’s where constitutional litigation can come in. I’m just going to tell you about, without detail, four quick arguments you could make that, again, I’m happy to talk about in the Q and A.

One claim is based on a series of due process cases dating back to the 1920s that say that it is a violation of due process for the judge that is imposing the economic sanction to have a conflict of interest. In other words, where judges are dependent either for their own purposes—their own salary—or to fund the courts generally. That’s what’s happening in many of these jurisdictions.

There’s also a longstanding case from the 1980s, Bearden v. Georgia, which is a combined equal protection and due process case that makes it flatly unconstitutional to incarcerate someone for nonpayment when they have no ability to pay unless there is no other way for the state to satisfy its penal interest. That is a high bar, so in nearly all cases, if we’re revoking or extending the terms of probation or parole or incarcerating someone for nonpayment, that is just unconstitutional.

There are also Excessive Fines Clause arguments, which would be arguments made at sentencing. I’m sure you all saw

70. See, e.g., DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO REPAIR (2019); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003).
74. Id. at 672–73.
75. Id.
76. U.S. CONST. amend VIII; Colgan, Challenging the Modern Debtors’ Prison, supra note 3, at 2.
about Timbs v. Indiana, where the Excessive Fines Clause was just incorporated against the states thanks to the good work of the Institute for Justice. There are all sorts of issues there including that the states are now trying to reverse progress made under the Excessive Fines Clause regarding civil asset forfeiture. But there are also other questions, such as does ability to pay matter for the excessiveness inquiry. Again, I’m happy to talk about those things.

All of this really also comes down to the right to counsel, which is currently under attack by some of the Justices on the Supreme Court. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply if only fines or forfeitures are at issue. That doesn’t mean that the right couldn’t be extended. But if there’s no attorney in the room to preserve issues for appeal, that question or any other constitutional issue doesn’t get to the Supreme Court, and so that’s a real problem here.

The last thing I’ll say is the Constitution is a floor and not a ceiling. One of the things that we’ve seen in a lot of conservative states recently is a push for statutory right to counsel, as opposed to a constitutional right to counsel, in order to make sure that these kinds of claims can be preserved and that people are treated fairly in the system. Some conservative lawmakers are taking the lead on that, and I hope to see that work extend further.

I’ll end there.

77. 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
78. Id. at 687; see Timbs v. Indiana: There are Limits: IJ Takes Excessive Fines Case to the U.S. Supreme Court, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case/timbs-v-indiana/ [https://perma.cc/7UKQ-LAZA] (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
When first asked to participate on a panel about “economic crimes,” I thought I was not really equipped to opine on criminal law since I spend my time in court litigating civil cases to protect constitutional rights. Then I thought a little more about the types of cases I had been working on. I realized, quite to my dismay, that I am qualified to discuss criminal law because I have observed our governments at all levels engaging in a disturbing trend of criminalizing innocuous, peaceful economic activities, simply because those activities involve the exchange of money.

I will discuss a local and a federal example of these attacks on economic liberty. At the local level, cities across the nation are turning responsible homeowners into criminals, simply for renting out their homes to overnight guests. Home sharing, often facilitated via platforms like Airbnb or HomeAway, involves hosts opening their homes to overnight guests in exchange for money. You might think of it as a short-term rental or vacation rental. Despite technology making this practice more apparent and prevalent today, it has actually existed since the country’s Founding.

People have allowed overnight guests to stay in their homes for centuries—sometimes in exchange for money, but also in exchange for chores, meals, or other work or goods. This gives
homeowners additional money, which they can use to pay their bills or make improvements to their homes. It also gives travelers a wider variety of options in terms of price, location, and style of housing, and it allows them to experience local communities more intimately. The only thing that has changed between the Founding period and today is the burst of technology that has allowed homeowners and visitors to use online platforms to communicate. This development has made the practice of home sharing easier than ever before. This practice is also more accountable than ever before because all parties have access to more information. For instance, it is easier than ever for renters or neighbors who have a bad experience to leave feedback. Further, homeowners can be more selective about who stays in their homes, and they are able to make sure that those people are knowledgeable about local laws.

Cities, however, are responding to the growth in home sharing in a very different way. Rather than welcoming this economic activity, officials are instead imposing draconian new rules on this long-established practice. It has always been legal to allow an overnight guest to stay in your home for free, to let a friend to sleep on your couch, to have house sitters, or to have someone stay in your home and take care of your pets while you are out of town. However, in a growing number of cities, it is now not just illegal, but in many jurisdictions it is an


actual crime, to rent your home short term in exchange for money.\(^8\)

These cities treat home sharing itself as the crime—regardless of whether a particular guest is causing any kind of nuisance like making excessive noise, littering the yard with trash, or parking where they should not.\(^9\) These are very difficult laws for cities to enforce.\(^10\) Of course, the reason for that difficulty is the exact reason why the practice should not be a crime—although there are occasional problems with short-term rentals (as is true of long-term rentals, or owner-occupied homes), most of the time there are not. Usually, neighbors cannot tell whether somebody is renting their home to a short-term renter because the guest uses that home for a residential use—in the same manner a homeowner or long-term renter would—and goes about his business in a residential way. Unless the guest causes a disturbance, neighbors usually do not have reason to know whether somebody is staying in that home in a short-term manner (and thus violating the law) or a long-term manner (and is not). Therefore, cities have a difficult time enforcing these laws outside of the very small number of instances where occupants are actually causing nuisances (and thus are already violating other laws), so they have to resort to drastic measures.\(^11\) And cities get away with such extreme actions because anti-home-sharing laws are laws prohibiting economic activity. Law schools teach students that, in the eyes of courts, economic rights are not really rights at all.\(^12\) Courts are

\(^8\). See, e.g., PACIFIC GROVE, CAL., MUN. CODE § 7.40.140 (2019); CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 13-44(a) (2019); ARLINGTON, VA., CTY. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 64-12 (2011); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.600.130 (2019).

\(^9\). Supra note 8.


\(^11\). See Associated Press, supra note 10.

willing to rubber stamp infringements on economic rights, treating them more like mere privileges and permissions from the government.\footnote{13}

This problem is compounded when cities impose massive fines on anyone who violates these anti-home-sharing laws. The City of Miami Beach, which was founded on tourism\footnote{14} and depends on tourism as its lifeblood, has decided to outlaw and criminalize the renting of one’s home to short-term overnight guests in almost every place in the city.\footnote{15} If you violate that law and have somebody stay in your home overnight, you can be fined up to $100,000 per night.\footnote{16} This is not an overnight guest who is causing any sort of problem—the violation is simply that you’ve let somebody stay in your home overnight. A fee for home sharing just a few nights could quickly add up to the entire value of a host’s home.

Cities look at this as a way to increase revenue,\footnote{17} and it is a win-win for them because they get to outlaw the activity and also intimidate residents into giving up their property rights because of the serious consequences. And then, of course, city governments get to pocket the money (if they’re actually able to recover it—many people owe the City of Miami Beach large sums of money and are unable to pay it\footnote{18}). These people will eventually lose their homes and their livelihoods because the city is going to go after them for those unpaid fines.\footnote{19}

This is not only abhorrent public policy—it is also unconstitutional. My colleagues at the Goldwater Institute are challenging these excessive fines in Florida state court under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Constitution of the State of Florida.\footnote{20} Many

\footnote{13. See id.}
\footnote{15. MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 142-905(b)(5), 142-1111 (2019).}
\footnote{16. Id.}
\footnote{17. Kristine Phillips, A Florida woman was fined $100,000 for a dirty pool and overgrown grass. When do fines become excessive?, USA TODAY (July 22, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/politics/2019/07/19/florida-city-hits-homeowners-massive-penalties-supreme-court-excessive-fines/1691703001/ [https://perma.cc/7CJB-JD4Y].}
\footnote{18. Gurney & Dolven, supra note 10.}
\footnote{19. Phillips, supra note 17.}
\footnote{20. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17; Challenging the Highest Home-Sharing Fines in the Nation: Nichols v. City of Miami Beach, GOLDWATER INST. (June 27, 2018), https://
state constitutions protect individual liberties to a greater extent than the U.S. Constitution, and the state constitutions have their own provisions protecting individual liberty and stopping government overreach. Florida’s Excessive Fines Clause protects people from fines that are “grossly disproportional” to the person’s action. If it is not grossly disproportional to be charged $100,000 for peacefully exercising your property rights and letting somebody stay in your home overnight, then I do not know what is. That is the argument the Goldwater Institute will be making in Florida state court.

One might ask why advocates for economic rights have been turning to the courts instead of the city councils and the state legislatures. There is a legal reason and a practical reason. As a legal matter, it is the responsibility of the courts to uphold their state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution, and citizens should never have to go to a city council or a state legislature and beg them to respect their constitutional rights. That is the job of judges upholding the constitutions, that is why we have constitutions, and that is why we go to court. And as a practical matter, citizens have a tough fight against special interests before city councils and state legislatures. The hotel industry, for example, had an incentive to go to the Mayor and City Commission of the City of Miami Beach and convince them to outlaw and criminalize home sharing.

goldwaterinstitute.org/challenging-the-highest-home-sharing-fines-in-the-nationnichols-v-city-of-miami-beach/ [https://perma.cc/8TT9-VFXR]. One reason the Goldwater Institute chose to litigate using Florida’s Excessive Fines Clause is that the lawsuit began before the Supreme Court had decided Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019), which finally incorporated the U.S. Constitution’s Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment against the states. Id. at 686–87.

22. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
23. Since this speech was delivered, a Florida trial court struck down Miami’s home sharing ban and its accompanying $20,000 to $100,000 fines on state statutory grounds. The court did not reach the constitutional claim. Miami Beach’s $100,000 Home-sharing Fines Struck Down, GOLDWATER INST.: DEF. LIBERTY BLOG (Oct. 7, 2019), https://indefenseofliberty.blog/2019/10/07/miami-beachs-100000-home-sharing-fines-struck-down/ [https://perma.cc/8V3W-D3T2].
25. Id.
Here are a couple of interesting examples from Arizona. The Town of Jerome, Arizona, is a small, beautiful tourist town that outlawed short-term rentals before the Goldwater Institute and its allies stepped in and fixed the problem. The Jerome Town Council defended its decision to outlaw home sharing by warning that people who are only staying for a short term might put their trash out on the wrong day, which could cause wild javelinas to eat away at the trash and make a mess. No matter that a reasonable person might recognize that residents or the city government could tell these visitors when trash day is, and visitors could probably put their trash out on that day.

Another of the city council’s arguments was that the potholes all over the Town of Jerome might hurt short-term guests who do not know they are there. Never mind that the town could just fix the potholes. And the most entertaining argument was that allowing short-term rentals would result in a lack of housing for people who want to serve in city government. I can’t make this stuff up.

Even worse, the City of Sedona, another beautiful, popular tourist location, also decided to criminalize home sharing, again before the Goldwater Institute came in and fixed the problem. The city did not argue that there were nuisances, like noise, traffic, or trash problems. Rather, the City of Sedona responded to the aesthetic desires of a few local residents, who argued that the city ought to preserve the community for local artists and families, rather than allowing visiting outsiders in


29. Id.

30. Id.

their neighborhoods.32 Never mind that a tourist city’s economy is built on outsiders visiting.33

Can you imagine a city criminalizing the peaceful use of its residents’ property because neighbors don’t want outsiders in the community?34 While that might be the role of a homeowner association when people contract to determine how to use their properties, a city government should not have that power. It is a dangerous proposition that government not only should be able to decide who is desirable and who is not in a particular community, but also that it should be able to criminalize violations of that judgment. Miami Beach,35 Nashville,36 and cities across the country37 are not only fining people excessively, but

32. See, e.g., SANDEFUR & SANDEFUR, supra note 28, at 17 (“Despite vague references to ‘the peace, safety and general welfare of the residents,’ city records showed that officials adopted the rental ban in order to protect its ‘small-town character’ and ‘scenic beauty,’ not to prevent any public dangers. The complaints officials received from residents all related to general grievances about roadside parking or traffic, or neighbors expressing a desire to live in a ‘small town’ where ‘you know most everyone.’ These residents urged the city to ban short-term rentals in order to maintain ‘a quiet, friendly, family’ neighborhood—not to protect public safety.”); Joe Dana, Sedona’s quality of life impacted by home-sharing economy, locals say, 12NEWS (Aug. 1, 2019, 2:40 PM), https://www.12news.com/article/news/local/arizona/sedonas-quality-of-life-impacted-by-home-sharing-economy-locals-say/75-50af04a0-bd53-4092-a7a9-b4ee6773385[https://perma.cc/C9GH-FS8D].


they’re even putting them in jail for violating these anti-home-sharing rules. Cities are taking away people’s livelihoods and taking away their liberties for the “crime” of allowing people to stay overnight in their homes.

This criminalization of harmless economic activity has implications far beyond economic liberty and property rights. Some cities are even outlawing home sharing advertisements, and they’re compelling online platforms to turn those homeowners and advertisements over to the police and city government. They are able to outlaw these advertisements? Isn’t truthful speech protected by the First Amendment? It typically is, but not always when the underlying activity is illegal—especially not when the underlying activity is a crime. If the underlying activity is a crime, then the cities argue that they’re also able to outlaw and criminalize the speech because it’s speech about something that is criminal and perpetuates that illegal activity. Although courts sometimes embrace this type of reasoning, such an argument can be taken too far. As the Fifth Circuit observed in Byrum v. Landreth, if the government can criminalize harmless behavior to empower itself to censor


41. 566 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009).
people or to intrude on other rights, then our constitutional rights are doubly at risk. We at the Goldwater Institute are certainly making that argument in courts across the country as we stand up to excessive bans and the criminalization of home sharing.

The federal government is also intruding on the economic rights of Americans. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is applying rules to pure speech that were instead designed to regulate economic actions. It is doing this by pursuing strict liability criminal penalties against people in the healthcare industry for doing no more than simply speaking the truth in a way that can ultimately help patients.

Under federal law, a pharmaceutical company that manufactures drugs or medical devices can be charged with a crime for simply telling a doctor about a legal, safe, and alternative use for a particular medicine. This is the federal off-label speech rule, also called the FDA gag rule. Most readers have used a medical treatment off label. An off-label treatment occurs when a doctor prescribes a drug that is legally on the market after going through the FDA approval process—which in and of itself is a daunting task—for a purpose, patient population, or dose other than what the FDA approved it for. This is perfectly lawful, it happens all the time, and it’s legal, safe, and common.

42. Id. at 447 (finding state’s assertion that calling oneself an “interior designer” without receiving a government license is unprotected speech to be circular and would “authorize legislatures to license speech and reduce its constitutional protection by means of the licensing alone”).


44. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009).


46. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 44.

One in five of all prescriptions are for off-label uses. But here’s the oddity in the law: although the treatment is legal and prescribing the off-label treatment is legal, it is often a crime for a manufacturer of that treatment to share truthful, nondeceptive information about off-label treatments with a provider.

Because the manufacturer is usually the party with the most up-to-date information about the treatment, it is in a position to share alternate uses and negative side effects with doctors to guide their off-label treatments. So the FDA gag rule not only harms the companies themselves by depriving them of their free speech rights, but it also harms doctors who may not know about all of the tools available to treat patients. Ultimately, that harms patients because they have less information and their doctors are not fully equipped to help heal them.

Black letter First Amendment case law teaches that commercial speech receives less protection than many other types of speech, like political speech. Note that the text of the First Amendment does not make such distinctions. Speech is speech, and it is all protected the same way as far as our Founding Fathers were concerned. However, recent cases have confirmed that commercial speech is still protected speech, so one might wonder how the FDA is able to outlaw, and even criminalize, truthful speech about a lawful practice. From the FDA’s perspective, this is speech that is somehow tainted because it is performed to facilitate an economic activity.

48. Clancy, supra note 47; Sandefur, supra note 43.
49. See Paul Howard & James Copland, Off-Label, Not Off-Limits: The FDA Needs To Create a Safe Harbor For Off-Label Drug Use, 110 Mo. Med. 106, 108 (2013) (“Companies’ fear of federal criminal action to enforce off-label drug promotion is not merely hypothetical. Claims of illicit off-label drug promotion have been among the most commonly asserted Medicaid fraud allegations in federal enforcement actions.”); see also Sandefur, supra note 43.
52. U.S. Const. amend. I.
53. Id.
54. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (dealing with a restriction on sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing practices of individual doctors); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553 (2001) (dealing with a ban on tobacco ads and sales of tobacco within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds).
Courts that have heard challenges to this ban on speech regarding off-label uses have stepped up to strike down the FDA gag rule.\(^5\) A prime example of this comes from *United States v. Caronia*,\(^6\) in which the Second Circuit overturned the criminal conviction of a pharmaceutical representative whose only crime was to share truthful information about lawful treatments—all without the presence of fraud or other misrepresentation.\(^7\) The Second Circuit in *Caronia* overturned the conviction on the ground that speech, including speech used in pharmaceutical marketing, cannot be prosecuted under the First Amendment.\(^8\) In other words, the court held that if the conduct is lawful, then the speech is also lawful, and as long as it is not false or misleading, then neither the conduct nor speech may be prosecuted.\(^9\)

In response, the FDA essentially ignored the Second Circuit’s ruling and has continued to argue that prosecuting off-label speech does not automatically violate the First Amendment because such speech may be used as evidence of the crime of misbranding under the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.\(^6\)

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6. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).

7. Id. at 160 (“Because we conclude from the record in this case that the government prosecuted Caronia for mere off-label promotion and the district court instructed the jury that it could convict on that theory, we vacate the judgment of conviction.”).

8. Id. at 160–63 (finding that the government prosecuted directly based on speech and did not use speech as mere evidence of intent to misbrand in violation of United States Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)); see also Sorell, 564 U.S. at 557 (“Speech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”).

9. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 160 (“[U]nder the principle of constitutional avoidance, . . . we construe the FDCA as not criminalizing the simple promotion of a drug’s off-label use because such a construction would raise First Amendment concerns.”).

60. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1) (2012) (defining misbranding as lacking directions for approved use); 21 U.S.C. § 352(q)(1) (2012) (defining misbranding as false or misleading advertising); 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (2019) (defining intended use as “directions under which the layman can use a drug safely and for the purposes for which it is intended”); 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2019) (defining intended use as “the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of drugs[,] which is[,] . . . determined by such persons’ expressions or circumstances surrounding the distribution”); see also Ralph Hall & Eric Marshall, *FDA Explains Decision Not to Seek Rehearing in Caronia*, BEYOND HEALTHCARE REFORM (Jan. 23, 2013), https://
That is a distinction that only a lawyer can love, but that is how the FDA operates.61

The FDA takes this distinction even further by using the off-label gag rule to convict individuals of criminal conspiracy, including conspiracy to misbrand pharmaceuticals and send them into interstate commerce.62 Although, as the Second Circuit held in Caronia, it is legal for a salesperson to speak honestly about off-label uses, it is legal for doctors to prescribe the product, and it is legal for a company to ship the product to the doctor, when those three things together come together, they become the crime of criminal conspiracy.63

In United States v. Park,64 the Supreme Court held that the government can not only hold individual sales representatives liable, but it can actually extend that liability all the way up to the executives of the company.65 The Court’s holding means that executives who do not order improper conduct, or even know about it, could be held liable merely because they have the potential authority to stop it. By creating criminals out of people who are trying to sell off-label products to patients who need treatment, the FDA is preventing customers from getting the help they need.

In closing, consider this guiding principle: if it is legal and safe to perform an activity, it should be legal to do that activity

s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/8a57dab3-d96f-40d3-8e45-5a473e9ed43.pdf [https://perma.cc/25LY-LUX5].

61. Further, FDA guidance construes nondeceptive off-label promotion as evidence of misbranding if it can demonstrate that the drug is being sold for an unapproved intended use. See, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 44 (“An approved drug that is marketed for an unapproved use (whether in labeling or not) is misbranded because the labeling of such drug does not include ‘adequate directions for use.’”).


64. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).

65. Id. at 670–71 (citations omitted).
in exchange for money. 66 If it is lawful to allow an overnight guest in one’s home for free, it should be lawful to allow an overnight guest in one’s home in exchange for money. If it is lawful to share truthful, helpful information about a product, then it should be lawful to exchange that information to facilitate a transaction. Money does not magically transform a harmless activity into a harmful activity, and money certainly should not transform a harmless activity into a crime.

66. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 80, 82, 213–16 (rev. ed. 2014); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75–76 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 8th prtg. 2012) (1859) (“As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself or needs not affect them . . . .”).
When I became a member of the small band that the Federalist Society was thirty-seven years ago, it would have been impossible to imagine discussing the subject of cryptocurrency as part of its proceedings, let alone before such a substantial crowd. But ultimately, the Society and the Constitution that it celebrates are concerned with the relation of liberty and the state. And there’s no issue of modern technology more appropriate for us to consider, with cryptocurrency on the cutting edge of the divide between liberty and the state—between a centralized, coercive order, and a decentralized, voluntary one. And that divide, here, comes in that most important matter of money.

Modern fiat currency, like the dollars in your pocket and bank account, is quintessentially a creature of the state. Early in the twentieth century, Georg Frederick Knapp, the father of modern monetary theory, wrote, “The soul of currency is not in the material of the pieces, but in the legal ordinances which regulate their use.” Knapp argued that currency must be constituted by law, since only government could confer the requisite legitimacy to gain acceptance and public trust. Thus, the underlying value of a currency is intrinsically tied to a public’s trust in that legal system.

Of course, some citizens have little trust in their legal system, particularly when it comes to currency. Nation states can manipulate their currency, printing more money to fund projects for their favorite supporters. Savings then lose their value, as
prices are driven up by inflation.\textsuperscript{4} Citizens become less certain of money as a store of value and economic growth suffers.\textsuperscript{5} Government control over money thus can be a form of oppression no less than the denial of civil liberties. Because, for instance, of its hyperinflation today, Venezuela is about the most extreme example of what I would call a monetarily oppressive regime.\textsuperscript{6}

The recent advent of cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin chief among them, poses both a practical challenge to such monetarily oppressive regimes, and a theoretical challenge to the view that the public law of currency is the necessary foundation of money. Thus, while the creation of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies is impressive as a technological innovation, their central innovation is in trust, the essential characteristic of any currency that will have long-term success.\textsuperscript{7} Bitcoin does not require faith in any public institution, such as the Federal Reserve, a monarch, or any other central authority, but rather, trust in the computer logic and the effectiveness of a decentralized order that maintains it.\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{4} See N. Gregory Mankiw, Macroeconomics 130 (9th ed. 2016).


\textsuperscript{6} See, e.g., Emma Graham-Harrison, Patricia Torres & Joe Parkin Daniels, Barter and dollars the new reality as Venezuela battles hyperinflation, GUARDIAN (Mar., 14, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/13/venezuela-hyperinflation-bolivar-banknotes-dollars [https://perma.cc/PGH5-4VAQ] (describing the extreme economic hardships in Venezuela, as a result of hyperinflation, such as power outages disrupting electronic transactions and a lack of plastic to make debit and credit cards).

\textsuperscript{7} See, e.g., The promise of the blockchain: The trust machine, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/10/31/the-trust-machine [https://perma.cc/WY58-7UHR] [hereinafter The trust machine] (describing how the blockchain, the core technology underlying the Bitcoin innovation, enables transactions between individuals who do not have an established trust relationship, in the absence of a third party).

\textsuperscript{8} In traditional bank-to-bank transactions, trust is created by a third party. In the United States, the automated clearinghouse (ACH) system is a network through which banks send each other “batches of electronic credit and debit transfers.” Automated Clearinghouse Services, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RIS. SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/edach_about.htm [https://perma.cc/2BWX-WZT8] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). The ACH was responsible for moving $51.2 trillion worth in financial transactions in 2018. What is ACH, NACHA, https://www.nacha.org/content/what-is-ach [https://perma.cc/7UUY-VRPK] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). However, centralized trust comes at a cost: transaction fees processed by the ACH range between $0.15 and $0.95, costing financial institutions
Thus, Bitcoin is nothing less than a fundamental assault on the idea that a public law of currency is a necessary prerequisite of the modern monetary order. In fact, Bitcoin has the potential to outperform the currencies produced by legal regimes as a store of value, precisely because it requires no trust in political process, but rather trust in a transparent set of rules and transactions that follow those rules. The basic problem for public or fiat currencies is that a legal system cannot generally make the precommitments necessary to completely isolate the governance of its money supply from all political pressure. Bluntly, no one can insulate the stability claimed by public law from the hurly burly of politics.

To be sure, the U.S. dollar is the world’s most trusted currency. Despite its many critics, the dollar has formed the basis for 90 percent of international trade over the last thirty years. Companies, consumers, and central banks around the world trust in the relative stability of the Federal Reserve and the U.S. government. Yet, the dollar has been subject to periods of severe and unexpected inflation. In fact, since the creation of the Federal Reserve, the purchasing power of the dollar roughly $20 billion a year. ACH Processing Fees, FIRST ACH, https://www.firstach.com/front/ACH-Processing-Fees.html [https://perma.cc/TFA9-LAJA] (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). Conversely, the Bitcoin blockchain is essentially a transaction database that contains every transaction ever executed in the currency, which is publicly available on the internet where one can find out how much value belonged to each Bitcoin address at any point in history. See AJ, Blockchain 101: Beginners Guide to Understanding the Technology, COINMONKS (Apr. 11, 2018), https://medium.com/coinmonks/blockchain-101-beginners-guide-to-understanding-the-technology-75a75f863ec2 [https://perma.cc/D8EN-SNH8]; see also The trust machine, supra note 7.


12. Id.
has fallen by 97 percent.\textsuperscript{13} And that’s not a surprise. Since the Progressive Era, the Federal Reserve has had, by law, other political objectives than maintaining the value of the currency, such as getting to full employment.\textsuperscript{14} But individuals only have one desire for a currency: that it maintain its value.\textsuperscript{15} The basic divergence between the social objectives of fiat money and the individual’s objectives of maintaining value is what necessarily limits the trust that any fiat currency can enjoy.\textsuperscript{16}

I emphasize that I have only spoken of Bitcoin’s potential, not its current reality. If Bitcoin succeeds as a currency, it will do so only by climbing the rungs left open by the frailties of the public law of money. It has already gained strength and stability by competing successfully against monetarily oppressive regimes, and performing payment functions for the poor that the bank regulations have made difficult. Looking at its past history, Bitcoin has been an enormous success. It has had substantial volatility of late, but if one had been an investor early on, one could be a millionaire, indeed even a billionaire today.\textsuperscript{17}

Bitcoin could become even more competitive, and climb other open rungs, because even the best currencies are subject to the political risks built into any public law of currency. But while Bitcoin is used as a currency in monetarily oppressive regimes (the people of Venezuela are using it right now),\textsuperscript{18} it does not

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012).
  \item \textsuperscript{15} See George Melloan, Only a Crisis Will Bring Money Reform, 32 CATO J. 279, 279 (2012); Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 74 (1996).
  \item \textsuperscript{16} See Melloan, supra note 15, at 279–81.
\end{itemize}
function as a currency in more established regimes.\(^\text{19}\) That does not mean that people don’t hold it in the United States. Some do, but even most of those hold it only for small investments, and use it to pay for a few items—often as a kind of hobby.\(^\text{20}\) The vast majority of us hold most of our investments in dollar denominated assets, and use cash to pay day-to-day expenses.\(^\text{21}\) For most people, Bitcoin is not yet a good enough store of value. It’s simply too volatile compared to the dollar, and risk-averse people don’t want to hold their cash or assets in a unit account so volatile.\(^\text{22}\)

I conclude by outlining what needs to happen for Bitcoin, or possibly some other cryptocurrency, to gain greater market share against more mature currencies—and ultimately against the dollar itself. It needs to continue to gain in price to attract investors, but also to lessen in volatility to attract people who would like to hold it for general purposes of payment. For a cryptocurrency with a fixed supply, like Bitcoin, these two forces may sometimes be in tension. For instance, although rampant speculation may drive up a currency’s value, the inherent volatility that comes along with such upward swings can be destabilizing for a currency. But that might not be a fatal


\(^{20}\) See, e.g., Spencer Bogart, Bitcoin is a Demographic Mega-Trend: Data Analysis, BLOCKCHAIN CAP. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2019), https://medium.com/blockchain-capital-blog/bitcoin-is-a-demographic-mega-trend-data-analysis-160d2f7731e5 [https://perma.cc/2CP4-H6XM] (showing that 9 percent of Americans own Bitcoin); Alex Lielacher, How Many People Use Bitcoin in 2019?, BITCOIN MKT. J. (Feb. 11, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.bitcoinmarketjournal.com/how-many-people-use-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/S5N5-XBLG] (showing that there are 32 million bitcoin wallets, but only 11 percent of total bitcoin owners use wallets for payment); Why haven’t we all bought cryptocurrency yet?, FINDER (June 13, 2018), https://www.finder.com/why-people-arent-buying-cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/X97F-RVUF] (showing that the average amount of bitcoin owned is $3,453.89).

\(^{21}\) See, e.g., Kharif, supra note 19; James Royal, Survey: Real estate is back as American’s favorite long-term investment, BANKRATE (July 17, 2019), https://www.bankrate.com/investing/financial-security-july-2019/ [https://perma.cc/78S2-FZLE] (showing only 4 percent of Americans said Bitcoin, or cryptocurrencies, were their favored long-term investments).

flaw.\textsuperscript{23} If Bitcoin comes to enjoy steady growth and demand, it will be able to attain an acceptable level of volatility, while at the same time reaching a broader market.

To become more successful and widely used, Bitcoin does not need to become less volatile and more accepted than the dollar. There are many less successful currencies against which it could compete, and it would gain much value simply by replacing, or even complementing, gold as the basic hedge against currency devaluation.\textsuperscript{24} There are two important conditions to facilitate such developments. First, there have to be monetarily oppressive currencies so as to give substantial impetus to the use of Bitcoin as an alternate currency. Given the renewed enthusiasm about socialism throughout the world,\textsuperscript{25} this condition is already being satisfied. When socialists run out of other people’s money, they print more of it for themselves.

The second condition is more open ended. There has to be continued strength in the “Bitcoin ecosystem.” Most people don’t have the skills to use Bitcoin directly. There are amusing stories about people somehow losing their Bitcoin key, and looking around for it in some of their papers, having lost a million dollars.\textsuperscript{26} Bitcoin owners need to keep an open key wallet. They need mechanisms to ensure the security of dealing with Bitcoin. Thus, they need cryptocurrency wallets and exchanges. Fortunately, these institutions have gotten a lot more profes-


\textsuperscript{25} See, e.g., Frank Newport, Democrats More Positive About Socialism than Capitalism, GALLUP (Aug. 13, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/240725/democrats-positive-socialism-capitalism.aspx [https://perma.cc/7RN7-K93F] (acknowledging that both Americans under twenty-nine and Democrats statistically have a more positive view of socialism than capitalism).

sional since the day Mt. Gox lost hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Bitcoin.27

Even more importantly, there needs to be continued growth in the markets around Bitcoin. Futures and forward markets make the price discovery process for Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, more efficient and help dampen volatility.28 Permitting funds that invest in Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, will allow more people to hold Bitcoin or cryptocurrencies as part of their portfolio. That will also thicken the market, and have a stabilizing effect.29

Now, note that these wallets, futures markets, and investment funds are not order without law. They are institutions regulated by our law, and by our administrators.30 And indeed, the SEC recently rejected—in my view wrongly—the Winklevoss twins’ application for an ETF investment fund that would have been devoted to Bitcoin.31

Thus, paradoxically, the success of Bitcoin may depend on the state’s willingness to apply the neutral principles of its laws to an innovation that may itself turn out to be a competitor to one of the greatest powers of the state: its ability to print fiat money. That

shows why cryptocurrency is directly in the Federalist Society's wheelhouse. Its success depends, ultimately, on the rule of law and the constitutional respect for a new form of property.
Rather than discussing economic liberty as a product of federalism, I will address economic liberty as a product of constitutionalism. This idea is based on three key principles of our constitutional system. The first pertains to the relationship between democracy and republicanism, the second is the practice of judicial review, and the third is the fundamental idea of due process. And I will attempt to show how these seemingly disparate principles are all closely related to one another.

It is well known that the Constitution reflects a profound distrust of popular democracy. One of the motivating forces behind the Constitutional Convention was a perception that democracy at the state level had become excessively abusive. The Convention sought to temper those perceived democratic excesses by filtering the method of democracy through a government structure built on the principles of republicanism with an aim toward promoting civic virtue. Thus, we have the separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government, the separation of governmental authority between the states and the federal government, and a series of important checks on those who temporarily hold the reins of federal...
power, including bicameralism,⁴ presentment,⁵ and the state-based composition of the Senate.⁶

The body of the original Constitution also included specific limits on the states’ democratic impulses, with the most important being the Contract Clause, which prohibits states from passing laws that impair the obligation of contracts.⁷ Although it is now rarely taught in introductory constitutional law courses, the Contract Clause was a key motivator for the Constitutional Convention because states had been forgiving debts incurred during the War of Independence, thus impairing the contractual rights of creditors.⁸ The Contract Clause specifically limits the states’ democratic authority to do that.

In tension with republicanism is, of course, the principle of democracy, a principle that was reflected more in the Anti-Federalist Papers than in the Federalist Papers.⁹ This may be a silly quibble, but I always thought the Federalist Society should have been named the Anti-Federalist Society, because that’s really the states’ rights society. Regardless, the value of democracy was reflected in the Anti-Federalist Papers, and it is also reflected in certain essential Founding-era and historical documents. President Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address is distinctly democratic,¹⁰ and I take as my definition of democracy President Lincoln’s apt description of the ideal government as being “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”¹¹

⁸. See James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673, 699-702 (2008) (discussing the problematic practice of states enacting debt-relief laws that violated contracts prior to the Convention, while also noting that despite the issue’s great importance, attendees gave it little attention at the Convention).
¹⁰. See Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (“Bliss Copy”) (Nov. 19, 1863) (proclaiming “that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth”).
¹¹. Id.
According to this view, the Declaration of Independence is much more democratic than the Constitution.\textsuperscript{12} The Bill of Rights is also the product of the democratic impulse. It is a reaction to what the Anti-Federalists saw as the Constitution’s excessive obeisance to republicanism.\textsuperscript{13} The Anti-Federalists wanted a democratic guarantee.\textsuperscript{14} Many of the amendments in the Bill of Rights are directed toward rights of the people that would be essential for an effective democracy: the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech;\textsuperscript{15} the Second

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{The Declaration of Independence} para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”); see also Lee J. Strang, \textit{Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?}, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 415–31 (2006) (recounting the reliance that leaders of various popular movements—including abolition of slavery, civil rights, women’s suffrage, and pro-life—have placed on the natural law principles of the Declaration of Independence in galvanizing support).

\textsuperscript{13} See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, \textit{The Contingent Fourth Amendment}, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229, 1232 (2015) (noting that “a sufficient number of moderate Anti-Federalists dropped their opposition to the Constitution in return for the promise of a Bill of Rights that would provide such constraints”); see also Vincent Phillip Muñoz, \textit{The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossibility of Its Incorporation}, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 616 (2006) (asserting that since Anti-Federalists were likely “[i]nfluenced by Montesquieu’s maxim that republican government can encompass only a small territory and that rule in large territories necessarily tends towards tyranny, [they] claimed that the new constitution would result in centralization, consolidation, and—through enforced uniformity—despotism” (footnote omitted)); Nils Gilbertson, Note, \textit{Return of the Skeptics: The Growing Role of the Anti-Federalists in Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence}, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 255, 258 (2018) (citing Cecelia M. Kenyon, \textit{Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government}, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 6 (1955) (observing that “Anti-Federalist opposition to increased centralization of power in the national government was the belief that republican government was possible only for a relatively small territory and a relatively small homogeneous population”)).

\textsuperscript{14} See William A. Aniskovich, Note, \textit{In Defense of the Framers’ Intent: Civic Virtue, The Bill of Rights, and the Framers’ Science of Politics}, 75 VA. L. REV. 1311, 1328–29 (1989) (noting that “close examination of the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debate reveals . . . an unresolved tension at the Founding between those who believed proper institutional arrangements could alone protect individual rights in a democratic society and those who believed that, in addition, government had to play some role in promoting those American civic virtues that could guide popular sentiments”).

\textsuperscript{15} See \textit{U.S. Const. amend. I} (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
Amendment’s protection of the right to bear arms, if you accept the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller; the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law. So while the Constitution emphasizes antidemocratic, very republican perspectives, the Bill of Rights provides a strong democratic response to that.

Some might argue that the Bill of Rights is antidemocratic to the extent that it allows the unelected and undemocratic Supreme Court to limit the power of representative institutions. Judicial review is often perceived as deviating from what is an otherwise democratic system. But such a perception presumes a state of affairs that is more theoretical than real. Certainly, at the federal level, neither Congress nor the Executive are truly representative of the people—that is, if we take “the people” to mean a majority of the electorate nationwide. Rather, the judicial enforcement of rights is a check on power invested through

16. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).

17. 554 U.S. 570, 582, 595, 618, 635 (2008) (noting the connection between the First and Second Amendments); id. at 579–92 (discussing the Second Amendment generally); id. at 580–81 (“Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only the right to ‘keep and bear Arms’ in an organized militia therefore fits poorly with the operative clause’s description of the holder of that right as ‘the people.’ We start therefore with a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.”).

18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); Heller, 554 U.S. at 579 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s Searches and Seizures Clause is regarded as a “right of the people”).

19. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); see Heller, 554 U.S. at 616; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
a non-majoritarian republican structure. The enforcement of the Bill of Rights is a—somewhat ironic—republican promise to democracy.

Based on that understanding of the democratic role of the Bill of Rights, I disagree with the standard perception of judicial review drawn from Professor Alexander Bickel’s statement that “judicial review is at least potentially a deviant institution in [American] democratic society.”20 Judicial review is a republican part of American democracy. It is meant to ensure that the structure of government is honored, that Congress operates within and only within its enumerated powers, and that the branches of government operate according to their design. The Supreme Court’s discussion of bicameralism in INS v. Chadha21 demonstrates this.22 In other words, in many contexts, and especially those involving structure, judicial review is republican for the sake of being republican.

Though judicial review is republican in design, it is not necessarily deviant from a democratic perspective—for although it is part of a republican institution, the judiciary is potentially the most democratic institution. To the extent that judges engage in the enforcement of rights against republican power, they play a role in the enforcement of the democratic Bill of Rights and the highly democratic Reconstruction Amendments. This does not just mean the principle of one person, one vote or issues pertaining to gerrymandering. Rather, all enforcements of liberty and equality are inherently democratic. To conclude otherwise would be to presume that legislative judgments are universally or even usually democratic, which is not the case, according to my thicker understanding of democracy.

So the judiciary is not a deviant institution, nor is judicial review merely a device of republicanism designed to enforce the structure of government. It exists in between those two poles, and it offers the best of both worlds. It is republican in nature but potentially democratic in operation. And that brings us to the Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause can be traced

22. See id. at 948–51.
directly to the *Magna Carta*’s “law of the land” principle, which evolved over several centuries into the phrase “due process of law.” And the law of the land principle is a principle that objects to the arbitrary application of law. Due process was meant as a bulwark against arbitrary exercises of power. As such, it provides both procedural and substantive protections. To conclude otherwise would be to presume that the substance of the law is never arbitrary.

I have a slightly different view of the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Lochner v. New York* and the more modern economic substantive due process cases such as *Ferguson v. Skrupa*, *Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.*, and *New Orleans v. Dukes*. The holding of *Lochner*, that economic legislation must rest upon reasonable grounds, was correct in theory. If the law does not rest on reasonable grounds, by which I mean some fact-premised grounds, then it is arbitrary. The criticism that the *Lochner* era embraced an antidemocratic judicial activism is fair. While *Lochner* was right in theory, it was wrong in fact. The reason for this can be found in Justice John Marshall Harlan’s masterful dissent, where he considered the scientific information then available that supported the proposition that

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23. J.C. Holt, *Magna Carta* 389 (George Garnett & John Hudson eds., 3d ed. 2015) (“No free man is to be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.” (quoting *Magna Carta*, ch. 39 (1215)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).


26. See id. at 460–61.

27. See id. at 479–82.

28. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).


the job of being a baker was a particularly unhealthful and dangerous one.34

Unlike Justice Harlan in dissent, the majority embraced its own imagined set of facts, saying that it is common knowledge that being a baker is not that tough of a job.35 But Justice Harlan’s opinion observed that the material available to the legislature could lead a reasonable legislator to conclude that the law in question was a reasonable protection of bakers.36 The contrast between the two opinions is remarkable. The majority held that the law just needed to rely on some reasonable grounds, but decided that common sense dictated there were no reasonable grounds.37 But judges should not be simply applying their common sense. They should have common sense, of course, but they should defer to a legislative judgment that is built on facts.

Often placed in contrast to *Lochner* are cases like *New Orleans v. Dukes*, which is a combined Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause case.38 The City of New Orleans passed an ordinance that gave one hotdog vendor—Lucky Dogs, which you can still visit on Bourbon Street—the right to operate a hotdog stand on Bourbon Street and in the French Quarter.39 All other curbside vendors were banned from the French Quarter.40 The law was designed and written to exclude everyone except Lucky Dogs without explicitly mentioning Lucky Dogs,41 which allows us to conclude that it was designed for the benefit of Lucky Dogs.

An individual who, prior to the enactment of the ordinance, had been operating a curbside food stand in the French Quarter challenged the ordinance in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.42 Applying a deferential rational basis test, rather than the more intrusive *Lochner* model, the court found that the city could do whatever it wanted in

35. *Id.* at 59 (majority opinion).
36. *Id.* at 68–73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. *Id.* at 56, 59 (majority opinion).
40. *Id.*
41. *Id.*
42. *Dukes*, 427 U.S. at 299.
this area.43 A liberal panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied a form of economic substantive due process and concluded that the peculiarity of the statute was enough to raise a suspicion that this was, in general, a rent-seeking statute designed to create a monopoly.44 As such, the Fifth Circuit held the ordinance unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due process.45

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion was very carefully reasoned. It recognized that although courts usually defer to the legislative judgment at the national level, the state level, and the local level, there was enough in this ordinance to trigger a court’s suspicion.46 One of the judges in the case, Judge Minor Wisdom, was a resident of New Orleans, and he was familiar with the way the New Orleans City Council operated.47

The Supreme Court’s reversal of the Fifth Circuit48 was wrong in theory and wrong in fact. It did not adopt the Lochner theoretical model of demanding a reasonable justification for the ordinance, nor did it apply a standard form of deferential basis review. Rather, the Court embraced a conceivability standard,49 which is based not on the facts of the case, but rather on anything a court might imagine that the lawmakers could have considered in supporting the ordinance. The Court also got the facts wrong, because the facts were imagined facts. The Court held that if the New Orleans City Council had thought in the way the Court imagined it could have thought, then the ordinance would be constitutional. This is troubling because judges—especially Article III judges—are supposed to apply the law to the facts of the case, not to an imagined set of facts.50

43. Dukes, 501 F.2d at 709.
44. Id. at 712–13.
45. Id. at 713.
46. Id.
48. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 299.
49. Id. at 303–04.
50. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 59 (July 13, 2009) (statement of J. Sonia Sotomayor) (“The task of a judge is not to make law, it is to apply the law. . . . In each case I have heard, I have applied the law to the facts at hand.”); Our Government: The Judicial Branch,
The Due Process Clause does have a role in securing economic substantive due process. Rational basis should not be based on a hypothetical set of facts, but on the actual facts as likely (not conceivably) relied on by the lawmakers. This approach reflects a prodemocratic impulse that would lead a court to examine carefully the sometimes-corrupted democratic practices that lead to laws that offer rent-seeking or are irrational in terms of the legitimate interests of a city council, a state legislature, or the federal government. Courts should not be actively involved in striking down statutes—they should defer to the judgment of the legislative branch. That deference has less to do with democracy and republicanism than it does with the locus of responsibility placed in the legislative branch. We might say that courts should not invade the realm of discretionary power. But there should be a judgment of the legislative branch to examine. Not a conceived set of facts, but a real set of facts. That means *Lochner*’s standard, applied with deference and considered judgment.

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ARE STATES PROTECTING ECONOMIC LIBERTY?

DANA BERLINER*

A lot of people have referred to, and Justice Clint Bolick just talked about, the *Patel* case.¹ It is definitely true that much of the action right now in economic liberty is in state constitutions, state judicial decisions, and state legislation, and we do a lot of that at the Institute for Justice. I am going to talk about some of those developments. I have to respond to Professor Roderick Hills, even though he is not here, who said very strongly that we should pursue only state constitutional litigation, because there’s no federal protection whatsoever for economic liberty.

I do not agree at all with the conclusion that there is no federal constitutional protection for economic liberty, but there is a lot of opportunity for state constitutional litigation now. First, it is important to realize that state constitutional texts are not little copies of the U.S. Constitution. Some of them were written even before the U.S. Constitution.² Some were written in the 1970s.³ The rest were written in between.⁴ Some are based on the Northwest Ordinance.⁵ Some have due course of law provi-

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¹ *Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation*, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015).
³ Id. (listing Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, North Carolina, and Virginia as states with constitutions written in the 1970s).
⁴ Id.
sions. Some have anti-monopoly clauses. Some have anti-gift clauses. Some have anti-favoritism clauses. They contain various provisions that are not in the U.S. Constitution, and Professor Steven Calabresi is someone who writes about that and catalogs different kinds of state constitutional provisions in his work.

In addition, most states have at least two, and often as many as four, different lines of interpretation of the rational basis test, or the equivalent thereof. So most states are a total mess on this. There will be one line of cases that strictly follows federal law under the state constitution. There will be one line of cases that uses, perhaps, the real and substantial test, which was an influential test that a lot of states used in the middle of the 1900s. And that, like you might think, involves real evidence and a real and substantial relationship.


9. John Martinez, Getting Back the Public’s Money: The Anti-Favoritism Norm in American Property Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 619, 649–59, 653 n.144, 657 n.162 (2010) (describing the four different types of favoritism clauses—state taxing and spending clauses, state just compensation clauses, state due process clauses, and uniquely state constitutional prohibitions—listing example state constitutions); see also DeBoer, supra note 6, at 135 n.3.


There are other states that have a line of reasonable relationship cases, which do not tend to be rational basis. Then there are states that have things in between. As I said, most states have several of these different lines of cases going on at once that involve complicated tests with multiple factors. In Texas, the way that we were granted Supreme Court review was by saying, “You have three lines of cases that are all in conflict with each other and never cite each other. You should resolve that.” And they did.

But that is true of virtually every state court right now, which means there is a huge opportunity to develop economic liberty jurisprudence and unique state tests. I do want to talk for a second about what the Patel test is, because it is not the federal test. First, the court looks at legitimate government interest, but not just a conceivable government interest. The court instead looks to what the government interest for the law actually was. Then the court looks at actual facts—real facts in the real world—to determine if there is a relationship between those facts and the actual purpose of the statute. Then, even if there is a real relationship, the court looks to see whether the law is so oppressive or burdensome to the individual that it does not justify the achievement of its supposed public purpose.

Patel is a completely different test. It is a three-part test. I do not think any other state has that exact formulation, but they could. So we are litigating in many different state high courts. We currently have one case at the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Pennsylvania is usually more protective of economic liberty than other states. We also had one recent case at the Illinois Supreme Court.

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15. Id. at 87.

16. Id.

17. Id.

Supreme Court. Illinois is usually not more protective of economic liberty than other states, and it rubber stamped the law in question. Both of those cases are really about the question of whether economic protectionism is a legitimate government interest, a question that has largely not been decided by almost any state court. It is a wide-open area.

There is currently one other case, which is in South Carolina, where we are essentially bringing *Lee Optical* again and saying, “Do not follow the U.S. Constitution on this. Go with your own constitution.” Under the South Carolina constitution, in *Lee Optical*, the plaintiffs would have won. That is a fun case. I cannot wait to see what happens.

This is what is currently happening in state constitutional law. I also want to point out the influx of activity right now with state statutes. For one thing, we previously talked a lot about licensing laws. Licensing is extremely varied across states. The Institute for Justice completed a study called *License to Work* where we catalogued the statutory requirements to practice 102 lower-income occupations. Of those, only thirteen are licensed in every state, and only twenty-three are licensed in forty states. For almost every occupation, there are at least a few states that do not license it. And the burdens and requirements to obtain a license vary widely from state to state.

In almost every state, there is no experience requirement for the licensing of residential landscapers, with the exception of four states where it takes an individual four years to get the license. This difference is something that states can use to de-


20. Since this speech was delivered, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its ruling in this case, holding that favoring restaurants and protecting them from competition was a proper governmental purpose in Illinois. *See LMP Servs., Inc. v. Chicago*, No. 123123, 2019 WL 2218923, at *3–4, *8 (Ill. 2019).


24. *Id.* at 6, 13.

25. *See id.* at 7.
termine whether they actually need the licenses they are imposing, and whether they need them at that level of burden. Two states have now passed laws to do exactly that.26 Nebraska and Ohio have passed the broadest economic liberty legislation in recent years. Both states are doing what is called sunset review where, on a rolling basis, they review all licensing laws and determine whether the regulation is truly necessary, and whether the regulation is the least restrictive way of achieving the health and safety purpose it was designed to achieve.27

Ohio has passed sunrise review, which means each time a whole new set of regulations is proposed, a government body will assess whether it is, in fact, necessary.28 This is important because there is always pressure to have new licensing regulations. Right now, there are nationwide lobbying efforts on music therapy, interior design, and lactation consultants to make licensing of those occupations much more restrictive, and to make it difficult for those not already in these occupations to enter. Under these proposed laws, the existing practitioners, of course, will get to continue their occupations, but newcomers will be excluded or severely limited.29

Nebraska and Ohio have the broadest recent statutes that improve economic liberty. But it is not always possible to get bills passed, as extensively discussed in the earlier panel today. Florida has been trying to pass a bill to repeal licenses for twelve occupations, including things like auctioneer and interior design, and some other even more uncommon occupations, but the legislature has not managed to pass it. They have already failed three years in a row to get it passed.30 They are trying again this year. We will see.


It is difficult to get such repeals passed because of the intense pressure from the people who are benefiting from the licensing laws. One area in which there has been significant improvement, which we heard about in the panel in the middle of the day today, is that many states—twenty-eight in the last four years—have reduced the barriers for ex-offenders to get licenses in different occupations.\(^{31}\) In some states, where it is uncertain if one might be excluded from an occupational license, the state provides an early opportunity to find out whether past offenses would prevent the person from getting the license. This is extremely useful, as it avoids the situation where someone has completed the educational and testing requirements only to find out that the license will be denied anyway.

Other states have promulgated statutes requiring the crime to be related to the occupation before you can prohibit someone from going into the field. That would seem obvious, but it is not. We have a case in Pennsylvania where a woman has an assault conviction from twenty years ago as part of a domestic dispute and she is not being allowed to become an esthetician.\(^{32}\) There is absolutely no relationship—and no claim even of a relationship—between the original offense and doing makeup and facials, but she nevertheless was prohibited from working.

The change from preventing ex-offenders from entering licensed occupations is a really interesting development. I believe significant legislative pressure to make that change exists—probably more even than licensing change overall, but I am hoping it bleeds over into licensing change too.

One other area where there has been significant development is in food freedom and the ability of people to make food in their homes to then sell. Three states—Wyoming, North Dakota, and Utah—have passed sweeping reforms that, in essence, say that as long as it is not meat then you can produce the food in your


home and sell it.\textsuperscript{33} This includes perishable items, including foods like pies that contain milk.

Since those laws have gone into effect—the first one four years ago—there has not been one single report of a foodborne illness from one of these home-prepared foods.\textsuperscript{34} This showcases that these incredible barriers for home food preparation are likely not necessary. States could have significantly fewer regulations to achieve the same result (to the extent they are achieving any result).

That change has been made, and many states also have made it possible to sell shelf stable foods, like cookies and cakes, directly from your home. This has a huge impact, of course, on people who can finally work. I hope the more regulated states will observe that the less regulated states are doing something totally different and less restrictive, and that there have been absolutely no adverse consequences from it.

I would love for this to spread as a legislative matter. It is something we are working on and that I am hopeful about. At the same time though, we cannot escape the need for actual judicial constitutional decisions protecting economic liberty at the state and federal level. That is the only way that these rights are truly guaranteed, and not subject to repeal.

Thank you.

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33. See Home Consumption and Homemade Food Act, UT AH CODE ANN. §§ 4-5a-101 to -105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2019); Wyoming Food Freedom Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-49-101 to -103 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-09.5-01 to -02 (Supp. 2019); see also MODEL FOOD FREEDOM ACT (INST. FOR JUST. 2018).

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ARE CRIMINALS BAD OR MAD?

PREMEDITATED MURDER, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND KAHLER V. KANSAS

PAUL J. LARKIN, JR.† & GIANCARLO CANAPARO‡

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 86
I. KAHLER V. KANSAS ................................................................. 91
   A. The Treatment of Mental Disease under Kansas’s Criminal Law .......... 91
   B. Kahler Shoots Four Members of His Family at Close Range in Different Locations in His Grandmother-in-Law’s Home ....................... 93
   C. The Kansas Supreme Court’s Decision ...... 95
II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE ........................................... 96
   A. The Text of the Due Process Clause .......... 96
   B. The History of the Due Process Clause ..... 100
   C. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Due Process Clause ................. 103
      1. The Supreme Court and Mens Rea .......... 103
      2. Procedural Versus Substantive Due Process ................................... 110
   D. The Rationality of Kansas’s Approach to Criminal Responsibility .......... 114
III. THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE .......... 131

‡ J.D., Georgetown Law Center, 2014; B.A., University of California at Davis, 2011. We want to thank John Malcolm and Amy Swearer for invaluable comments on an earlier version of this Article. We also want to thank Alexis Huggins for invaluable research assistance. The views expressed in this Article are our own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. Any mistakes are ours.
INTRODUCTION

Murder, it is sad to say, is an ancient phenomenon.\(^1\) Each one is a profound assault on its immediate victim, but also has the same far-reaching, rippling effect as a stone thrown into a still body of water. Among other consequences, felt both immediately and over the long term, murder corrodes the perception of communal security that any society needs to remain cohesive.\(^2\)

In the earliest days of Anglo-American law, society found punishment of murderers necessary to avoid the violent inter-clan retaliation that would otherwise follow and to restore, as far as possible, the peace of the realm.\(^3\) The criminal law has always been civilization’s principal defense against crime; it protects society against such mayhem, whatever its cause might be. As Professors Joseph Goldstein and Jay Katz put it, the criminal law seeks “to protect the life, liberty, dignity, and property of the community and its members by threatening to deprive those who . . . contemplate [antisocial] conduct and

\(^1\) See Genesis 4:8 (King James) (the story of Cain murdering Abel); Thomas A. Green, The Jury and the English Law of Homicide, 1200–1600, 74 MICH. L. REV. 413, 415 (1976) (“Homicide was a daily fact of life in medieval England. Brawling was common; serious physical violence routine.”).


\(^3\) See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Lost Due Process Doctrines, 66 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 328 (2016).
by inflicting sanctions upon those who engage in proscribed activity.”4 That understanding is why the English common law ultimately came to treat all felonies, particularly murder, not only as a harm done to the victim, but also as an act “contra coronam et dignitatem regis” (an act contrary to the peace and dignity of the crown), which the sovereign may punish himself.5

Mental illness is almost as old as murder,6 and sometimes they occur in tandem.7 When a murderer is mentally ill, the problems he generates for society increase in complexity. Deciding precisely what the response should be has been the subject of vigorous debate throughout the legal community, the medical profession, and the legislatures on each side of the Atlantic.8 It is,
as Professor Francis Allen once put it, “a task of great difficulty.”9 The reason, as Chief Justice Burger explained, is that the issue of whether—and, if so, how—a mentally ill offender should be held responsible for his conduct is “complicated” by the “inter-twining moral, legal, and medical judgments” that a judge or jury must make.10

Tasked with the responsibility to decide concrete cases, however, the Anglo-American courts have long designed rules defining the consequences of mental illness for the trial, conviction, and punishment of an offender.11 That process has gone forward...
for centuries in much the same manner that Oliver Wendell Holmes used to describe the evolution of the common law: as a matter governed by experience, rather than logic.\textsuperscript{12}

The criminal law has traditionally used a multistage process to adjudicate cases involving a defendant’s claim that he is not criminally responsible because of insanity based on a severe mental illness.\textsuperscript{13} The trial in such cases worked as follows: A jury would first decide whether the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.\textsuperscript{14} In making that determination, the jury could not consider any evidence that, because of a mental disorder, the defendant could not formulate the scienter or mens rea elements of the charged offense.\textsuperscript{15} Under the law or practice in the states,\textsuperscript{16} the jury could consider evidence of a defendant’s severe mental illness only at a separate, post-guilt stage devoted entirely to the issue of his sanity, known as the insanity stage.\textsuperscript{17} At that phase, a defendant could offer evidence that he suffered from a disabling mental disease or defect and should not be

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\item[13.] See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 106–21, 171–90; David W. Louisell & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CAL. L. REV. 805 (1961) (discussing the process of adjudicating an insanity claim at trial).
\item[14.] Louisell & Hazard, supra note 13, at 809 n.12.
\item[15.] Id. at 813–15.
\item[16.] Kathryn S. Berthot, Bifurcation in Insanity Trials: A Change in Maryland’s Criminal Procedure, 48 MD. L. REV. 1045, 1046 n.5 (1989).
\item[17.] Id. at 1046 n.5, 1059; Louisell & Hazard, supra note 13, at 809 n.12. At one time, some states, California in particular, permitted a defendant to present evidence of mental illness at the guilt stage of a case to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt pursuant to a diminished capacity defense. See, e.g., People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492, 498–99 (Cal. 1959); People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53, 64–66 (Cal. 1949); Goldstein, supra note 8, at 199–202. In Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946), a case arising from a homicide in the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a defendant should be able to assert a diminished capacity defense in federal court. Id. at 473. Influencing the Court in Fisher were its precedents stating that the District of Columbia courts should fashion their own common law of crimes. See id. at 476 (“Matters relating to law enforcement in the District are entrusted to the courts of the District. Our policy is not to interfere with the local rules of law which they fashion, save in exceptional situations where egregious error has been committed.”). Most states agreed with that ruling as a matter of their own state laws. See id. at 473 n.12 (collecting cases accepting and rejecting a diminished capacity defense). For discussions of the diminished capacity defense, see, e.g., Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal Excuse in Contemporary American Law (2007); Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1977).
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held criminally responsible for his conduct.\textsuperscript{18} If the jury agreed with the defendant, the jury would return a verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity,” which ordinarily resulted in his commitment to a mental institution, instead of his imprisonment.\textsuperscript{19}

Within the last two decades, Kansas decided to try a new approach. The state revamped when and how it allows a jury to consider evidence of a defendant’s mental illness. Historically, Kansas followed the widely used practice of conducting a separate, post-guilt stage to resolve a defendant’s claim that he is not guilty of a crime because of a mental disease or defect. Now, Kansas has switched around its procedure for raising any such defense. A defendant may still argue that the jury should not hold him responsible for a crime because of mental illness. Under the new law, however, he may introduce that evidence only at the guilt stage and then only to raise a reasonable doubt that he possessed a mental state defined by state law as an element of the offense.\textsuperscript{20}

This term, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Constitution restrains a legislature’s decision to decide how mentally ill offenders should be held responsible. Offenders twice argued that the new Kansas procedure is unconstitutional, and the Kansas Supreme Court twice rejected their arguments.\textsuperscript{21} The Court granted review in \textit{Kahler v. Kansas}\textsuperscript{22} to decide whether the Kansas state legislature acted arbitrarily by

\textsuperscript{18} See, e.g., Louisell & Hazard, \textit{supra} note 13, at 806–13.
\textsuperscript{19} Id.
\textsuperscript{20} See infra Part I.A.
\textsuperscript{22} 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (order granting certiorari).
choosing to experiment with a new approach for resolving that issue.23

This Article maintains that Kansas’s decision was constitutionally permissible. The Due Process Clause does not require the criminal law to offer an insanity defense. The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, but says nothing about the definition of crimes. Ultimately, the Constitution allows the states to determine the relevance of mental illness to the substantive criminal law and requires only that a state’s chosen approach be rational, which Kansas’s approach certainly is.

The discussion below proceeds as follows: Part I explains how Kansas law treats mental illness, describes James Kahler’s crimes, and summarizes the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court. Part II addresses Kahler’s claim that the Kansas procedure violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part III addresses that issue from the perspective of the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

I. KAHLER V. KANSAS

A. The Treatment of Mental Disease under Kansas’s Criminal Law

At least as early as 1884, Kansas adopted the formulation of the insanity defense known as the M’Naghten rule.24 Established by the House of Lords in 1843, the M’Naghten rule required a jury to acquit a criminal defendant if it found that he was “not sensible” at the time he committed the crime because, by reason of a “disease of the mind,” he suffered “under such a defect of reason” that he did not know “the nature and quality” of his act or that it was “wrong.”25

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23. Id.; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2018) (Question Presented: “Do the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense?”).

24. See State v. Nixon, 4 P. 159, 163–64 (Kan. 1884) (holding that if a defendant lacks sufficient mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, then he cannot be held criminally liable).

25. M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (HL) (“[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on
The M’Naghten rule remained undisturbed in Kansas until 1995. Following years of growing public concern over the insanity defense after John Hinckley, Jr.’s attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, the Kansas legislature revisited the insanity defense and revised state law to refocus it. The new law, section 22-3220 of Kansas Statutes Annotated, provided as follows: “It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense.” The effect of the revision allows a defendant to use evidence of a mental disease to raise a reasonable doubt that he did or could not have acted with the mental state required for the crime charged. The ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”


27. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 121–26. For a sense of the fever pitch of public backlash against the insanity defense, see The Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982). At that hearing, the Judiciary Committee considered eight bills that would have, in one way or another, limited the insanity defense. Id. at 485–566. Senator Orrin Hatch proposed adding a new section to Title 18 of the United States Code that would read: “It shall be a defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute, that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.” Id. at 507–08 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). Kansas’s law, enacted thirteen years later, closely mirrored Senator Hatch’s proposed language.

28. The Question Presented in Kahler asks whether a state may abolish the insanity defense. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 23, at i. That question does not accurately describe Kansas’s law, which reshaped an insanity defense into a diminished capacity defense. Ultimately, however, Kahler’s framing of the issue is far less important than how Kansas permits a defendant to make use of evidence of mental illness at trial. The issue is whether—and, if so, how—a defendant can present evidence of mental illness as a defense. Kansas opted for a diminished capacity defense instead of an insanity defense. As explained below, that choice is a reasonable one.

29. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (2007) (repealed 2011). The legislature slightly revised the wording of the statute in 2011 when it moved the statute from section 22-3220 to section 21-5209. The relevant text remains substantively the same. Compare § 22-3220 with § 21-5209 (Supp. 2018) (“It shall be a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state required as an element of the crime charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense.”).
have formed the mens rea required for conviction. That statute was on the books when Kahler was tried and convicted of capital murder for killing four members of his family.

B. Kahler Shoots Four Members of His Family at Close Range in Different Locations in His Grandmother-in-Law’s Home

In the summer of 2008, Kahler’s wife, Karen, told him that she wanted to have a sexual relationship with a female colleague of hers. Kahler consented to the relationship but grew embarrassed by public displays of affection between his wife and her lover, one of which led to a shoving match between the Kahlers. The two attempted marriage counseling, but the effort proved unsuccessful. By January 2009, Karen had filed for divorce. Kahler maintained that these events threw him into severe depression. He was unable to cope with the divorce, and, in March 2009, he was publicly arrested and charged with domestic abuse against Karen. Karen then left the family home and took with her their three children, Emily, Lauren, and Sean.

Kahler’s marriage and family relationships disintegrated. His colleagues noted that he became increasingly preoccupied by his personal problems and paid less and less attention to his job. By August 2009, he was fired. His parents were concerned about his well-being and moved Kahler into their home.

The family had a tradition of spending the weekend after Thanksgiving at the home of Karen’s grandmother, Dorothy. Sean had been staying with Kahler and his parents in the days beforehand, and he asked Karen if he could remain there for

30. See § 21-5209 (formerly § 22-3220).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 114.
36. Id. at 113.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
the weekend. Karen said that Sean should spend the holiday at her grandmother’s house instead. That evening, Kahler drove to Dorothy’s house with a Remington .223 caliber rifle, carried it with him as he entered through the back door, saw and passed by Sean, and, moving throughout the house, shot and killed Karen, Emily, Lauren, and Dorothy. He did not harm Sean, who, after seeing his father, fled to a neighbor’s house. When officers arrived, they found Karen in the kitchen, Emily and Dorothy in the living room, and Lauren upstairs. They were dead or died later.

Kahler eluded law enforcement until the next morning when he was spotted walking down a country road. When law enforcement later searched his car, they found an empty box for a Remington .223 caliber rifle. Although the gun was never found, the serial number on the box matched the serial number of a rifle registered to Kahler.

At trial, Kahler did not deny that he shot his family members. Instead, he argued that his severe depression prevented him from forming the intent and premeditation necessary for capital murder. A defense psychiatrist expert testified that, at the time Kahler shot his family members, “his capacity to manage his own behavior had been severely degraded so that he couldn’t refrain from doing what he did.” The trial judge instructed the jury that it could consider any evidence that Kahler was mentally ill in deciding whether he premeditated on the intent to kill his victims.

The jury instructions were as follows:

Evidence has been presented that the defendant was afflicted by mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged crime. Such evidence is to be

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 119.
46. Id. at 113–14.
47. Id. at 113.
48. Id. at 114.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 119.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 114.
54. Id.
55. Id.
ated him from using evidence of mental illness for any other purpose, Kahler could not also defend on the ground that he was not guilty by reason of insanity.

The jury convicted Kahler of capital murder and recommended the death sentence, which the trial judge imposed.57

C. The Kansas Supreme Court’s Decision

On appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Kahler argued that section 22-3220 of Kansas Statutes Annotated violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it abolished the insanity defense.58 Relying on its 2003 decision in State v. Bethel,59 the Kansas Supreme Court rejected Kahler’s claim.60 In Bethel, the defendant killed his father because, he maintained, God had ordered him to do so.61 Like Kahler, Bethel had argued that the insanity defense was “a fundamental element of our criminal justice system.”62 The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an insanity defense is a creature of state law, not federal constitutional law.63 It relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Powell v. Texas64

considered only in determining whether the defendant had the state of mind required to commit the crimes.

When considering capital murder, you are instructed the defendant is not criminally responsible for his acts if, because of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked premeditation and/or the intent to kill.

When considering murder in the first degree, you are instructed the defendant is not criminally responsible for his acts if, because of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked premeditation and/or the intent to kill.

When considering murder in the second degree, you are instructed the defendant is not criminally responsible for his acts if, because of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked the intent to kill.

When considering aggravated burglary, you are instructed the defendant is not criminally responsible for his acts if, because of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked the intent to commit capital murder.

Id.

57. Kahler, 410 P.3d at 112.
58. Id. at 125.
60. Kahler, 410 P.3d at 124–25 (citing Bethel, 66 P.3d at 853).
62. Id. at 844.
63. Id. at 850–51.
64. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
and *Leland v. Oregon.* The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted those cases as holding that the Constitution does not mandate any particular approach to insanity but rather leaves it to the states. In neither *Bethel* nor *Kahler* did the Kansas Supreme Court expressly consider whether section 22-3220 violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.

II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE

A. The Text of the Due Process Clause

The Due Process Clause is an odd place to look for a limitation on a state’s power to define crimes or defenses to a criminal charge. All that its Delphic text states (in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment) is that “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Those sixteen words do not refer to, let alone define, any conduct that should be made an offense or provide a defense to one. In fact, they give no indication that they do anything more than refer to substantive criminal law that is defined elsewhere. To treat those bare words as creating an insanity defense without any need for supplemental judicial creativity is like saying that the Sistine Chapel painted itself.

That conclusion becomes even more apparent when one compares the text of the Due Process Clause with several other constitutional provisions that, expressly or impliedly, do directly address a legislature’s substantive legislative criminal lawmaking authority. Those provisions define the elements of a specific offense, empower Congress to carry out that function, or expressly limit federal or state criminal lawmaking authority. One must look to those provisions, not the Due Process Clause, to discern whether the Constitution abridges elected officials’ ability to represent the moral judgments of their communities.

65. 343 U.S. 790 (1952); *Bethel,* 66 P.3d at 847–51 (citing *Leland,* 343 U.S. at 797–99 (ruling that a state can require a defendant to bear the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt on an insanity defense); *Powell,* 392 U.S. at 535–36 (holding that conviction for public drunkenness where the defendant suffered from a compulsion to drink did not violate the Eighth Amendment)).


67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; *see also id.* amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
Start with the Article III Treason Clause, the only provision in the Constitution that actually defines a specific crime. The clause defines “Treason against the United States” as “consist[ing] only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”

The Framers went out of their way to define that crime in the Constitution because they did not trust elected officials to protect political dissent. The Framers remembered the English history of using a charge of treason to prosecute not rebels and revolutionaries for violent insurrection or sedition, but rather the average person for merely uttering “expressions” of dissent or possessing “mere mental attitudes” of disagreement with the governing authorities. The Framers’ decision to ensure that only conduct specifically defined by the Constitution as treason can serve as the basis for such a charge demonstrates that the Framers left the authority to define other crimes and defenses to the normal democratic process. The Treason Clause is the exception to the rule that the Constitution does not define specific crimes. It therefore strongly suggests that the Due Process Clause performs no such function.

Other constitutional provisions expressly authorize Congress to define offenses and affix punishments. The Article I Coinage and Counterfeiting Clauses appear in sequence and clearly address different parts of the same problem. No nation can operate a modern economy without a uniform national currency, and there has been a strong need to protect the integrity of banknotes against counterfeiting for probably as long as there

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68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
70. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 28.
have been coins or paper money. Thus the Coinage Clause authorizes Congress to establish a national currency and define its value, and the Counterfeiting Clause empowers Congress to punish falsification of currency. For another example, the Define and Punish Clause permits Congress to define the crime of “Piracy” along with “Offences against the Law of Nations.”

Finally, the Military Regulation Clause authorizes Congress to establish a separate criminal justice system, including a distinct military penal code, for the armed forces. These clauses expressly authorize Congress to define offenses, thereby relying on the political process to establish punishments for crimes other than treason.

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73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures . . . .”).

74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States . . . .”).


77. Other clauses implicitly authorize Congress to define crimes. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13–15 (Ox Bow Press 1985) (1969) (arguing that Congress has the inherent authority to protect the federal interests embodied in the substantive guarantees of federal law-making power in Article I, Section 8). The Commerce Clause power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes” carries with it the power to punish criminally anyone who violates those restrictions. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. A classic example is the Sherman Act, which makes illegal conspiracies to fix prices and output in interstate commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). The Excise Tax Clause enables Congress to raise revenue via “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and Congress has made smuggling a federal offense, 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2012). Finally, the Seat of Government Clause permits the federal government to use land ceded by Virginia and Maryland as the nation’s capital. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Implicitly, then, Congress is authorized to define common law crimes and otherwise use criminal law to exercise police powers over the federal district. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) (2012); D.C. CODE §§ 22-101 to -5215 (2013 & Supp. 2019). Even if the powers enumerated in the clauses of Article I, Section 8, did not, on their own, implicitly leave it to Congress to decide whether and how to use the criminal law as an en-
The constitutional text also creates certain express defenses to crimes. Consider the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clause. The first half bars a legislature from enacting a law that names and convicts someone of a crime without a trial. The second half forbids a legislature from retroactively applying a statute defining a new crime or enhancing the penalty for an old one. The First Amendment also takes away from Congress the authority to “make . . . [any] law” trespassing on certain civil liberties, which naturally includes any law making it a crime to engage in the conduct that the provision safeguards. Defendants in both federal and state criminal cases may defend against a charged federal offense on the ground that the statute violates the First Amendment.

The clauses discussed above have this in common: they all address aspects of substantive criminal law. One defines a crime in the text of the Constitution. Some describe the type of conduct that the government should outlaw. Others place certain primary conduct entirely out of bounds. The Due Process Clause does none of those things. Instead, as we will explain in the next Section, it ensures that no one can be criminally punished unless he has committed a constitutional offense defined by a different positive law and then only in compliance with whatever procedural restraints the law elsewhere requires.

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78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); id. § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . [or] ex post facto Law . . . .”).


81. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

B. The History of the Due Process Clause

Justice Holmes once remarked that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”83 His aphorism is particularly germane when the subject has deep roots in Anglo-American legal history, like the Due Process Clause.

The phrase “due process of law” comes from a fourteenth century act of Parliament, stating that “no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.”84 That provision, in turn, traces its lineage to Chapter 39 of Magna Carta of 1215, a document that rivals our own Constitution in the protections it affords against arbitrary government conduct.85

Magna Carta was born as a peace treaty during a time of great political tumult. Angry because of King John’s military failures in expensive overseas wars, never-ending political intrigue, arbitrary exercise of royal power, and repeated personal cruelties, the English barons renounced their feudal obligations

84. Liberty of Subject Act 1354, 28 Edw. 3 ch. 3; see also A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 15 (rev. ed. 1998) (“[A]s early as 1354 the words ‘due process’ were used in an English statute interpreting Magna Carta, and by the end of the fourteenth century ‘due process of law’ and ‘law of the land’ were interchangeable.”); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1911). The English Petition of Right of 1628 reaffirmed the 1354 act and again used the term “due process of law,” instead of “the law of the land.” LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 4 (1999).
to the crown and gathered their forces in rebellion. King John acceded to the barons’ demands in 1215 “in the meadow which is called Runnymede, between Windsor and Staines, on the fifteenth day of June, in the seventeenth year of [his] reign.”

The most relevant provision in Magna Carta is Chapter 39. Chapter 39 is perhaps the closest an English law has ever come to being tantamount to a written constitution. Chapter 39 provided that “[n]o free man is to be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.” Coke construed “the law of the land” to refer to “the Common Law, Statute Law, or Custom of England.” Over time, the phrase “law of the land” became “due process of law,” but that revision “did not alter its meaning, effect, or significance.” As Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell have written, “Fundamentally, ‘due process’ meant that the government may not interfere with established rights without legal authorization and according to law, with ‘law’ meaning the common law as customarily applied by courts and retrospectively declared by Parliament, or as modified prospectively by general acts of

86. See CARPENTER, supra note 85, at 70 (“The financial burdens placed on England to defend and recover the continental empire were the single most important cause of Magna Carta. Had John been content with ruling England and dominating Britain and Ireland, there would have been no Charter.”); PLUCKNETT, supra note 85, at 22–25; THOMAS PITT TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: FROM THE TEUTONIC CONQUEST TO THE PRESENT TIME 82 (Philip A. Ashworth ed., 7th ed. 1911) (“In disposition and character John was an oriental despot, a tyrant of the worst sort. . . . [He] was guilty of acts of cruelty rivaling those of Nero.”).

87. CARPENTER, supra note 85, at 69 (quoting signature section of Magna Carta) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 117–18, 315–23; Larkin, supra note 3, at 333–34.

88. See HOWARD, supra note 84, at 14.


90. HOLT, supra note 85, at 389 (quoting MAGNA CARTA ch. 39 (1215)) (internal quotation marks omitted).


92. Larkin, supra note 3, at 338.
Parliament.”93 The first Congress proposed adding the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to the Constitution, and the state ratifying conventions agreed.94

The provenance of the Due Process Clause reveals a concern with preventing the arbitrary deprivation of someone’s life, liberty, or property by a government official acting in a wanton, lawless fashion.95 The thrust of that history is that the purpose of the Due Process Clause is to limit the government’s ability to act oppressively by forcing it to prove whatever elements the substantive rules of criminal liability demand. It does not also suggest that courts may add to the government’s burden by adopting additional elements in derogation of whatever law Parliament, Congress, or a state legislature deems sufficient.

To be sure, English and American courts have created, shaped, and reshaped defenses to crimes as part of their perceived judicial authority to carry forward the common law and to fashion that law as reason dictates.96 There is, however, substantial reason to doubt that federal courts may use the Due Process Clause to accomplish that result. The history of the clause offers no warrant for doing so, and, as explained in the

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94. James Madison was principally responsible for the wording of the Fifth Amendment. Why he chose the phrase “due process of law,” not “the law of the land,” no one precisely knows. See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 445–46 (2010). Some scholars have speculated that he used the former to avoid implying that, given the text of the Article VI Supremacy Clause, the term “the law of the land” could permit Congress to escape being subject to the clause because federal legislation would be deemed “the supreme Law of the Land.” See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 93, at 1723–24. That explanation is a sensible one, but whatever its persuasiveness might be, it does not matter. The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted “due process of law” to mean the same as “law of the land.” See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 415–17 (1897); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 543 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101 (1878); Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856).
95. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (noting that the Framers adopted the Due Process Clause to “secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government” (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 527) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” (citing Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1890))).
next Section, the Supreme Court to date has repeatedly refused
to use that clause as a basis for creating a constitutionally based
d Doctrine defining criminal responsibility.

C. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation
   of the Due Process Clause

This Section addresses the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Due Process Clause. The first Subsection focuses on the
Court’s treatment of the use of scienter or mens rea elements to
avoid the conviction of morally blameless parties. As explained
below, the Court has been willing to read federal statutes to
require proof of intentional wrongdoing when the text of a fed-
eral offense allows that interpretation. At the same time, the
Court has refused to construe the Due Process Clause to de-
mand that legislatures always incorporate some mens rea ele-
ment into every criminal law. Rather than “constitutionalize” a
law of moral responsibility, the Court has gone out of its way
to make it clear that legislatures bear the burden of making that
judgment.

The second Subsection explains that Kahler’s claim rests on
substantive due process principles. Kahler does not cite the
principal Supreme Court decisions in that area of the law, but
his argument challenges the substantive definition of criminal
responsibility in Kansas’s law, not the adequacy or fairness of
the trial procedures that Kansas has adopted to adjudicate that
issue. He therefore cannot avoid relying on substantive due
process case law as the basis on which his claim must rest.

1. The Supreme Court and Mens Rea

In his appeal, Kahler argues that an insanity defense is criti-
cal to any fundamentally fair definition of criminal liability.97
To prove that point, he scours the common law and collects
numerous statements by luminaries such as William Blackstone,
Supreme Court Justices Story and Robert Jackson, Professor
Francis Bowes Sayre, and others from which he maintains that
the ability to know what the law prohibits and to distinguish
“good” from “evil” or “right” from “wrong” is essential to the
moral legitimacy of the criminal law.98 As shown by that evi-

98. Id. at 16–29.
dence, he argues that Anglo-American legal history demands “some mechanism to excuse a defendant who, because of mental disease or defect, is not morally culpable.” The insanity defense, he submits, is the only historically proven guarantee for that task. By adopting section 22-3220, Kansas has eliminated that protection, rendering the judgment entered against him unconstitutional.

Kahler is correct, in part. Tort law often uses liability without fault as a means of guaranteeing compensation to injured parties and forcing employers (and others) to maximize their safety efforts. The criminal law, on the other hand has traditionally limited criminal responsibility to people who are morally blameworthy, acquitting the blameless even when they cause harm. Oliver Wendell Holmes’s aphorism that “even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked” makes the point in a homely manner. The law achieves that result by requiring that the prosecution establish that a person committed a forbidden act with a “guilty mind” or an “evil intent.” “Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea” — or, said differently, a crime consists of “a vicious will” and “an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.” By defining crimes to require the prosecution to prove that a party had a mental state indicative of blameworthiness, contemporary criminal law car-

99. Id. at 16.
100. Id. at 16–29.
101. Id. at 28–29.
103. HOLMES, supra note 12, at 7.
104. Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932). In English, the maxim means that an act does not make one guilty unless the mind is guilty.
105. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21; see also, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2006); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980); Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW, at xxxvi–xxxvii (1927) (“Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong.”).
ries forward the principle that there is a difference between being ignorant, careless, or clumsy and being evil. 106

But the Due Process Clause does not require this result. For more than a century, the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress and state legislatures may, if they so choose, dispense with proof of any mens rea element by adopting so-called “strict liability” or “public welfare” offenses. 107 In a series

106. The common law courts were able to ensure that some form of evil intent was an element of every crime because they had the authority to create offenses and define their elements. Today, there are no federal common law offenses; every one is a creature of statute. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33–34 (1812); see also, e.g., Dixon, 548 U.S. at 7 (“[T]he definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.” (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nonetheless, because careless drafting can give rise to uncertainty whether and how a statute requires proof of scienter, the Supreme Court uses a presumption that “Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding ‘each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.’” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)); see also, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015); Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 657 (2009) (construing an identity theft statute to require proof that the defendant knew that the identifying information belonged to another person); X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 78 (construing a federal child pornography statute to require proof that the defendant knew that the actor was a minor); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 603–04, 619 (1994) (construing a federal law regulating firearms to require proof that the defendant knew that the weapon was capable of automatic fire); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433 (construing the federal food stamp laws to require proof that the defendant knew that his possession was not authorized by law); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435–36 (1978) (construing section 1 of the Sherman Act as requiring proof of knowledge); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 265–73 (1952) (construing theft statute to require proof that the defendant knew the property belonged to the federal government). The presumption helps ensure that only morally blameworthy parties are subject to conviction. The optimal way to satisfy that requirement, of course, is to force the prosecution to prove that a defendant knew he committed a crime—that is, to prove that he acted “willfully” by voluntarily and intentionally violating a known legal duty. The Supreme Court has consistently read the term “willful” in that manner. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991); United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973). As a general matter, however, statutes requiring proof of willfulness are a rarity in federal and state penal codes. Ordinarily, the prosecution need prove only that a defendant acted “knowingly” or “intentionally.” For most crimes, proof of either element is sufficient to avoid convicting a morally blameless party.

of cases decided between 1910 and 1975—Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,108 United States v. Balint,109 United States v. Dotterweich,110 United States v. Freed,111 United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.,112 and United States v. Park113—the Court rejected due process challenges to the constitutionality of various federal and state laws creating strict liability crimes.114 In each case, the relevant statute made it a crime to commit the actus reus elements of an offense without regard for the defendant’s state of mind. In each case, the defendant argued that the statute violated the Due Process Clause because it did not require the government to prove that the defendant acted with a “guilty mind,” however defined. And in each case, the Supreme Court rejected that argument and declined to impose a mens rea requirement on the criminal law under the federal constitution.115 In fact, despite the impressive pedigree that the mens rea doctrine had at common law and in the Supreme Court’s twentieth century case law,116 the Court’s opinions in its strict

108. 218 U.S. 57, 68–70 (1910) (holding that a corporation can be convicted for trespass without proof of criminal intent).
109. 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922) (holding that a real person can be convicted of the sale of narcotics without a tax stamp even absent proof that he knew that the substance was a narcotic); see also United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922) (companion case to Balint, holding that a physician can be convicted of distributing a controlled substance not “in the course of his professional practice” even without proof that he knew that his actions exceeded that limit).
110. 320 U.S. 277, 278, 284–85 (1943) (holding that a company president can be convicted of distributing adulterated or misbranded drugs in interstate commerce without proof that he even was aware of the transaction).
111. 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1971) (holding that a defendant can be convicted of the unlicensed possession of hand grenades).
112. 402 U.S. 558, 563–65 (1971) (holding that a defendant can be convicted of the unlicensed interstate transportation of sulfuric acid).
113. 421 U.S. 658, 660, 672–73 (1975) (holding that a company president can be convicted of violating the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act without proof that he was aware of unsanitary conditions in a food warehouse).
115. As explained below, the Supreme Court has also refused to use the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to create a constitutional mens rea defense. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535–37 (1968); infra Part III.C.2.
116. See, e.g., Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–51 (1952) (“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some
liability decisions from Shevlin-Carpenter Co. to Park gave surprisingly short shrift to the defendants’ due process claims.\textsuperscript{117}

The strict liability doctrine certainly is, and has always been, a controversial one. Scholars who could fill out a Criminal Law Hall of Fame lineup—such as Professors Lon Fuller, H.L.A. Hart, Sanford Kadish, Herbert Packer, and Herbert Wechsler—have consistently denounced strict criminal liability on a variety of grounds.\textsuperscript{118} The common denominator to their criticisms is that strict liability offenses turn morally blameless parties into

\textsuperscript{117} See, e.g., Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 66 (1910).

criminals.\textsuperscript{119} In so doing, strict liability flips on its head the criminal law tenet that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer”\textsuperscript{120} because it sacrifices a morally blameless party for the sake of others. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has showed no sign of abandoning those precedents.\textsuperscript{121} Strict criminal liability is likely to be with us for quite some time.\textsuperscript{122}

Indeed, it has not gone unnoticed that the criticisms advanced by those scholars of strict liability offenses bear a strong similarity to the same type of criticisms that Kahler (and others) have leveled against criminal prosecution of the mentally ill. As Professor Kent Greenawalt put it, one challenge to holding the mentally ill responsible for a crime is that “it is objectionable to punish someone for an antisocial act performed by him but over which he has no real control.”\textsuperscript{123} Yet, if that is true, he noted, “it is also objectionable to punish someone who supposes, after exercising all possible care, that the act he performs is socially beneficial and permitted by law, even though he turns out to be mis-

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\textsuperscript{120} Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895) (quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 79, at *358) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Alexander Volokh, \textit{n Guilty Men}, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997).
\textsuperscript{121} Despite substantial support for substantive federal criminal law reform, see John G. Malcolm, \textit{Criminal Justice Reform at the Crossroads}, 20 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 254–57 (2016), Congress has also given no indication that it will repeal, or even modify, those laws for fear (to some) that doing so would jeopardize “progressive” reforms. Barack Obama, Commentary, \textit{The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform}, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811, 829 n.89 (2017) (noting opposition to reform of the federal criminal laws to eliminate strict liability on the ground that any mens rea reform “could undermine public safety and harm progressive goals”).
\textsuperscript{122} See Larkin, supra note 119, at 1078–79 (“The result is this: Regulatory criminal laws have become a settled feature of modern-day statutory codes, and they often impose criminal liability for a host of actions that historically would have been considered only civil infractions. Rather than use the administrative state to sanction regulatory violations only through penalties such as fines, debarment, or license revocation, legislatures have conscripted the criminal justice system—police officers, prosecutors, judges, and jailers—to regulate business by punishing as crimes a broad range of conduct not considered inherently evil, dangerous, or blameworthy. Strict liability, although a relatively recent addition, is no longer a complete oddity in the criminal law. It is just another tool in the toolkit. The result is that we have reached the point where it can be difficult to distinguish the substantive criminal law from tort law save for one distinguishing feature of the former: Only the criminal law is used to incarcerate offenders.”).
\end{flushleft}
Perhaps, that should be the law, as he and others have argued, but, as he and others have recognized, it is not. The Supreme Court has reiterated for more than a century that a mistake of law is no defense to a federal crime. Given the pedigree and number of Supreme Court decisions rejecting a mistake of law defense as a basis for exculpating someone for a nonviolent regulatory crime, it is not likely that the Supreme Court will overrule that line of authority any time soon. And if that is true, it is difficult to see why the Due Process Clause would be thought to contain a mens rea element that would exculpate someone, such as Kahler, on the ground that he did not know that murder is wrongful.

124. Id.
125. Federal criminal law conclusively presumes that everyone knows the law. That ancient rule made sense at common law, when there were few felonies and they mirrored the crimes listed in the Decalogue. Today, there are thousands of federal statutes creating criminal offenses and hundreds of thousands of pertinent federal regulations. Under those circumstances, to refuse to reexamine the common law rule that everyone knows the criminal law is a crime all by itself. See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Folly of Requiring Complete Knowledge of the Criminal Law, 12 Liberty U. L. Rev. 335 (2018); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 715, 777–81 (2013); Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 725 (2012).


127. Professor Greenawalt’s argument undermines Kahler’s submission in another way. In the professor’s opinion, “[c]ertain forms of strict liability can be defended as consistent with the principle that an actor should be punished only if morally blameworthy.” Greenawalt, supra note 123, at 964–65. As an example, he offers the following hypothetical: someone convicted of murder “because death,
2. Procedural Versus Substantive Due Process

Only a modern day Rip Van Winkle would be unaware of the ongoing debate whether the Due Process Clause merely imposes procedural restraints on executive and judicial action or also limits a legislature’s substantive lawmaking power. The contemporary dispute began no later than the Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in *Griswold v. Connecticut*, which held unconstitutional a state law ban on the use of contraceptive drugs or devices by married couples. The debate has continued apace to the present. Ordinarily, the debate focuses on the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s later decisions in *Roe v. Wade* and *Obergefell v. Hodges*, cases in which the Court held that the clause imposes a substantive limitation on legislation affecting the areas of “marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.” Kahler does not expressly ask the Court to rule in his favor on substantive due process grounds, and he does not cite the *Roe* or *Obergefell* decisions as authority to limit Kansas’s criminal lawmaking power. Nevertheless, because of the nature of Kahler’s claim as a challenge to the substantive content of Kansas criminal law, there is no despite his precautions, occurs as a consequence of his felony.” That person, he writes, “has committed an illegal and blameworthy act,” so “[h]is only real complaint is that his penalty is disproportionate to his blameworthiness.” *Id.* at 965. Kahler cannot make that argument because he hardly took “precautions” to prevent his four victims from dying. On the contrary, he intentionally killed each one.

128. *See, e.g.*, Chapman & McConnell, supra note 93, at 1676 nn.5–6 (collecting authorities); *Larkin*, supra note 3, at 298–300 (same). For a description of this “Tastes Great!—Less Filling!” contest between the two theories, see *Larkin*, supra note 3, at 297–99.

129. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

130. *Id.* at 485.


134. Kahler does, however, cite the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in *Moore v. City of East Cleveland*, 431 U.S. 494 (1972), see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 16, which is also a substantive due process decision, see *Moore*, 431 U.S. at 502–03. Perhaps he did not see the irony between the ruling in *Moore* that the government cannot forbid a grandmother from living with her children and grandchildren, *id.* at 506, and the use he tried to make of it as support for the argument that someone who murdered a grandmother, her daughter, and two of her grandchildren should be able to escape criminal responsibility.
realistic way that he and the Justices can avoid considering the Court’s substantive due process case law.

Kahler does not argue that Kansas law made it unduly difficult for him to prove that he did not know the difference between right and wrong. Nor does he contend that the Kansas legislature has biased the trial process against someone like him who seeks to assert that claim. Either of those contentions would sound in procedural due process because their rationale would be that the state has unfairly engineered the conviction of an innocent person. That, however, is not the gravamen of Kahler’s argument. Instead, he argues that Kansas’s substantive criminal law does not allow him to show that he is morally blameless at all because it redefined moral responsibility to focus exclusively on the issue whether he premeditated on the intent to kill his victims. In so doing, he says, Kansas denied him any opportunity to prove that he is morally blameless for murder by virtue of a mental illness that kept him from knowing that murder is wrongful. This, he submits, Kansas cannot do—and that is an argument sounding in substantive due process.

Like any argument that rests so heavily on history, Kahler’s submission presents a host of familiar interpretive problems that have no obvious nonarbitrary solutions. How many jurisdictions with a particular practice make a consensus, how long a consensus must stand to become a well-settled tradition, and at what point a tradition is so entrenched that different approaches no longer pass muster, to list a few examples, are questions that defy easy answers. Should other states find the new Kansas approach preferable to their own, there would also be no easy answer for deciding how many states, in what period of time, would be enough to turn the Jayhawk State from an outlier to a trendsetter. Finally, as Professor John Hart Ely has noted, there is more than one past example of community conduct that we now would find unacceptable, even toward its

135. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 12–13.
136. See id.
most disfavored members.\textsuperscript{138} Clearly enough, expanse over time and space cannot make a practice into a hallowed constitutional rule, but the distinction between “good” traditions to be constitutionalized and “bad” ones to be abandoned can be elusive. Without answers to these questions, however, we cannot be certain we know what we need to know to create a constitutional right based on history and tradition.

The Supreme Court’s decisions in \textit{Roe} and \textit{Obergefell} involved issues regarding “marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.”\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Kahler v. Kansas} involves murder. Extending the substantive due process doctrine to embrace cases like \textit{Kahler v. Kansas} would be transformative. As explained above (and below), the Supreme Court has refused to use either the Due Process or Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as a vehicle for constitutionalizing the criminal law. In fact, less than two decades ago the Court relied on the diverse approaches that Anglo-American law has adopted to the problem of defining criminal responsibility in refusing to specify a particular type of insanity test.\textsuperscript{140}

The Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in \textit{Chapman v. United States}\textsuperscript{141} is instructive in this regard. Three defendants were convicted of selling ten sheets (containing 1,000 doses) of blotter paper containing lysergic acid diethylamide, a controlled substance colloquially known as LSD, in violation of the federal controlled substances laws.\textsuperscript{142} Under those laws, the length of a defendant’s sentence rests on the weight of the “mixture or substance” containing a detectable amount of a controlled substance.\textsuperscript{143} The defendants argued that, because the weight of the LSD was miniscule compared to the weight of the LSD-laced blotter paper (50 milligrams versus 5.7 grams), the relevant statute should not be read to require counting the weight of the blotter paper or any other transport medium (such as orange

\textsuperscript{138} Id. at 60 (“Running men out of town on a rail is at least as much an American tradition as declaring unalienable rights.” (quoting GARRY WILLIS, INVENTING AMERICA, at xiii (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted))).


\textsuperscript{140} Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 (2006) (quoted \textit{infra} at text accompanying note 182).

\textsuperscript{141} 500 U.S. 453 (1991).

\textsuperscript{142} Id. at 455.

juice) when calculating their sentences. Counting the weight of an inactive substance, they also argued, was so arbitrary as to violate the Due Process Clause.

The Supreme Court rejected those arguments. LSD-infused blotter paper, the Court concluded, was a “mixture” under the controlled substances laws because the LSD and paper were “commingled” or “blended together.” That reading of federal law, the Court also ruled, did not render the controlled substances laws unconstitutionally arbitrary. The defendants had asserted that, because “the right to be free from deprivations of liberty as a result of arbitrary sentences is fundamental,” the federal controlled substances laws could be upheld as applied to LSD “only if the Government has a compelling interest in the classification in question.” The Court quite emphatically rejected both the premise and conclusion of that argument: “we have never subjected the criminal process to this sort of truncated analysis, and we decline to do so now.” The Due Process Clause, the Court explained, regulates how the prosecution must prove the essential predicates for punishment, not what elements Congress must legislate to define a crime. “Every person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the Government may not punish him unless and until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with the relevant constitutional guarantees.” Once the prosecution satisfies that burden, the Court concluded, the government may impose whatever penalty is authorized by law so long as it does not violate either the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause or the equal protection principles implicit in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.

144. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 456.
145. Id. at 464–65.
146. Id. at 461–62.
147. Id. at 464–65.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 465.
150. See id.
151. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16, 536 (1979)).
Kahler’s argument boils down to the proposition that this case is like Obergefell. The two cases, however, are materially different. There is no remote similarity between the conduct involved in Obergefell (same-sex marriage) and in Kahler (murder), so the Court’s analysis in Chapman should apply here as well. In Chapman, the Court was unwilling to import into criminal law the same type of “fundamental right” and interest balancing that it has used in cases like Obergefell. Instead, the Court concluded that the Due Process Clause simply seeks to ensure that a defendant receives whatever other procedural guarantees the Constitution elsewhere requires at his trial. The Chapman case teaches that substantive due process is inapposite when the underlying conduct does not independently qualify for constitutional protection. Chapman, accordingly, is fatal to Kahler’s claim.

D. The Rationality of Kansas’s Approach to Criminal Responsibility

Kahler argues that the Kansas statute is unconstitutional because it irrationally dispenses with an insanity defense, thereby preventing him from showing he did not know that murder was wrongful.153 Kansas has a legitimate interest in defining criminal responsibility and in shaping an insanity defense so that only offenders so disturbed that they cannot distinguish right from wrong can invoke it. Kahler argues, however, that, by eliminating the insanity defense altogether, Kansas has gone too far. Kahler relies on the admittedly longstanding Anglo-American law practice of fashioning the metes and bounds of an insanity defense to allow a defendant to assert that, because of a severe mental illness, he did not know that his conduct was wrongful.154 No jurisdiction has ever done what Kansas

153. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 32–36.

154. A state can rationally limit a defense to individuals who suffer from a profound mental disease or defect, for several reasons, one being the interest in deterring fraudulent or false claims. For all their differences, various tests for insanity share one common feature: they aim to encompass only severe mental illnesses—for good reason. If any form of mental illness could prove exculpatory, an enormous number of defendants might be acquitted. Consider the test of Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), which exculpated a defendant because his unlawful act was the “product” of a mental disease or defect. Durham set off a firestorm of debate on that ground. See Abe Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia, 70 Yale L.J.
did with section 22-3220, he maintains, and, largely for that reason, Kansas cannot do so now.

Section 22-3220 does not eliminate all consideration of a defendant’s mental illness, though. Rather, the law channels a jury’s consideration of mental illness into the guilt stage, where the jury must decide whether it raises a reasonable doubt that the accused could have formed the intent defined by a crime. In effect, Kansas’s law has substituted a diminished capacity defense for an insanity defense. The Constitution does not require the States to recognize either defense. In fact, the Supreme Court twice expressly refused to create a diminished capacity defense. In Fisher v. United States, the Court declined the invitation to create such a defense for use in criminal prosecution in the District of Columbia courts. More recently, the Court again rejected a plea to create a diminished capacity defense, this time in Clark v. Arizona. Kansas’s choice is essentially the mirror image of the one that Arizona made, and that the Supreme Court upheld, in Clark—with one important difference. A state can require the defendant to bear the burden of proof on an


156. 328 U.S. 463 (1946).

157. Id. at 470, 476–77. “Criminologists and psychologists have weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the adoption of the theory of partial responsibility as a basis of the jury’s determination of the degree of crime of which a mentally deficient defendant may be guilty.” Id. at 475. Noting that Congress had already divided the offense of murder into separate degrees, the Court said that the matter was one for Congress to resolve. Id. at 475–76. “It may be that psychiatry has now reached a position of certainty in its diagnosis and prognosis which will induce Congress to enact the rule of responsibility for crime for which petitioner contends.” Id. at 476. That type of “radical departure from common law concepts is more properly a subject for” Congress or the District of Columbia courts. Id.

insanity defense. Kansas, however, has decided to bear the burden of proof on the issue of criminal responsibility by allowing a defendant to use proof of a mental disease to raise a reasonable doubt of his premeditation on an intent to kill. Kansas has therefore done more than just substitute one type of mental illness-based defense for another. The state has assumed the risk of nonpersuasion.

It turns out that Anglo-American legal history is rich with that type of experimentation. During the early years of the common law, the number of crimes was small, and the nature of the criminal law was rudimentary. For instance, the law did not distinguish between murder in the first and second degree or between murder and manslaughter, differences that the criminal law developed over time. Nor did the early common law recognize justifications and excuses as defenses to crime. Because all murders were capital crimes, the royal prerogative of mercy was the only means of “flexibility.” People who killed in cold blood ordinarily went to the gallows, but not everyone responsible for homicide was executed. To spare

159. Id. at 769 (“[A] jurisdiction may place the burden of persuasion on a defendant to prove insanity as the applicable law defines it, whether by a preponderance of the evidence or to some more convincing degree.” (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(C) (2001); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952) (ruling that a state can require a defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt))).

160. See CHRISTOPHER BROOKE, FROM ALFRED TO HENRY III: 871–1272, at 45 (3d ed. 1969) (“The written laws of Anglo-Saxon kings were not comprehensive codes. The main body of the law was customary and unwritten.”); Larkin, supra note 3, at 327 (“Early English ‘law’ reflected the Anglo-Saxon-Jute-Dane customs of the local community and was rudimentary at best, both ‘rough and crude.’” (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 139–40 (1904))). In the thirteenth century, for instance, there were only a handful of felonies and misdemeanors. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 85, at 442–62.

161. See Green, supra note 1, at 473–87.

162. See, e.g., GASKILL, supra note 72, at 206 (“Although homicide had been punishable at common law since the Norman Conquest, observing different degrees of the offense was a comparatively late development.”); id. at 206–07; Green, supra note 1, at 426–56.


morally blameless parties from execution, kings granted pardons to people who committed accidental, excusable, and justifiable homicides, particularly if they were children. Among the offenders traditionally pardoned were the insane, on the ground that they could not make their peace with God before meeting Him. Over time, the common law courts began to address issues of “madness” in the criminal law themselves. By the late eighteenth century, insanity became a defense for excusing a mentally ill defendant from responsibility.

Since then, the issue of how the criminal law should treat a mentally ill defendant has arisen in two very different contexts: mental illness at the time of trial and at the time of the offense. The first context raises the question of whether the accused’s mental illness is sufficiently severe that the government can bring him to trial for a crime, regardless of his mental responsibility at the time of the alleged offense.

166. See NAOMI D. HURNARD, THE KING’S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE A.D. 1307, at vii–viii, 152–53 (1969); Duker, supra note 164, at 479 (describing the need to pardon a four-year-old child who “accidentally pushed a younger child into a vessel of hot water” simply by opening a door).


168. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 7, at 8; MORRIS, supra note 8, at 54–55; Homer D. Crotty, The History of Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English Criminal Law, 12 CALIF. L. REV. 105, 110–15 (1924).

169. In a different context, the Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits the execution, but not the imprisonment, of a condemned prisoner, who, because of a mental disease or defect, cannot understand that he will be executed and why. See, e.g., Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 720 (2019) (ruling that an offender’s inability to remember the events underlying his crime do not justify forestalling his execution, but his dementia might); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986) (ruling that a
has concluded that the Due Process Clause prohibits a mentally ill offender from standing trial or pleading guilty unless he has “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him” and “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.”

By contrast, when the issue is the responsibility of a mentally ill offender for a crime, there has been anything but uniformity. English and American courts have created an assortment of different tests to distinguish a “bad” from a “mad” offender. Among them were the “total defect of understanding” test, the “wild beast” test, the “right and wrong” test, the M’Naghten test, the “irresistible impulse” test, the “product of mental illness” test, and the American Law Institute test. Some states have chosen a different approach by authorizing the execution of a mentally ill and condemned prisoner if he is incapable of understanding that he will be executed.

170. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391 (1993) (ruling that the standard of competency to plead guilty or waive representation by counsel is the same as the standard for competency to stand trial); cf. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 167 (2008) (ruling that a state may deny a mentally ill defendant the right to represent himself at trial if the defendant is not competent to defend himself, even if he is sufficiently competent to be tried).


174. See, e.g., Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 863 (Ala. 1887); State v. Thompson, Wright 617, 622 (Ohio 1834); Regina v. Burton (1863) 176 Eng. Rep. 354, 357; 3 F. & F. 772, 780; Regina v. Oxford (1840) 173 Eng. Rep. 941, 950; 9 Car. & P. 525, 546 (“If some controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power within [the defendant] which he could not resist, then he will not be responsible.”); Hadfield’s Case (1800) 27 How. St. Tr. 1281 (KB) 1314–15, 1354–55.

175. M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722; 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210 (HL) (ruling that a defendant pleading insanity must prove that, at the time of the act, he suffered from a mental disease or defect of reason so as not to know the nature of the act or, if he did know it, that it was wrong).


177. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (“A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental
Authorizing a jury to return a verdict of "guilty but mentally ill." Other states have abandoned the insanity defense but, like Kansas, allow evidence of a mental illness to defeat a mens rea element of a crime. As the Supreme Court summarized in *Clark v. Arizona*:

> With this varied background, it is clear that no particular formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal
offenses, is substantially open to state choice. Indeed, the legitimacy of such choice is the more obvious when one considers the interplay of legal concepts of mental illness or deficiency required for an insanity defense, with the medical concepts of mental abnormality that influence the expert opinion testimony by psychologists and psychiatrists commonly introduced to support or contest insanity claims. For medical definitions devised to justify treatment, like legal ones devised to excuse from conventional criminal responsibility, are subject to flux and disagreement.182

Foreign nations, including countries such as Canada and Australia that share English legal heritage with the United States, also use different approaches. Canada, for instance, replaced the “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict with the verdict “not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.”183 And Australia’s nonbinding Model Criminal Code recommends for Australia’s states a test following M’Naghten, but also requires that the defendant prove that he was unable to control his behavior.184 Some Australian states, meanwhile have created a secondary defense applicable only in murder cases called the “diminished responsibility defense.”185 Among the other former British colonies, too, there is little uniformity.186 And among nations that do not share a common British legal heritage, the approaches differ even more dramatically.187 In

182. Clark, 548 U.S. at 752.
183. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 § 16; RITA J. SIMON & HEATHER AHN-REDDING, THE INSANITY DEFENSE, THE WORLD OVER 15–16 (2006). Under that approach, a judge has significant discretion to determine whether a defendant’s mental illness prevented him from appreciating the nature of his act or knowing that it was wrong.
184. SIMON & AHN-REDDING, supra note 183, at 221.
185. Id. at 221–23. If a defendant convicted of murder successfully proves this defense (by satisfying a relaxed insanity standard), his conviction will be deemed one for manslaughter instead.
186. See id. at 233–34.
187. French courts will acquit a defendant whose mental illness “destroyed his discernment or his ability to control his actions,” but will still criminally punish those with diminished discernment or control. Id. at 65 (quoting CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 121-3) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Netherlands uses a guilty but mentally ill verdict that considers the defendant’s degree of culpability when determining an appropriate punishment. Id. at 100–02. Some Brazilian states use a verdict similar to “guilty but mentally ill” whereby a mentally ill defendant is convicted but treated. Id. at 57–58. Poland considers mental illness when determining a defendant’s culpability, which, in turn, determines the proper punishment. Id. at 131. Japan has no specialized law governing mentally ill crimi-
short, when it comes to determining how the criminal law should account for insanity, diversity reigns. Accordingly, even if a longstanding, uniform consensus could establish a due process-based definition of criminal responsibility, there is no such basis here.

That conclusion, however, poses a question: Why do we see uniformity in the case of a standard for determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, but variety in the case of the insanity defense? Why has the Supreme Court invoked the Constitution to define the effect of mental illness in the one case but not the other? The reason is twofold. Although medical knowledge is relevant to each problem, the legal response to each problem is fundamentally different from the other. First, the text of the Constitution bears on the issue of competency, but not criminal responsibility. Second, moral (and not only medical) considerations play an important role in deciding criminal responsibility, but not competency.

The Sixth Amendment expressly guarantees every federal defendant a “speedy and public trial,” and the Fourteenth Amendment provides every state defendant with the same right. By the time that the Sixth Amendment had become law, the concept of a “trial” had acquired a meaning that excluded certain practices, including ones previously used to decide guilt or innocence. One forbidden practice was a trial in

188. U.S. Const. amend. VI.


absentia.191 That principle is relevant here. Trying a defendant who, because of mental illness, does not know what is happening is tantamount to trying him when he is physically absent from the courtroom.192 Because the courts are responsible for defining the type of “trial” guaranteed by the Constitution, it makes sense to have a uniform rule to determine a defendant’s competency.

The problem of defining the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill raises different considerations. As explained above, there is no term comparable to a “trial” that the Constitution uses to define criminal responsibility.193 The only crimes and defenses defined by the Constitution—for example, “Treason” and “Bills of Attainder”—have a meaning that does not demand any consideration of mental illness. Moreover, although moral considerations are inapposite to the issue whether a defendant can understand that he is on trial and what that entails, moral considerations are critical to the definition of crimes and defenses.194 Understanding that one is on trial is largely a medi-

criminal charges through ordeal, trial by combat, or peine forte et dure, a form of torture in which heavier and heavier stones were placed on a defendant until he confessed or died. See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN RÉGIME 3 (paperback ed. 2006); MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, supra note 5, at 49–50; Andrea Mckenzie, “This Death Some Strong and Stout Hearted Man Doth Choose”: The Practice of Peine Forte et Dure in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century England, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 279, 281–82 (2005). None of those options would have been acceptable in the colonies or new nation.

192. See Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1963); Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960) (“The competency rule did not evolve from philosophical notions of punishability, but rather has deep roots in the common law as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia; the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself.”); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171–72 (1975) (“[T]he prohibition [of trials in absentia] is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.”).
193. See supra Part II.A.
194. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 228, 232 (1996) (recognizing “the preeminent role of the States in preventing and dealing with crime and the reluctance of the Court to...
cal (in particular, psychiatric or psychological) matter. Knowing whether killing is wrongful is predominantly a moral issue, and moral issues inevitably arise when the government seeks to hold someone criminally responsible for his past conduct. To be sure, medical and psychiatric learning is clearly relevant to criminal responsibility, but they are “intertwined” with moral and legal judgments, as Chief Justice Burger once noted. The criminal law has not turned over to psychiatrists the moral judgments that are the jury’s prerogative.

The result is this: the most that due process can demand is that the state’s judgment regarding criminal responsibility not be irrational. There are numerous available options for treating the effect of mental illness on criminal responsibility, and there is no one optimal penal code that every state must use. The Supreme Court has all but admitted as much. In *Clark v. Arizona*, the Supreme Court, after canvassing the history summarized above, concluded that history has not witnessed the universal adoption of any “particular formulation” of mental responsibility that could arguably create “a baseline for due process.” The result is to leave the matter “substantially open

disturb a State’s decision with respect to the definition of criminal conduct and the procedures by which the criminal laws are to be enforced in the courts, including the burden of producing evidence and allocating the burden of persuasion” (citing *Patterson v. New York*, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)); *Patterson*, 432 U.S. at 201 (“It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government . . . .” (citing *Irvine v. California*, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954) (plurality opinion))); see also *Holmes*, supra note 12, at 36 (“The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.”).

195. See supra text accompanying note 10; see also *Goldstein*, supra note 8, at 91 (“So long as we do not know what really ‘causes’ crime, the insanity defense will have to be framed in a way which permits juries to express the feelings of the community on the subject of responsibility. . . . [L]egislatures and courts have fixed the insanity standard in ways which enable jurors to make moral judgments about blame, but informed as much as possible by relevant fact and medical opinion. And because moral judgments are involved about matters calling for widespread acceptance by the public, it is entirely fitting that they be made by a jury. Thus viewed, the insanity test is merely the organizing principle of a process of decision which uses a ‘political’ solution to advance subtle social objectives. It is a normative standard applied to conflicting clusters of fact and opinion by a jury, an institution which is the traditional embodiment of community morality and, therefore, well suited to determining whether a particular defendant, and his act, warrant condemnation rather than compassion.”).

to state choice.”197 To the extent that the Due Process Clause plays any limiting role regarding the choices that a legislature may make in this regard, that role is the limited one of making sure that states do not act arbitrarily. Why? Because that was the rationale for the adoption of Magna Carta and its lineal descendant, the Due Process Clause.198

Has Kansas acted arbitrarily? To answer that question, one must start by asking what Kansas has done.

Kansas has done what every jurisdiction has always done: use its penal code to prevent *bellum omnium contra omnes*—“war of everyone against everyone.”199 Along with the responsibility of defining rules and punishments comes the task of identifying who should be exempt from those proscriptions or punishments and why. Kansas has exempted from criminal responsibility people whose mental illness keeps them from forming the premeditation and intent to kill that are elements of the Kansas law of murder. In Kahler’s case, Kansas law, as well as the instructions that his jury received, permitted him to adduce whatever evidence he could muster of mental illness to escape any liability for murder by raising a reasonable doubt about his ability to act intentionally and with premeditation.200 Kahler’s mental illness-based defense to murder failed not because the state arbitrarily chose to define that crime in a manner that entraps morally blameless parties, but because he failed to satisfy the fair and reasonable terms of the defense available to him under Kansas law. To understand why that is so, consider how Kansas’s law applied to Kahler’s claim of mental illness. Three features of this case stand out as being particularly important in that regard.

First, Kahler was convicted of capital murder for shooting and killing his wife, from whom, because of her infidelity, he had been estranged.201 Kahler also killed his two daughters,
whom he believed had taken his wife Karen’s side in the divorce proceedings, and finally Karen’s grandmother Dorothy, the woman who gave refuge to his other three victims. These facts helped to establish a powerful motive for killing them: retribution. Although proof of motive is not an element of murder at common law or in Kansas, establishing a defendant’s motive nonetheless can be “crucial in determining whether or not the defendant has committed a given crime,” particularly one involving proof of intent, like murder.

Second, in accordance with Kansas’s law and the guilt stage jury instructions given at Kahler’s trial, the prosecution had to prove that he intentionally killed his four victims. The evidence establishing that element was conclusive. An “intentional” murder is a homicide that is “purposeful and willful,” rather than “accidental.” To shoot his family members, Kahler used a civilian version of the rifle used by the United States military for the last 50 years. His use of that weapon alone proves that Kahler intended to kill his victims.

Third, Kansas law and the jury instructions in this case also required the state to establish that Kahler acted with premeditation, which means that Kahler “thought the matter over beforehand” and “formed the design or intent to kill before” shooting his victims. Although there is no fixed period required for someone to premeditate, premeditation “requires more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another’s life.” Some reflection is necessary. Here, there was plenty. The police found an empty rifle box in Kahler’s car and discovered the victims lying in three separate parts of the home; Karen was lying in the kitchen, Emily and Dorothy were in the living

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202. Id.
203. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.3(a), at 273 (5th ed. 2010).
204. Joint Appendix, supra note 56, at 164–73.
205. Id. at 175.
207. Joint Appendix, supra note 56, at 163.
208. Id. at 176.
209. Id.
room, and Lauren was upstairs.\textsuperscript{210} Together, that evidence showed that Kahler took his rifle from his car into Dorothy’s home and moved throughout the house to shoot his four victims—virtually a textbook case of premeditation.

To succeed with his due process challenge, a defendant like Kahler would have to show that the law permitted the state to convict him arbitrarily, that is, without the necessary finding of blameworthiness.\textsuperscript{211} But the record in this case is clear that, even without a formal insanity defense, the jury had ample opportunity to weigh all the appropriate evidence and assess Kahler’s responsibility before handing down its verdict. People who premeditate on an intent to kill are not morally blameless by any stretch of the imagination. The jury convicted Kahler because the state’s proof established beyond peradventure that Kahler chose to take four lives with no remote justification or excuse. That conduct has been immoral since Cain killed Abel\textsuperscript{212} and has been a crime since Moses came down from Mount Sinai with the Ten Commandments\textsuperscript{213} conduct that traditionally has been, and is in Kansas today, punishable by the death penalty.\textsuperscript{214}

A state does not act irrationally by relying on long-standing, widely accepted principles defining conduct like Kahler’s as immoral. As historians have noted, “the early criminal law appears to have been well integrated with the mores of the time, out of which it arose as ‘custom.’”\textsuperscript{215} Those mores and customs represented a local consensus that certain conduct should be prohibited and certain offenders treated as outlaws.\textsuperscript{216} Mem-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{210} Kahler, 410 P.3d at 114.
\item \textsuperscript{211} See supra Part II.C.2.
\item \textsuperscript{212} See supra note 1.
\item \textsuperscript{213} See, e.g., Exodus 20:13 (King James) (“Thou shalt not kill.”).
\item \textsuperscript{214} See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6617 (Supp. 2018); Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1122 (2019) (“The Constitution allows capital punishment. In fact, death was ‘the standard penalty for all serious crimes’ at the time of the founding.” (citations omitted)).
\item \textsuperscript{215} Livingston Hall & Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 644 (1941); see also ROBERT KELHAM, THE LAWS OF WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR, at v–xii (London, Edward Brooke 1779) (William the Conqueror maintained pre-Norman English customs); LAFAVE, supra note 203, at 78–80.
\item \textsuperscript{216} See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 5, at 8–9; JENKS, supra note 5, at 3 (“The so-called Anglo-Saxon Laws date from a well-recognized stage in the evolution of law. They reveal to us a patriarchal folk, living in isolated settlements, and leading lives regulated by immemorial custom.”); F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
bers of the community had knowledge of what the law prohibited. For one thing, as Holmes noted, “crimes are also generally sins,” so if you knew the Decalogue, you knew the penal code.217 Moreover, “The common law is in great part nothing more than common honesty and common sense. Therefore although a man may be ignorant that he is breaking the law, he knows very well in most cases that he is breaking the rule of right.”218 For that reason, “If not to his knowledge lawless, he is at least dishonest and unjust. He has little ground of complaint, therefore, if the law refuses to recognise his ignorance as an excuse, and deals with him according to his moral deserts.” 219 In fact, there has long been a consensus that the crimes defined at common law reflect harmful and wrongful conduct.220 That consensus was not a transient phenomenon; it remains strong today.221

HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1–4 (reprt. 1913); FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 139–40 (1904); Larkin, supra note 3, at 327 (“Early English ‘law’ reflected the Anglo-Saxon-Jute-Dane customs of the local community and was rudimentary at best, both ‘rough and crude.’ The laws of the folk, the ‘folk-right,’ could vary among ancestors and from community to community.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 328–29; supra text accompanying notes 4–5.

217. HOLMES, supra note 12, at 100.
218. JOHN W. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 374–75 (2d ed. 1907).
219. Id. at 375.
220. As Professor Lawrence Friedman has written about property crimes:
   Perhaps the most primitive and basic rules in the criminal justice system were those that protected property rights…. The laws against theft, larceny, embezzlement, and fraud are familiar friends. People may not know every technical detail, but they get the general point. Probably all human communities punish theft in one way or another; it is hard to imagine a society that does not have a concept of thievery, and some way to punish people who help themselves to things that “belong” to somebody else.
221. Professor Wesley Skogan explained that agreement as follows:
   In the case of common crime, a large body of research indicates that there is in fact a value consensus. People of all races and classes agree we should shun theft, violence, sexual assault, and aggression against children. They give very similar ratings to the seriousness of various kinds of offenses, and they agree to a surprising extent on how stiff the punishments ought to be for violations of the law. The issue of what is criminal has been settled politically in debate over the criminal code, and within law-abiding society there is broad consensus on such matters. These middle-class values are just about everyone’s values.
Not surprisingly, murder has always been at the top of that list. Every colony and every state has treated murder as a heinous offense. In the words of Professor Mark Yochum, “evil is fundamentally known. . . . Ignorance that murder is a crime is no excuse for the crime of murder.”

What Kansas has done, at bottom, is make the decision that anyone who premeditates on an intent to kill should be held morally responsible for that crime, regardless of whether he knew that murder is wrongful.

Finally, it would be a mistake to assume that every aspect of section 22-3220 works solely to a defendant’s disadvantage. Traditionally, the insanity defense “has not threatened” a state’s interest in public safety because it rested “upon the concept of mental disease,” and that concept has long been regarded as a restrictive one, “extending only to those who had obviously lost touch with reality.” The Kansas statute, however, does not require that a defendant be so severely disturbed before he can offer evidence of a mental illness to defeat the state’s proof of intent and premeditation. The statute, section 22-3220 of Kansas Statutes Annotated, uses the term “mental disease or defect,” but it does not define that term to include only the type of severe mental disorders that rob someone of knowing who he is, what he is doing, and whether (and, if so how) his actions have consequences. Nor did the jury instructions in Kahler’s own case limit the jury’s consideration of the type of proof that Kahler offered to such severe diseases.

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222. Mark D. Yochum, The Death of a Maxim: Ignorance of Law Is No Excuse (Killed by Money, Guns and a Little Sex), 13 St. John’s J. Legal Comment 635, 636 (1999).

223. Consider that point from another perspective. In United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), the Supreme Court held that Congress could prohibit the possession or receipt of unregistered hand grenades without including a mens rea element. Id. at 609. The likelihood of convicting a morally blameless person, the Court noted, was small because “one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act.” Id.; see also id. at 616 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Without exception, the likelihood of governmental regulation of the distribution of such weapons is so great that anyone must be presumed to be aware of it.”). The same is true of intentional, premeditated murder.

224. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 19.

225. The trial judge instructed the jury in Kahler as follows:

Evidence has been presented that the defendant was afflicted by mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged crime. Such evidence is to be considered only in determining whether the defendant had the state of mind required to commit the crimes.
actually were a benefit for Kahler because he does not maintain that he suffered from the type of mental disease that leads someone to lose touch with the world.226

The result is that section 22-3220 has a benefit for a mentally ill defendant that a traditional insanity defense would not: it allows him to use evidence of mental illness to disprove the necessary mens rea for murder in circumstances where he could not hope to prevail if he could use that evidence only to support an insanity defense. That would be particularly true if, as the Supreme Court has held, a state can require a defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.227 It should be far easier for a defendant to use evidence of mental illness to disprove an element of the offense that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt than it would be to prove his insanity under that standard. At the very least, it was certainly rational for the Kansas state legislature to conclude that the balance struck by section 22-3220 is a reasonable one.228

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226. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 6–9.
228. One class of defendants adversely affected by the change of law are those represented by the defendant in *Bethel*: killers who believe they are acting on a divine command. Defendants like those suffer from a form of mental illness that does not cast doubt on premeditation, but has historically found some recognition in the law. *See* People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915). The issue has arisen in other cases too. *See*, e.g., Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 784 (6th Cir. 2006) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (collecting cases where a deific decree claim served as the basis for an insanity defense); Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 182 (D.C. 1882) (dictum stating hypothetical in jury instructions); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 503 (1844) (same); Moett v. New York, 85 N.Y. (40 Sickels) 373, 380 (1881) (same). This issue is academically interesting but vanishingly rare in the real world. According to some amici supporting *Kahler*, the insanity defense itself
Where does that leave us? With this: The Due Process Clause neither defines a crime nor creates a defense to one. In fact, it does not speak to the substantive criminal law at all. That does not mean the clause is unimportant; it is, because it prevents the government from punishing someone outside the bounds of the law. Summary execution, imprisonment, or fines are forbidden. But the clause leaves to the political process—federal and state legislators, and the electorate of each—the responsibility to define the substantive criminal code, both in terms of its offenses and defenses. The Constitution created only one exception to that rule: treason. The Framers defined that crime in the Constitution because they feared that even the new American Congress could be susceptible to the same impulse for self-preservation that drove the English Crown and Parliament.

is rarely an issue in criminal cases and is raised in less than one percent of federal and state trials. See Brief of Amici Curiae 290 Criminal Law and Mental Health Law Professors in Support of Petitioner’s Request for Reversal and Remand at 19, 21, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 (U.S. June 7, 2019) (less than one percent of criminal cases); Brief of Amici Curiae the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU Foundation of Kansas in Support of Petitioner at 19, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 (U.S. June 7, 2019) [hereinafter Brief of ACLU] (collecting citations that defendants rarely claim insanity); Brief of American Psychiatric Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10, Kahler v. Kansas, No. 18-6135 (U.S. June 7, 2019). Although the precise number of instances of these cases is unknown, the majority in Lundgren was satisfied that it was so small that defense counsel’s failure to raise a deific decree insanity defense did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 773 n.6. Even in the famous case of People v. Schmidt, Schmidt’s claim was of dubious validity; he later admitted that his asserted delusion was a lie. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945–46. One possible resolution is that the people of a state like Kansas, through their lawmakers, have simply decided, quite reasonably, not to extend the same protection for such conduct as they do to other forms of homicide under the influence of mental disturbance. If so, that is well within the state legislature’s historically broad discretion on the issue. In Powell v. Texas, the Supreme Court blanched at the prospect of allowing a mentally ill defendant to go free for murder when his illness compelled him to commit that crime. 392 U.S. 514, 534–35 (1968) (plurality opinion); see id. at 548–54 (White, J., concurring in the result); infra text accompanying notes 316–318. Powell suggests that the Court would not be receptive to such a claim. But whatever the outcome might be for such a defendant’s claim, Kahler v. Kansas does not give the Supreme Court an opportunity to resolve it. Kahler does not contend that God commanded him to slaughter his family. Nowhere in his own description of how his mental illness affected his actions does Kahler even hint that God gave him any such order. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 6–9. Nor does Kahler suggest that, because God told him that his family members were, for example, in league with Satan, he inferred that God wanted them dead. Whatever the outcome might be were a different defendant to raise such a claim, Kahler v. Kansas does not give the Supreme Court an opportunity to resolve it.
to treat political dissenters as tantamount to armed insurrectionists. Otherwise, the Founders trusted the elected members of Congress and state assemblies with the responsibility of defining the penal code. Neither the text, the history, the judicial interpretation, nor the purpose of the Due Process Clause justifies casting aside the Framers’ trust in the democratic process.

III. THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE AND THE INSANITY DEFENSE

Kahler argues that, however the Supreme Court resolves his due process claim, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause also prohibits Kansas from defining murder and insanity as section 22-3220 provides. In his view, any punishment that an offender receives by virtue of the application of that statute is both “cruel” and “unusual.” It would be “cruel,” he contends, to punish someone who was “wholly unable to comprehend the nature and quality” of an act when he committed it. Doing so serves no legitimate justification for punishment, he contends, and partakes of being “[p]leased with hurting others; inhuman; hard-hearted; void of pity; wanting compassion; savage; barbarous; [and] unrelenting.” It would also be “unusual” to punish such an individual, Kahler maintains, because “both England and the Colonies universally recognized” that someone incapable of distinguishing right from wrong should not be criminally punished. The appropriate response, Kahler concludes, is to use a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity to civilly commit an offender until he “has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society.”

Kahler’s argument rests on a faulty premise, confusing guilt and punishment issues that are properly treated separately. Kahler starts with the rule that the state cannot try or execute a

229. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 29–36.
230. Id. at 30–31.
231. Id. at 30 (quoting Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 583 (Miss. 1931) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. Id. at 31 (first alteration in original) (quoting Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1123 (2019) (quoting 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773))).
233. Id. at 30.
234. Id. at 36 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
mentally incompetent offender. To that rule, he adds the conclusion that Kansas’s law has eliminated the issue of whether an offender can distinguish right from wrong at the time of the offense, an issue that might be the only one that can save an offender from the gallows. Together, the two halves of that argument, Kahler submits, not only make section 22-3220 an outlier in Anglo-American law, but also render unconstitutional any punishment imposed on a defendant unaware that his conduct was unlawful. As explained in this Part, however, materially different constitutional terms apply to the guilt and sentencing stages, foreclosing any elision of the two.

A. The Text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

If the Due Process Clause is an odd place to look for a limitation on a state’s power to define crimes, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is a positively bizarre choice. Its text focuses expressly and exclusively on “punishment,” and, as explained above, the Constitution prohibits the state from imposing any punishment on someone until after he has pleaded or been found guilty. The Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in Chapman v. United States made that point well. Accordingly, the text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause alone proves that it has no bearing on the antecedent issue of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. The definition of criminal responsibility is a matter for the substantive criminal law, and perhaps the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but certainly not the Eighth. By the time that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause comes into play, a party is no longer “accused” of a crime, as the Sixth Amendment would treat him; he has been “convicted” of committing it. His status has changed; he now may be penalized however the law provides, so long as that punishment is not cruel and unusual. Put differently, by the time of sentencing, the government’s power to define crimes

235. Id. at 12–14.
236. Id. at 14–15.
237. Id. at 29–36, 39–43.
238. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 148–152.
241. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
has dropped out of the picture; what matters is its power to punish.

The scenario in Kahler is analogous to the one in United States v. Marion.242 There, the defendants argued that the federal government violated their Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause right to a prompt trial243 by waiting three years after the occurrence of the alleged fraud before obtaining an indictment charging them with a crime.244 The Supreme Court made short work of that argument. In an opinion by Justice Byron White, the Court explained that the Speedy Trial Clause “has no application” until an offender “in some way becomes an ‘accused,’” which did not happen in Marion until the grand jury returned its indictment.245 “On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been ‘accused’ in the course of that prosecution,” Justice White explained.246 “These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused” he added, “nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time.”247

Marion recognized that constitutional terms—like “accused”—matter because they define and limit the reach of the law. For that reason, the Court held that the Speedy Trial Clause does not apply to someone not yet charged with a crime because, until a person has been charged, he has been “accused” of nothing.248 The methodology and logic of Marion apply directly to Kahler. The term “punishments” matters for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause because it limits the reach of that clause. To adopt a phrase from Marion, a clause devoted to regulating the legality of a punish-

243. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
244. Marion, 404 U.S. at 308–09.
245. Id. at 313.
246. Id.
247. Id.; cf. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992) (“We have said before that a charge under a recidivism statute does not state a separate offense, but goes to punishment only.” (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623–24 (1912); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313 (1901))).
248. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313–14.
ment “has no application” to the logically and legally antecedent issue of how a crime can be defined.

In sum, just as Marion could not force the Speedy Trial Clause to play a role at a preindictment stage because its text did not permit that reading, Kahler should not be able to force the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to play a role at the preconviction stage. In each case, the text does not allow for that reading. That conclusion should end any discussion of the use of the latter clause to define an offense.

B. The History of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

The history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause confirms the evident meaning of its text.250 The clause is the direct offspring of the English Bill of Rights of 1689251 and section 9 of the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights252—both of which (except for unimportant spelling differences) prohibited “cruel and unusual punishments.”253 Historians generally agree that what prompted Parliament to adopt the English Bill of Rights were the sentences imposed by the infamous King’s Bench Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys during the Stuart reign of King James II.254 Historians differ only over what precise atrocities Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys committed that outraged Parliament.255

249. Id. at 313.


251. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M. c. 2, § 10 (Eng.).

252. VA. CONST. of 1776 (Bill of Rights), § 9.


254. Id. at 967.

255. See id. at 967–74 (summarizing the different theories).
theory focuses on the vicious sentences that Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys handed down during the “Bloody Assizes” following the Duke of Monmouth’s unsuccessful 1685 rebellion. Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys sentenced hundreds of insurgents to death via disemboweling, beheading, and drawing and quartering. The other theory is that Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys imposed punishments unauthorized by statute and unknown to the common law. In 1685, Titus Oates, a Protestant cleric, was convicted of committing perjury for making false accusations against fifteen Catholics who were executed for organizing the 1679 “Popish Plot” to overthrow King Charles II. Capital punishment was no longer an authorized penalty for that crime, but Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys decided to take the law into his own hands. He orchestrated a novel sentence for Oates of two floggings and life imprisonment accompanied by five exposures on pillory a year, perhaps believing (perhaps hoping) that Oates would “be scourged to death.” Though Oates was not a sympathetic character, there was considerable contemporary agreement that, however much he may have deserved the punishment he received, the law did not authorize his sentence, so Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys’s judgment was illegal.

Either way, the history offers no support for Kahler’s argument. The Framers understood that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would prohibit hideously painful or unauthorized sentences. There is nothing to suggest that it would also serve as a restraint on Congress’s ability to define crimes, to say nothing of Congress’s power to decide what defenses to recognize and how they should be adjudicated. Indeed, concern that the courts, not Congress, might exceed their authority by going on a frolic and detour to take “special care” of an of-

256. Id. at 968.
257. Id. Picture the “Freedom!” scene in BRAVEHEART (Paramount Pictures 1995).
258. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
259. Id. at 969.
260. Id. at 970.
262. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 973–74 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
fender was a prominent feature of at least one of the explanations why that clause became law.263

C. Judicial Interpretations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

1. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and Sentencing

The Supreme Court’s precedents confirm the teaching of the text and history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.264 Nearly all of the Court’s decisions focus on one aspect or another of the punishment of convicted offenders. Those decisions address one or more of the following types of questions: Are some punishments impermissible regardless of the facts and circumstances of the crime and offender?265 Are some penalties impermissible only for certain crimes266 or offenders?267 Can recidivists be more severely punished than first time offenders?

263. Second Trial of Titus Oates, 10 How. St. Tr. at 1316.

264. Nineteenth century lower court decisions are to the same effect. They read state counterparts to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as forbidding only certain punishments. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 102 F. 473, 487–90 (9th Cir. 1900); Whitten v. State, 47 Ga. 297, 301–02 (1872); Hobbs v. State, 32 N.E. 1019, 1020–21 (Ind. 1893); State v. White, 25 P. 33, 33–35 (Kan. 1890); Garvey v. Whitaker, 19 S. 457, 458–59 (La. 1896); Commonwealth v. Hitchings, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 482, 486 (1855); Cummins v. People, 3 N.W. 305, 305 (Mich. 1879); State v. Williams, 77 Mo. 310, 312–13 (1883); State v. Driver, 78 N.C. 423, 426–28 (1878); State v. Becker, 51 N.W. 1018, 1022 (S.D. 1892); Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449–50 (1824).


267. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 709 (2014) (prohibiting execution of a condemned prisoner suffering from intellectual disability); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–79 (2005) (prohibiting execution of an offender who was younger than eighteen at the time of the crime); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–21 (2002) (same, a mentally disabled offender); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 146–58 (1987) (ruling that parties who planned a violent prison escape were aware that life could be taken and are therefore are eligible for the death penalty); Ford v.
offenders? Do juvenile offenders merit special treatment? Is it permissible to carry out a particular punishment in some ways, but not others? Are there special procedures that a trial or

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405–10 (1986) (prohibiting the execution of a condemned prisoner incapable of understanding that he will be executed); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788–801 (1982) (prohibiting mandatory imposition of death penalty on an offender who did not intend to kill and did not contemplate that lethal force would be used in commission of the crime).

268. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (upholding two consecutive terms of twenty-five-years-to-life imprisonment for a repeat offender under a state’s “three strikes” law); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (upholding a sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life imprisonment under a state’s “three strikes” law); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279, 303 (1983) (prohibiting a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a repeat but nonviolent offender); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264–65 (1980) (upholding a sentence of life imprisonment on a recidivist); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992) (“Statutes that punish recidivists more severely than first offenders have a long tradition in this country that dates back to colonial times. . . . Such laws currently are in effect in all 50 States and several have been enacted by the Federal Government, as well.” (citations omitted)); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 534, 559–60 (1967) (citations omitted). It is difficult to reconcile Solem and Rummel in anything approaching an honest, intelligent fashion. Given the Court’s later decisions in Andrade and Ewing, however, there is no reason to try.


271. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole on an offender who was younger than eighteen at the time of the crime); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 165–66 (2006) (upholding state law directing jury to impose a capital sentence if aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise); Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 39–40 (2001) (ruling that a defendant must be able to inform jury that he will be ineligible for parole if the state makes “future dangerousness” a relevant capital sentencing factor); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 375–76 (1999) (ruling that jury need not be informed about consequences of its inability to reach a capital sentencing decision); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 773–74 (1996) (ruling that the President can specify aggravating factors for a military court-martial panel to consider in a capital case); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 817–30 (1991) (upholding use of “victim impact” evidence at sentencing stage of a capital case); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282–83, 291 (1987) (rejecting the argument that state had improperly discriminated on the basis of the race of defendants or victims); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 355–62 (1977) (ruling that state must disclose to a defendant before sentencing any evidence on which the sentencer might rely to impose the death penalty).
appellate court must follow before imposing or upholding a particular type of punishment? Must a state grant a trial judge or jury discretion to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors in a particular case, or can a state impose the identical sentence on everyone convicted of the same crime? Are there limitations on the type of factors that a state can say aggravate or mitigate the nature of an offense? Finally, how much punishment is too much? All of those inquiries address different aspects of the “punishment” that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was designed to regulate. They do not tell a state how to draft its criminal code.

272. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 149 (1990) (ruling that state is not required independently to review legality of a capital sentence that defendant decided not to challenge); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44–54 (1984) (ruling that state supreme court need not conduct a state-wide review of proportionality of capital sentences); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (ruling that condemned prisoner may waive any and all federal constitutional challenges to his sentence).


274. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971–80 (1994) (upholding state capital sentencing aggravating factor over argument that it is unconstitutionally vague); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 352–53 (1993) (upholding state sentencing scheme over the challenge that it did not allow adequate consideration of the mitigating effect of the offender’s youth); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional the overbroad interpretation of an aggravating factor permitting the death penalty to be imposed for an “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman” murder); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” (footnote omitted)).

275. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371–72, 375 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding sentence of forty years’ imprisonment for the possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute it); supra note 268 (collecting cases rejecting the argument that life-without-parole sentences imposed on recidivists were disproportionate).
2. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and Criminal Responsibility

In truth, only two Supreme Court decisions are relevant to Kahler’s claim. The first one is Robinson v. California. It suggested that the Eighth Amendment might prohibit a state from punishing someone who could not control his conduct. The second decision, Powell v. Texas, quite explicitly refused to construe (or extend) Robinson to create an involuntariness defense. Powell eliminates any basis for asserting that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause regulates how the state can define the criminal responsibility of the mentally ill.

Robinson held unconstitutional a California law making it a crime to be a narcotics addict and imposing a punishment of no less than 90 days’ incarceration for conviction of that offense. The statute did not criminalize the purchase, possession, or use of narcotics. In fact, the California law did not punish any conduct at all; the only offense was the status of being addicted to narcotics. In theory, the statute would have allowed the state to arrest and convict anyone who admitted to being an addict at a Narcotics Anonymous meeting. Because the law imposed a criminal punishment for addiction, rather than authorizing involuntary commitment of addicts, it is likely that the rationale for the statute was to simplify narcotics prosecutions. Nonetheless, the result was that, under California law,

277. See id. at 666–67.
280. Id. at 666.
281. Id.
282. See Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 70 (1968) (“California, surely, sought to punish ‘being an addict’ not from any abhorrence for the status but because addicts act, that is, they use drugs, and some are tempted to commit crimes to obtain money to buy drugs.”); Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 600–03 (1981); Note, Public Intoxication Convictions and the Chronic Alcoholic, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 107 n.19 (1968) (“A state may well have valid reasons for punishing the status of being an addict, since it simplifies the problem of enforcement by making proof of actual use of drugs unnecessary and at the same time anticipates future antisocial acts almost certain to occur.”).
if you were addicted to narcotics, you were guilty. It was unnecessary for the prosecution to prove anything else.283

The Court acknowledged that a state could regulate and punish narcotics trafficking.284 The Court also noted that, as a general matter, a state could involuntarily confine a narcotics addict for treatment.285 California, however, had chosen neither option in Robinson’s case. Instead, California had chosen to make the mere status of being a drug addict into a crime.286 That clearly troubled the Court because it was tantamount to making it a crime to suffer from a disease that “may be contracted innocently or involuntarily.”287 That was a bridge too far. A state could no more make it a crime to become involuntarily addicted to narcotics, the Court reasoned, than it could outlaw becoming involuntarily afflicted with a physical or mental illness.288 That the punishment for being a narcotics addict was only 90 days’ confinement did not save the California law from invalidity. As Justice Stewart put it, “imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual.”289 “But the question cannot be considered in the abstract,” he cautioned.290 He then penned the famous line: “Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”291 Because the California law made it a crime to become ill without requiring any voluntary action on someone’s part, the Court held the California statute unconstitutional.292

283. The jury instructions in Robinson’s case made that point quite clear. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 662–63; id. at 665 (“Although there was evidence in the present case that the appellant had used narcotics in Los Angeles, the jury were instructed that they could convict him even if they disbelieved that evidence. The appellant could be convicted, they were told, if they found simply that the appellant’s ‘status’ or ‘chronic condition’ was that of being ‘addicted to the use of narcotics.’ And it is impossible to know from the jury’s verdict that the defendant was not convicted upon precisely such a finding.”).
284. Id. at 664.
285. Id. at 664–65.
286. Id. at 666.
287. Id. at 667. The state conceded that narcotics addiction was an “illness.” Id.
288. Id. at 666.
289. Id. at 667.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See id.
The Robinson decision created quite a stir in the legal and medical communities because it suggested that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause effectively barred criminal liability for involuntary conduct. In the years immediately following that decision, the courts and academic community debated that issue in the contexts of alcohol and drug use. Two federal courts of appeals went so far as to rule that the government could not punish an alcoholic for the crime of public intoxication because alcoholism is a disease beyond an alcoholic’s voluntary control. To resolve that confusion, the Supreme Court granted review in the other Eighth Amendment case relevant here, Powell v. Texas. Powell took back any suggestion that Robinson constitutionalizes an involuntariness defense or creates a mental illness-based defense in one form or another.

Powell was convicted in a Texas state court of being intoxicated in public, in violation of state law. Citing Robinson, Powell argued that he could not be held criminally responsible for the offense of public intoxication because he was an alcoholic.

293. See, e.g., Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10, 11 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1965) (questioning whether, in light of Robinson, it is permissible to revoke an alcoholic’s probation for violating a condition of his probation that he refrain from alcohol use); United States ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344 F.2d 260, 260–63 (2d Cir. 1965) (concluding that Robinson did not immunize an alleged narcotics addict from the crime of unlawfully possessing narcotics); State ex rel. Blouin v. Walker, 154 So. 2d 368, 371–72 (La. 1963) (same, for the crime of habitually using narcotics); People v. Hoy, 143 N.W.2d 577, 578 (Mich. 1966) (concluding that it is not a cruel and unusual punishment to imprison an alcoholic for the crime of being drunk and disorderly); City of Seattle v. Hill, 435 F.2d 692, 698–99 (Wash. 1967) (concluding that Robinson did not immunize an alcoholic from the crime of public intoxication); Browne v. State, 129 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Wis. 1964) (concluding that Robinson did not immunize an alleged narcotics addict from the crime of using narcotics).


297. Id. at 517 (plurality opinion).
coholic and could not prevent himself from drinking.\footnote{298. \textit{Id.} at 532.} To prove his case, Powell testified at trial and detailed his inability to overcome his drinking problem.\footnote{299. \textit{Id.} at 519–20.} Powell also offered the testimony of a psychiatrist that “‘a ‘chronic alcoholic’ is an ‘involuntary drinker,’ who is ‘powerless not to drink,’ and who ‘loses his self-control over his drinking.’”\footnote{300. \textit{Id.} at 518 (quoting the psychiatrist’s trial testimony). The defense psychiatrist added that, when intoxicated, Powell “is not able to control his behavior . . . because he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink” and lacks “the willpower to resist the constant excessive consumption of alcohol.” \textit{Id.} (same) (internal quotation marks omitted). The psychiatrist conceded that Powell knew the difference between right and wrong when he was sober, but concluded that Powell’s knowledge during sobriety was beside the point because Powell could not keep himself from becoming drunk. See \textit{id.} (same).} Based on that proof and relying on \textit{Robinson}, Powell argued that he could not be held criminally liable for public intoxication because, as an alcoholic, he could not refrain from drinking to intoxication and appearing in public in that state.\footnote{301. See \textit{id.} at 521, 532.}

The Supreme Court rejected Powell’s argument.\footnote{302. See \textit{id.} at 531–37; see also \textit{id.} at 548–54 (White, J., concurring in the result).} After discussing shortcomings regarding the then-current legal and medical knowledge about alcoholism,\footnote{303. The plurality found that the trial and public records failed to resolve a host of relevant issues, such as whether Powell could refrain from taking his first drink, even if he could not stop drinking afterwards; whether the medical profession believed that alcoholism was a “disease”; and whether there were differences among the types of alcoholics. \textit{Id.} at 521–26 (plurality opinion).} the plurality opinion by Justice Marshall turned to the issue of whether \textit{Robinson} prohibited the state from punishing alcoholics for any conduct that was the involuntary product of their disease.\footnote{304. \textit{Id.} at 532.} The \textit{Powell} plurality concluded that \textit{Robinson} did not so hold and declined to extend \textit{Robinson} to reach cases like Powell’s.\footnote{305. \textit{Id.} at 532–37.}

Justice Marshall distinguished \textit{Robinson} on the ground that Texas law punished Powell, not for the status of being an alcoholic, but for his conduct of being publicly intoxicated.\footnote{306. \textit{Id.} at 532.} The holding in \textit{Robinson}, the plurality explained, “brings this Court but a very small way into the substantive criminal law” because it disallowed a state only from making the status of ad-
diction into a crime.\textsuperscript{307} Reading the holding in \textit{Robinson} any
more broadly, the plurality acknowledged, would make the
Court, “under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause,” into “the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal
responsibility, in diverse areas of the criminal law, throughout
the country.”\textsuperscript{308} Justice Marshall explained that \textit{Robinson} does
not stand for the proposition that the state cannot outlaw con-
duct that a defendant cannot stop himself from committing.\textsuperscript{309}
“The entire thrust of \textit{Robinson’s} interpretation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause” is that the state may criminally
punish someone only if he “has committed some act, has en-
gaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in pre-
venting, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has
committed some \textit{actus reus}.”\textsuperscript{310} \textit{Robinson}, Justice Marshall rea-
soned, did not address “the question of whether certain con-
duct cannot constitutionally be punished because it is, in some
sense, ‘involuntary’ or ‘occasioned by a compulsion.’”\textsuperscript{311}

The plurality also declined the invitation, offered by Justice
Fortas in dissent,\textsuperscript{312} to extend the holding in \textit{Robinson} to include
cases in which a defendant has involuntarily acquired a “sta-
tus” or “condition” that forced him to commit the conduct that
lead to his prosecution.\textsuperscript{313} Extending \textit{Robinson} that far would
require the Court to create and define “the scope and content of
what could only be a constitutional doctrine of criminal re-
ponsibility.”\textsuperscript{314} Only by “fiat” could a court limit any such de-
fense to conduct that is both “a characteristic and involuntary”
part of conduct caused by a mental illness.\textsuperscript{315}

Atop that, “If Leroy Powell cannot be convicted of public in-
toxication” the plurality reasoned, “it is difficult to see how a
State can convict an individual for murder, if that individual,
while exhibiting normal behavior in all other respects, suffers
from a ‘compulsion’ to kill, which is an ‘exceedingly strong in-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{307} Id. at 532–33.
\item \textsuperscript{308} Id. at 533.
\item \textsuperscript{309} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{310} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{311} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{312} Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{313} Id. at 533–34 (plurality opinion).
\item \textsuperscript{314} Id. at 534.
\item \textsuperscript{315} Id. (quoting id. at 559 n.2 (Fortas, J., dissenting)).
\end{itemize}
fluence,’ but ‘not completely overpowering.’” 316 Given the “centuries-long evolution” of the various “interlocking and overlapping” aspects of the concept of criminal responsibility, there was no good reason to conclude that the Due Process Clause forced the states to adopt any one particular answer to that issue.317 “Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms. Yet, that task would seem to follow inexorably from an extension of Robinson to this case.”318

In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice White agreed with the plurality that the statute in Powell was materially different from the one in Robinson because Texas law did not make it a crime simply to be an alcoholic.319 His opinion, together with the Marshall plurality opinion, eliminates any basis for asserting that the clause creates a constitutional rule for the law of criminal responsibility.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Powell dooms Kahler’s Eighth Amendment claim. The Court refused to use the Constitution as a mechanism for displacing legislative judgments regarding criminal responsibility, concluding that the legislatures were the better forum to resolve the relationship between a mental disease and criminal responsibility. The Court declined the invitation, implied by Justice Fortas in dissent, to become “the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility, in

316. Id.
317. As the plurality put it:

We cannot cast aside the centuries-long evolution of the collection of interlocking and overlapping concepts which the common law has utilized to assess the moral accountability of an individual for his antisocial deeds. The doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to be the province of the States.

Id. at 535–36 (footnote omitted).
318. Id. at 536.
319. Id. at 550 (White, J., concurring in the result) (“I cannot say that the chronic alcoholic who proves his disease and a compulsion to drink is shielded from conviction when he has knowingly failed to take feasible precautions against committing a criminal act, here the act of going to or remaining in a public place. On such facts the alcoholic is like a person with smallpox, who could be convicted for being on the street but not for being ill, or, like the epileptic, who would be punished for driving a car but not for his disease.”).
diverse areas of the criminal law, throughout the country.” All that the Eighth Amendment requires—the “thrust” of its decision in Robinson—is that a defendant “has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus.” Murder certainly qualifies. Indeed, the Court went out of its way to emphasize that a consequence of treating Powell like Robinson would be to make difficult the conviction for murder of someone whose mental disease compelled him to kill—a claim that even Kahler does not advance.

The only ground left for making that claim would be that the purpose of the clause—preventing the gratuitous infliction of pain—justifies reading the clause to regulate a state’s definition of criminal responsibility. As explained below, however, that argument is also unpersuasive.

D. The Purpose of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

Kahler’s last argument is that criminally punishing an insane offender serves no legitimate purpose and therefore amounts to the type of gratuitous infliction of pain that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause bans. As he sees it, punishing someone who could not and did not know right from wrong serves “none of the four accepted penological justifications for punishing criminal conduct—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.” Punishing an offender who cannot understand that his conduct was wrongful is like punishing a tree for falling on someone. Neither one comprehends why he or it was punished. The prospect of criminal punishment also cannot deter a deranged individual from committing a crime any more than the availability of a fire extinguisher can deter a blaze from consuming a home. Punishment “is a poor tool for incapacitating the insane” because an offender’s term of im-

320. Id. at 533 (plurality opinion).
321. Id.
322. Id. at 534.
323. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 31. Kahler also argues that punishing an insane offender is “grossly disproportionate,” but that argument is a make-weight. He committed not one but four murders, so the death penalty is not remotely disproportionate for his crimes.
324. Id. at 32 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010)).
prisonment is ordinarily too short or too long relative to his crime.325 Finally, punishment is unlikely to rehabilitate the insane because prisons are not mental institutions.326 Under those circumstances, he concludes, punishing an offender who could not and did not know right from wrong is simply wanton cruelty.

Precedent does not support the result Kahler seeks. Kahler cites Justice Kennedy’s opinion in *Graham v. Florida*327 for the proposition that the four penological goals he discusses are exclusive.328 *Graham*, however, held no such thing. *Graham* concluded only that there was no penological justification for sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without parole for nonhomicide offenses.329 In so ruling, *Graham* did not purport to define an exclusive set of justifications for punishment. *Graham* also did not walk back the Court’s recognition only seven years beforehand that “the Constitution ‘does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.’”330 After all, as Justice Kennedy explained in his separate opinion in *Harmelin v. Michigan*,331 “[M]arked divergences both in underlying theories of sentencing and in the length of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often beneficial, result of the federal structure…. [D]iffering attitudes and perceptions of local conditions may yield different, yet rational, conclusions regarding the appropriate length of prison terms for particular crimes.”332 In fact, *Graham* noted that “Criminal punishment can have different goals, and choosing among them is within a legislature’s discretion.”333

325. Id. at 34.
326. Id. at 34–35.
332. Id. at 999–1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Reason also does not support Kahler’s claim. His argument rests on several curious assumptions that he makes no effort to justify. The first one is that the purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause matter more than its text. The history discussed above reveals that the Framers sought to prohibit use of hideously painful punishments, such as boiling someone in oil, as the penalty for crime. The Framers’ use of the term “cruel,” read against the English and American background to the clause, proves as much. But the clause ties its concern with cruelty to the punishments that the government may impose, not to the government’s definition of the offenses that could lead to those punishments. The clause prohibits the imposition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” not the definition of “cruel and unusual crimes.”

The second mistaken assumption is that the government must justify its punishment decisions. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not require justifications for punishment; it only bans punishments that are “cruel and unusual” regardless of their rationale. Boiling child rapists in oil might well effectively deter that crime, and many people might conclude that a child rapist deserves to suffer in that manner. The clause forbids that punishment, however, even if its use would eradicate that offense. The same point can be made in the other direction. Perhaps the reason why prisoners wear orange jumpsuits (or the old-fashioned, black-and-white, vertically striped jacket and pants) rather than blue jeans is that wardens believe orange jumpsuits are humiliating. That rationale might be childish, but that does not mean the practice is forbidden or that wardens must justify their decisions about prisoners’ wardrobes. Even making the heroic assumption that forcing a prisoner to wear an orange jumpsuit to satisfy a warden’s ego is a “punishment,” it is hardly a “cruel and unusual” one, whatever the underlying rationale might be. Requiring the government to justify a punishment by proving that it promotes one or more judge-created penological rationales gets the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause backwards. A punishment that is neither cruel nor unusual is permissible even if there is no rational explanation why a legislature authorized it or a judge imposed it.

334. See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966–75 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
The third assumption is that there are only four legitimate rationales for punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation (and punishing Kahler, quite conveniently, advances none of them). This assumption ignores what history teaches, how government works, what punishments accomplish, and what courts may do.

At early common law, local English clans sanctioned offenders to prevent the violent retaliation that would follow if murders, assaults, and thefts were left unpunished and uncompensated. That rationale has little in common with the ones that Kahler contends are exclusive. However “unappealing” to some it might appear today to maintain that forestalling private vigilantism is a legitimate justification for punishment, that is the ground on which modern Anglo-American criminal law rested. If you think that America has outgrown any need to use punishment to prevent vigilantism, think again. People have changed since King Ethelbert drafted the first criminal code in (about) 600 A.D., but their nature has not. “The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law.” Having the government take up that function, the Supreme Court noted in Gregg v. Georgia, “is essential in

335. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 5, at 2–3; Jenks, supra note 5, at 3 (“The so-called Anglo-Saxon Laws date from a well-recognized stage in the evolution of law. They reveal to us a patriarchal folk, living in isolated settlements, and leading lives regulated by immemorial custom.”); Larkin, supra note 3, at 329 (“English King Ethelbert drafted the first written code in approximately 600 A.D. . . . The hoped-for goal was to forestall violent retaliation and intertribal warfare.” (footnote omitted)); Frederick Pollock, The King’s Peace in the Middle Ages, 13 HARV. L. REV. 177, 177 (1899) (“All existing civilized communities appear to have gone through a stage in which it was impossible to say where private vengeance for injuries ended and public retribution for offences began, or rather the two notions were hardly distinguished.”).

336. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (Stewart, J., lead opinion) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring)).


338. See Baker, supra note 5, at 2–3; Maitland, supra note 216, at 1.

339. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (Stewart, J., lead opinion) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

an ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal processes rather than self-help to vindicate their wrongs.”

How about three other justifications: educating the public about the importance of obeying the law, recognizing the importance of crime’s victims, and expressing moral outrage at particular crimes and criminals? The government must have punishments available to advertise the importance of compliance, and the government must inflict those punishments on offenders to display its enforcement resolve and thereby educate the public that it means what it says. Punishing offenders is also critical to demonstrate societal concern for the damage that offenders inflict on their victims. The legislative budgetary process demonstrates that people are important by funding their interests; the criminal justice system demonstrates that people are important by punishing their victimizers. As for expressing moral outrage: Gregg noted that “capital punishment is an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.” In some cases—say, mass or torture murders—only the death penalty may adequately express the community’s belief regarding the heinousness of the offense.

There might be other justifications as well. Our point is not that our list is exclusive but that Kahler’s list is not and that, even if it were, it is beside the point. There might be scores of

341. Id. at 183 (Stewart, J., lead opinion); see also id. at 226 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (referring to his opinion in Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 355 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (“It will not do to denigrate these legislative judgments as some form of vestigial savagery or as purely retributive in motivation; for they are solemn judgments, reasonably based, that imposition of the death penalty will save the lives of innocent persons. This concern for life and human values and the sincere efforts of the States to pursue them are matters of the greatest moment with which the judiciary should be most reluctant to interfere.”)).

342. To the inevitable responses that allowing education to serve as a rationale for punishment enables the government both to avoid defending the rationality of its punishment decisions and to use whatever punishments it finds necessary, we plead “Guilty” and “Not guilty.” Yes, an education rationale enables the government to avoid proving that a punishment advances retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. But the relevant question—is that punishment cruel and unusual?—remains unchanged. Whether that punishment “works,” as explained below, is beside the point. Whether or not the government finds a punishment necessary to advance those ends is also beside the point. The government might believe that amputating a pickpocket’s hands is the only way to prevent him from recidivating. The Eighth Amendment nonetheless prohibits that penalty.

343. 428 U.S. at 183 (Stewart, J., lead opinion).

344. See id. at 184 & n.30.
reasons why a particular sanction could be a legitimate punishment. Investigating their rationality would be a reasonable inquiry for a penologist or a philosopher. The only relevant inquiry for a court, however, is whether a punishment is “cruel and unusual.” Spending time inquiring why society punishes offenders—an undertaking neither expressly nor impliedly required by anything in the text or history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause—serves no legitimate purpose.

Kahler’s last curious assumption, perhaps the least justifiable of the three, is that a punishment must be effective to avoid being gratuitous. The Constitution grants the federal government specific powers in the hope that elected officials will use them wisely, maybe even effectively. Congress has the power to borrow money, to regulate interstate commerce, and to declare war. Congress acts improvidently, but not unconstitutionally, if it runs up a backbreaking debt, if the economy goes into the tank, and if the nation loses a military conflict. If that happens, the public has the chance to replace its elected officials every two, four, and six years.

Punishment decisions are no different. There too, the remedy for failure is political, not legal. No other approach would be workable. Think of the questions that must be answered to do that job properly. Are all justifications of equal importance or do some—say, deterrence—carry more weight than others—say, retribution? How do you measure a punishment’s effectiveness? How effective must a punishment be? How do you trade off short-term versus long-term effectiveness? Are some successes—such as uncovering espionage plots or intercepting terrorist attacks—worth more than others are—such as apprehending mass murderers (or serial killers) or convicting senior members of an organized crime family? There are no easy answers to those questions, let alone objective ones. To evaluate the effectiveness of the decisions that legislators and executive officials make, we use the ballot box, not a courtroom.

Unless the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires an elitist perspective for resolving those questions, how the public would answer them is critical. Courts are better

345. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 97, at 31–36.
equipped than the public to resolve the legal issues involved in any interpretation of the terms of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Law schools train embryonic lawyers, and law school graduates obtain experience in construing legal documents, like constitutions. For that reason, lawyers are better equipped than the public to answer a question involving the meaning of ancient legal texts. But a law degree does not make an attorney into a more qualified decisionmaker for every issue that could arise in a criminal case, even one involving an issue of mental illness. For example, a psychiatrist is more qualified than a lawyer or judge to decide whether a prisoner is mentally ill and would benefit from medication.348 Whether a punishment advances society’s interests in retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation is a question involving moral and political considerations, not an issue of law.349 Judges are no better equipped to evaluate the effectiveness of government than are the people chosen to sit on a jury at trial.350 Kahler, in effect, asks the Supreme Court Justices to serve as amateur criminologists and undertake the “tantalizing aspect” of their profession by deciding the effectiveness of punishment.351

The public would likely say that executing Kahler would readily promote the public interest in each of the first three ra-

348. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 228–31 (1990) (concluding that “an inmate’s interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals rather than a judge”).

349. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“Whatever views may be entertained regarding the severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or futility, these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.” (citation omitted)); see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 97 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I am unwilling to assume that we, as Members of this Court, are any more capable of making such moral judgments than our fellow citizens. Nothing in our training as judges qualifies us for that task, and nothing in Article III gives us that authority.”); supra note 10.

350. As Justice Frankfurter once put it:

Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of the judgment).

351. Gore, 357 U.S. at 393.
tionales that Kahler identifies. Retribution “build[s] on the widely held feeling that the criminal owes the community a measure of suffering comparable to that which he has inflicted.”\textsuperscript{352} Kansas can legitimately believe that capital punishment has a deterrent effect, and the state does not need to prove that point with respect to each individual capital defendant. As for incapacitation: capital punishment ensures that result. Finally, given the nature of his crimes, the public would likely be willing to trade any interest it might have in rehabilitating him for the hope of securing greater protection for potential victims. The state legislature made that judgment, and it is in a better position to represent what Kansans think than any federal court.

One could label punishing Kahler and others like him in different ways: as giving Kahler and any future multiple murderers their just deserts, as deterring other people who have also hit rock bottom from committing murder, as avoiding the suffering of future victims, or just as increasing respect for the law. However you describe it, punishing murderers is a legitimate use of governmental power.

\* \* \* \*

We find ourselves in the same position now that we did at the end of our analysis of the Due Process Clause. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause serves an eminently valuable role, but that role comes into play only after a legislature has defined an offense and a jury has convicted a defendant of committing it. The text, the history, and the judicial interpretations of the clause limit its relevance to the punishment that a state has authorized for a crime.

CONCLUSION

Neither the Due Process Clause nor the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause contains a directive ordering the federal or state governments to define the substantive criminal law in any particular fashion. The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from punishing someone until he has been convicted of a crime under the governing jurisdiction’s laws, but it does not instruct legislatures how to define those crimes and whether

\textsuperscript{352} \textsc{Goldstein, supra} note 8, at 11–12.
or how to recognize defenses to them. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause has even less relevance to the content of the substantive criminal law. It only comes into play after an offender has been convicted of a crime and focuses entirely on the punishments that he can receive. The criminal law recognizes various defenses—self-defense, defense of others, duress, necessity, consent, and so forth—but the Framers did not incorporate any of them into the text of the Constitution. Indeed, with the exception of the Treason Clause, the Constitution leaves entirely to the political process the definition of the penal code because the judgments involved in drafting it involve precisely the type of moral decisions that the public and its elected representatives are fully competent to make. The most that could be required of the federal or state governments is to make a nonarbitrary choice. The judgment that Kansas made easily passes that test.
THE CONSCIENCE OF CORPORATIONS AND THE RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK

WILLIAM E. LEE*

INTRODUCTION

The right to refrain from speaking is part of a broader concept the Supreme Court describes as “individual freedom of mind.”1 But do corporations have protection from compelled speech under the freedom of mind concept? It is bizarre to ascribe human characteristics to corporations, yet the Court has held that newspaper publishing corporations are protected by the freedom of mind concept from state-imposed requirements that interfere with their ability “to decide what to print or omit.”2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court ignored the corporate identity of the publishing company and instead emphasized the burden on editors.3 Later cases rejecting a First Amendment distinction between press and non-press corporations, such as Citizens United v. FEC,4 raise the question whether the Court should also ignore the corporate form of non-press entities and instead assess a law’s burden on management, employees, and shareholders. Stated differently, do non-press corporations have standing to assert that compelled speech vio-

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2. Id.

3. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Torrillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 257 (1974) (arguing that law requiring newspapers to publish replies by candidates whom they had criticized would cause editors to conclude “the safe course is to avoid controversy”).

lates the “freedom of mind” of the humans affiliated with the corporation?

Although the first principle of corporate law is that for-profit corporations have a legal identity separate from their shareholders, management and employees, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the bakery downplayed its corporate identity when challenging the commission’s decision that refusing to design a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple violated the state’s antidiscrimination law. Masterpiece emphasized the law’s burden on the First Amendment rights of Jack Phillips, a co-owner and cake designer who was described as “a cake artist.” Compelling Phillips to create a cake for a same-sex wedding forces him to “speak” in violation of his sincerely held religious beliefs. Conversely, Colorado downplayed Phillips’s artistry by asserting the commercial conduct of the bakery Phillips owned with his wife was at issue; “a business’s decision of whom not to serve is not ‘speech.’”

During the oral argument of Masterpiece Cakeshop, only Justice Sotomayor probed the link between Phillips’s beliefs and the corporation’s actions. Noting that “the seller of the cakes is not

5. See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (“[I]ncorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.” (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61–62 (1998); Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932))); see also Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 477 (2006) (“[I]t can be said [that] the whole purpose of corporation and agency law . . . [is] that the shareholder and contracting officer of a corporation has no rights and is exposed to no liability under the corporation’s contracts.”).


8. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). The corporate identity of Masterpiece Cakeshop was completely absent from the petitioner’s framing of the question. The petitioners wrote that the question presented was whether “applying Colorado’s public accommodations law to compel Phillips to create expression that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added).

9. Id. at 13–14.

Mr. Phillips, it’s Masterpiece Corporation,” and that corporations are separate entities from their shareholders, Justice Sotomayor asked “who controls the expression here, the corporation or its shareholders?”11 Masterpiece’s attorney Kristen Waggoner emphasized that in the context of a closely held corporation, Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop were in effect the same as both are “speaking when they’re creating” cakes.12 Justice Sotomayor interrupted, again asking “But who makes a decision for the corporation?”13 Waggoner responded that the shareholders in a small, family-held corporation would decide.14 “And that’s exactly what’s at stake in this case. Mr. Phillips owns Masterpiece Cakeshops [sic]. He designs most of the wedding cakes himself . . . .”15 In other words, forcing Masterpiece Cakeshop to create and sell a wedding cake that expresses a message in support of a same-sex marriage “violates Mr. Phillips’s religious convictions.”16

The case presented novel and difficult questions about the definition of speech17 and whether a closely held corporation’s decisions, animated by a co-owner’s personal beliefs, may be exempt from generally applicable laws.18 The Court side-

12. Id. at 100.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 101.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 105.
17. During oral argument, the Justices pursued at length the distinction between selling an existing cake and the sale of a custom-designed cake, id. at 5–10, whether the actions of others contributing to a wedding, such as florists, hair stylists, jewelers, and makeup artists, could be regarded as “speech,” id. at 10–20, and how to define “speech” where the creation, such as food, has a utilitarian function, id. at 35–42. Justice Kennedy’s opinion noted the free speech aspect of the case was “difficult” but was an “instructive example” of the proposition that new contexts can deepen our understanding of the meaning of constitutional freedoms. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
18. First Amendment experts were sharply divided on how to answer these questions. Compare Brief of Floyd Abrams et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (arguing First Amendment does not protect a right to choose customers based on sexual orientation), with Brief of Amicus Curiae The First Amendment Lawyers Association in Support of Petitioners at 12, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (arguing First Amendment prohibits state action compelling creation of artistic works, including wedding cakes).
stepped these questions and instead found that the commission showed clear hostility to Phillips’s sincere religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. The Court’s acknowledgment of the beliefs of a shareholder in *Masterpiece Cakeshop*, mimics *Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, where the Court held the religious beliefs of the shareholders of three closely held corporations justified exempting those corporations from a mandate to provide contraceptives to employees.

The issues raised in *Masterpiece Cakeshop* were not unique to that business; other businesses have also raised conscience-based objections to the enforcement of state antidiscrimination laws and the Court has avoided the substantive questions in those cases as well. Thus, the conflict between conscience and antidiscrimination laws remains unresolved. For example, in the aftermath of the *Masterpiece Cakeshop* decision, Phillips and his bakery settled with Colorado regarding a transgender woman’s claim of discrimination, but the woman initiated a

19. *Masterpiece Cakeshop*, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. While the Colorado proceedings against Masterpiece were ongoing, the state commission found that three other bakers acted lawfully in declining to create cakes that demeaned same-sex marriages. See id. at 1730. The Court found the treatment of these conscience-based objections “sent a signal of official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs.” Id. at 1731.


23. Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its ruling in *Masterpiece Cakeshop*, the Colorado Civil Rights Division found there was sufficient evidence to support a
lawsuit on her behalf because of Phillips’s refusal to design a cake that reflected her transgender status.\textsuperscript{24} Justice Kennedy’s assurance in \textit{Obergefell v. Hodges}\textsuperscript{25} that “those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction” their opposition to same-sex marriage, and presumably other contentious social changes,\textsuperscript{26} is unfulfilled, unless advocacy is defined as having little or nothing to do with the operation of a business.

Conscience arguments were also presented in two other October 2017 Term cases, \textit{Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees}\textsuperscript{27} and \textit{National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA)}.\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Janus} involved an individual who was forced to contribute to a public sector union whose positions on public policy he opposed.\textsuperscript{29} The Court

\begin{quotation}
transgender woman’s claim that the bakery’s refusal to create a custom cake for the anniversary of her gender transition violated the state’s antidiscrimination law. Determination, Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., Charge No. CP2018011310 (Colo. Civil Rights Div. Aug. 14, 2018). Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips filed suit against various Colorado officials, contending that the division’s action violated the freedom of religion and free speech rights of both Masterpiece and Phillips. Complaint at 39–45, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Elenis, No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 2018). On January 4, 2019, Judge Daniel dismissed the defendant’s motion that the suit should be dismissed in its entirety on four different abstention grounds. Order at 3, 53, \textit{Masterpiece Cakeshop}, No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2019). Colorado Attorney General Cynthia Coffman’s motion to dismiss the claims against her was denied, \textit{id.} at 16, 53, as was the defendant’s motion to dismiss the suit for lack of standing. \textit{id}. The plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages against the director and members of the division were dismissed, \textit{id.} at 53, as were the claims against Governor John Hickenlooper. \textit{id}. In both the complaint and Judge Daniel’s order, the First Amendment rights of Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips were treated as identical. Following Judge Daniel’s ruling, the parties settled; Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips agreed to dismiss their lawsuit and the civil rights division agreed to dismiss its action. Elise Schmelzer, \textit{Masterpiece Cakeshop, state of Colorado agree to mutual ceasefire over harassment, discrimination claims}, \textit{DENVER POST} (Mar. 5, 2019, 9:37 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/03/05/masterpiece-cakeshop-colorado-mutual-ceasefire-over-claims/ [https://perma.cc/7Z9Y-YWQC]. Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser stated, “The larger constitutional issues might well be decided down the road, but these cases will not be the vehicle for resolving them.” \textit{id}.

\textsuperscript{25} 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{id.} at 2607.
\textsuperscript{27} 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
\textsuperscript{28} 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Janus}, 138 S. Ct. at 2461.
found compulsory union dues to be unconstitutional because “individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions.”  

Justice Alito, writing for the Janus majority, stated that “[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support for views they find objectionable” violates the “cardinal” command against government-mandated orthodoxy first set out in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.  

In NIFLA, the Court struck down a California law requiring clinics that primarily serve pregnant women to provide certain notices, such as the availability elsewhere of state-funded abortions. The petitioners in NIFLA, nonprofit corporations operating pro-life pregnancy clinics as a form of advocacy, asserted that the state-mandated disclosure violated their consciences, a novel argument Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court ignored. Justice Kennedy, though, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch, conflated the nonprofit corporations with the individuals who work or volunteer at the clinics. Justice Kennedy wrote that the law requires pro-life centers “to promote the State’s own preferred message advertising abortions.” “This compels individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs.” Justice Kennedy added, “Governments must not be allowed to force persons to express a message contrary to their deepest convictions.”  

30. Id. at 2464.  
31. Id. at 2463 (referencing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”)).  
32. 138 S. Ct. at 2368, 2378.  
33. The petitioners in NIFLA were “formed primarily to advocate and implement their core pro-life values as well as to express these views publicly and privately.” Brief for Petitioners at 20, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140).  
34. Id. at 13–14.  
36. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378–79 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
37. Id. at 2379.  
38. Id. (emphasis added).  
39. Id. (emphasis added).
That Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in *NIFLA* would use nearly identical language as that in Justice Alito’s *Janus* opinion is conspicuous because the *NIFLA* petitioners were corporations. The Court has held that nonprofit advocacy corporations have standing to assert the rights of their members, but Justice Kennedy did not cite any precedent regarding the nexus between nonprofit corporations and their members. And because the Court in *Hobby Lobby* dismissed the distinction between nonprofit and closely held for-profit corporations, a significant question raised by Justice Kennedy’s *NIFLA* concurring opinion is whether a for-profit corporation, which lacks a conscience, may assert harm to the consciences of its shareholders.

The *Janus* and *NIFLA* majority opinions show two quite distinct tracks for assessing compelled speech claims. *Janus* is grounded in harm to freedom of conscience; *NIFLA* emphasizes the risks of content regulation. The latter analytical option, utilized by the Court in some earlier non-press corporate speech cases, downplays corporate identity and employs traditional content-based analysis such as assessment of tailoring. As shown later in this Article, *NIFLA*’s overriding theme is that the government harms the marketplace of ideas when it compels speech. Stated differently, government efforts to promote a
well-informed public do not justify interfering with speaker autonomy.

Before NIFLA, the conflict between a well-informed public and compelled non-press corporate speech was addressed in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission (PG&E). Justice Powell’s papers, along with the papers of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Byron White, reveal he had to finesse references to the Court’s compelled speech precedents to omit references to conscience in his PG&E opinion. The analytical track utilized by Justice Thomas in NIFLA has its genesis in PG&E. This Article puts NIFLA in context by exploring the dialogue within the Court as it was creating the compelled speech doctrine for non-press corporations in PG&E.

Part I of this Article provides a summary of the Court’s struggles with non-press corporate speech cases and presents the thesis that “forward thinking” government efforts to fine tune the flow of information by compelling corporate speech should be rejected, not on the basis of conscience, but because these efforts promote government-defined orthodoxy. Part II

43. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).

44. Although corporations have frequently challenged restrictions on their commercial speech, see, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 560 (1980), corporate status has not been a factor in the Court’s commercial speech cases. Further, the Court distinguishes comments on public issues from statements made “in the context of commercial transactions.” Id. at 562 n.5. The former are fully protected and the latter receive diminished protection. Id. This Article focuses on fully protected expression by corporations.

California sought to justify the licensed notice disclosure in NIFLA, see infra notes 221–222 and accompanying text, under the ruling in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), which upheld compelled disclosures of factual, noncontroversial information in the commercial speech of professionals. Id. at 651–52. The NIFLA Court found Zauderer to be inapplicable because the licensed notice “in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics provide.” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. Moreover, abortion is “anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic.” Id. As for the unlicensed notice, see infra note 223 and accompanying text, the Court said that assuming Zauderer was the appropriate standard, the notice was unduly burdensome and poorly tailored. Id. at 2377–78.

For a recent application of NIFLA in the context of compelled commercial speech, see Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 2019), which held that an ordinance requiring health warnings in certain sugar-sweetened beverage advertisements likely violates the First Amendment. See also The Supreme Court 2017 Term—Leading Cases, 132 HARV. L. REV. 277, 351 (2018) (arguing that NIFLA foreshadows greater protection for commercial speech).
takes a close look at the right to receive expression in *First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*. Justice Powell’s papers reveal that framing the case in terms of the rights of listeners presented a less complicated path to a majority than if his opinion had addressed the nature of corporations. Part III explains why Justice Powell eliminated conscience from his PG&E opinion and created a methodology for compelled speech cases involving non-press corporations that does not require veil piercing or derivative rights analysis. Part IV contrasts Justice Thomas’s NIFLA opinion with Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion. Although Justice Kennedy’s veil piercing is appropriate in the setting of a nonprofit advocacy corporation, the question of which for-profit corporations have standing to assert harm to the consciences of shareholders should be avoided. Analyzing compelled corporate speech cases within the content-based framework raises fewer questions than if conscience arguments are addressed.

I. THE COURT STRUGGLES WITH CORPORATE IDENTITY

The Court has been repeatedly criticized for its analysis in non-press corporate free speech cases, but NIFLA’s aversion to content discriminatory regulation and preference for speaker autonomy offers a theory for corporate speech cases that allows courts to abstain from deciding which corporations are eligible for insider reverse veil piercing as the oral argument in

46. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, *Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free*, 83 *Iowa L. Rev.* 995, 1020 (1998) (arguing that the Court’s “constitutional doctrine remains studiously ignorant of state and federal law regulating corporations”). Similarly, after canvassing the Court’s approach to corporate constitutional rights since the nineteenth century, Professors Margaret Blair and Elizabeth Pollman conclude the Court “has not carefully analyzed its legal theory of corporate rights, nor has it expressly articulated a framework for thinking about corporations that could guide its decision making in a consistent way.” Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, *The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights*, 56 *Wm. & Mary L. Rev.* 1673, 1679 (2015); see also Tamara R. Piety, *Why Personhood Matters*, 30 *Const. Comment.* 361, 364 (2015) (“[M]any scholars have observed [that] the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a theory for corporate rights, relying instead on what could (at best) be described as ‘case-by-case adjudication’ and (at worst) as something less charitable.” (footnote omitted)).
47. Insider reverse veil piercing allows a shareholder of a closely held corporation to ask a court to disregard the corporation’s separate legal personality. See Michael J. Gaertner, *Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation
Masterpiece Cakeshop reveals, along with the Hobby Lobby opinion, the Court would rather not confront the complexities of insider reverse veil piercing. Discounting the corporate identity of a speaker in compelled speech cases permits the Court to emphasize concerns broader than harm to conscience.

The Court, however, has a spotty and confusing record in discounting corporate identity in free speech cases. Cases where corporate identity was front and center, such as Bellotti, contrast sharply with those where corporate identity was treated as irrelevant, such as cases involving speech by religious corporations.

Owners Have It Both Ways? 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 667 (1989) ("Under the reverse pierce, the corporation owner and the corporation become one legal entity . . . ."). There is significant criticism of veil piercing. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1037–38 (1991) (describing the doctrine as incoherent). This doctrine, however, is limited to close corporations. See Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 9 (1997) (concluding based on his empirical analysis of piercing cases, that piercing occurs only in corporate groups or close corporations of fewer than ten shareholders; it does not occur in publicly held corporations).

48. In a range of cases challenging the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act, lower courts reached disparate results on whether corporations had standing to assert the free exercise rights of their owners. Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge concluded that none of the courts offered a coherent doctrinal justification for their holdings, so he proposed a three-pronged test to determine whether reverse veil piercing was appropriate. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 235, 240, 246 (2013). But see Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 16–18, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (arguing reverse veil piercing should not be applied). The Court in Hobby Lobby did not follow Professor Bainbridge’s test, it merely announced a derivative rights conclusion: "When rights, whether constitutional or statutory are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights" of shareholders, officers, and employees. 573 U.S. 682, 706–07. Protecting "the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby . . . protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies." Id. at 707. As discussed above, only Justice Sotomayor asked about the petitioners’ reverse veil piercing argument in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Supra text accompanying notes 11–16.

49. See also Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (holding that the requirement that non-press corporations channel candidate-related advocacy through PACs is justified by advantages conferred by the corporate form).

50. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448–61 (2011) (finding a damage award against a minister, two of his daughters, and Westboro Baptist Church, Inc. unconstitutional); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Stratton, 536
press corporations,\textsuperscript{51} and corporations in the business of communication such as theatrical productions,\textsuperscript{52} The distinction between non-press corporations and those engaged in communication lacks consistency. In \textit{Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission},\textsuperscript{53} the Court only two years after \textit{Bellotti} found a restriction on public utility bill inserts to be content discriminatory, employing standard content-based analysis\textsuperscript{54} with no consideration of the utility’s corporate status. \textit{NIFLA} again signals that the Court prefers to address speech restrictions as speech restrictions without the added complexity of considering corporate law.

\textit{PG&E} and \textit{NIFLA} confront two entirely different types of corporations, a publicly traded utility and a nonprofit advocacy group; yet the opinions are linked by aversion to content-based regulation. Together, these cases illustrate that the Court has sufficient analytical tools embedded in its content-based framework to protect speaker autonomy without deriving rights for a corporation from the humans associated with the corporation or addressing the complexities of insider reverse veil piercing.

Both \textit{PG&E} and \textit{NIFLA} entailed “forward thinking” governmental efforts to promote a well-informed public. These cases

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{U.S. 150, 160–69 (2002) (finding unconstitutional a municipal ordinance requiring a permit before door-to-door canvassing could occur).}
\item \textit{51. As Professor Michael McConnell writes, “The vast majority of the Court’s press cases involve for-profit corporations . . . and no one, even in dissent, has ever suggested that corporate status mattered in those cases.” Michael W. McConnell, \textit{Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case}, 123 \textit{YALE L.J.} 412, 417 (2013).}
\item \textit{52. See, e.g., \textit{Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad}, 420 U.S. 546, 547, 558–62 (1975) (holding that a corporation “promoting and presenting theatrical productions” successfully asserted harm to its First Amendment rights); \textit{Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson}, 343 U.S. 495, 497–506 (1952) (finding that a corporation engaged in the business of distributing motion pictures successfully challenged New York motion picture licensing statute).}
\item \textit{53. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).}
\item \textit{54. Id. at 537–40. The Court, per Justice Powell, held that the restriction limited the means by which Consolidated Edison could participate in public debate. Justice Powell’s analysis focused on the content discriminatory effects of the prohibition and spent little effort discussing public utilities or their rate structures. Id. at 534 n.1 (stating that Consolidated Edison’s status as a government monopoly “does not decrease the informative value of its opinions on critical public matters”). \textit{But see id. at 549–51} (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (addressing Consolidated Edison’s monopoly status and rate structure).}
\end{itemize}
show the danger of using the public’s right to receive expression as justification for compelled speech. In the context of corporations, the right to receive expression had its most important application in *Bellotti*, where the Court found a restriction on the speech of non-press corporations unconstitutionally restricted the flow of information to the public.\(^{55}\) The right to receive expression was used by Justice Powell in *Bellotti* as a way of avoiding the question of whether corporate First Amendment rights were coextensive with those of individuals; Justice Powell did not intend to signal that governments could compel speech to promote a well-informed public. Justice Powell’s *PG&E* opinion is a clear rebuke to governmental efforts that sacrifice speaker autonomy in the interest of a well-informed public. To reach that conclusion, Justice Powell had to shift the concern from harm to conscience to what he termed “broader” concerns, defined as the harm posed by government intervention in speech markets.\(^{56}\) In doing so, Justice Powell’s *PG&E* opinion creates an analytical track that allows the Court to assess compelled speech requirements without confronting issues of conscience. Stated differently, *PG&E* takes the fact of incorporation out of compelled speech analysis.

II. "Bellotti"

Forty years after glibly announcing in *Grosjean v. American Press Co.*\(^{57}\) that newspaper publishing corporations had liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,\(^{58}\) the Court in *First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765, 781–83 (1978). See infra note 180. In *Grosjean*, the Court announced, without elaboration, that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. *Id.* This holding was a significant development in corporate rights because the Court had held earlier that corporations did not have liberty rights. See Adam Winkler, *We the Corporations: How American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights* 253–54 (2018). Professor Charles O’Kelley regards *Grosjean* as relying on the Field rationale, which “requires that corporations be allowed to assert the constitutional rights necessary to protect their business to the same extent as if they were unincorporated.” Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., *The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti*, 67 Geo. L.J. 1347, 1360 (1979). Professor O’Kelley argues that under this rationale, a court “does not need to deal with the corporate status of a party asserting first amendment rights, as long as the corporation asserts the
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti ruled by a 5-4 vote that the speech of non-press business corporations could not be restricted to matters affecting corporate property. The informative value of speech, Justice Powell wrote for the majority, did not depend upon the identity of its source.

Bellotti arose when the Attorney General of Massachusetts informed several corporations, such as the First National Bank of Boston, that he intended to bring criminal prosecutions if they followed through on their plans to spend money opposing a 1976 referendum allowing a graduated income tax on individuals. A Massachusetts statute specified that business corporations could only make expenditures or contributions to influence the vote on ballot propositions that “materially” affected their financial interests. An amendment specified that no question solely concerning the taxation of individuals shall be deemed to affect the financial interests of a corporation. The amendment was added after voters on multiple occasions refused to approve a graduated income tax.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the statute, ruling that business corporations do not have First Amendment rights coextensive with rights in connection with a form of expression that is a part of the corporation’s business.” Id. at 1362. Although a newspaper cannot speak, its business requires individual speech and the newspaper corporation may be held legally responsible for the speech of its agents. Id. at 1360. Thus, it is entitled to protection under the Field rationale.

60. Id. at 777.
61. Id. at 769.
62. See id. at 769 n.3 (describing the history of the statute). The statute provided for fines against corporations and fines and imprisonment against officers, directors, and agents of corporations. Id. at 768; see also Francis H. Fox, Corporate Political Speech: The Effect of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti Upon Statutory Limitations on Corporate Referendum Spending, 67 KY. L.J. 75, 77–80 (1979) (describing judicial interpretations of the statute).
64. Fox notes that each of the four times the legislature passed the proposed amendments concerning a graduated income tax by “top-heavy majorities, but each time the people voted them down by substantial margins.” Fox, supra note 62, at 78 n.21.
those of natural persons or associations of natural persons.\textsuperscript{65} The state court held a corporation’s property and business interests are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection and as an incident of that protection, a corporation may assert First Amendment protection only for speech about a political issue materially affecting its business, property, or assets.\textsuperscript{66}

After the Supreme Court heard oral argument, it voted 8-1 on November 11, 1977, to find the amendment unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{67} Chief Justice Burger, concerned that a broad statement of corporate speech rights would undermine laws preventing corporations from participating in candidate elections, initially assigned the opinion to Justice Brennan, who had strongly argued during the conference discussion that only the amendment needed to be addressed.\textsuperscript{68} Justice Brennan, however, quickly concluded that both aspects of the statute had to be addressed and that he would sustain the constitutionality of the general prohibition; a decision invalidating the general prohibition “must inevitably call into question the constitutionality of all corrupt practices acts.”\textsuperscript{69}

\begin{flushleft}
66. Id.
67. Justice Powell’s notes for the conference of November 11, 1977, show Justice White as the sole dissenting vote. See Conference Notes, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (Nov. 11, 1977) [hereinafter Bellotti Conference Notes] (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy). Justices Brennan and Stevens said the Court should invalidate only the amendment, fearing that a broader ruling would undermine the corrupt practices acts that prevented corporate expenditures in candidate elections. Id. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and then-Justice Rehnquist also focused on the amendment, although not addressing corrupt practices acts. Id. At the conference, Chief Justice Burger contended the amendment went “too far.” Id. However, after the conference he wrote to Justice Brennan that he “had begun to have misgivings about the case, particularly on its potential for undermining the well established Corrupt Practices Act’s limitations.” Letter from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Dec. 6, 1977) [hereinafter Dec. 1977 Letter] (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy).
68. Chief Justice Burger assigned the opinion to Justice Brennan because “when a case is to be narrowly written, it should be written by the judge ‘least persuaded.’” Burger, Dec. 1977 Letter, supra note 67.
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Justice Powell was assigned the opinion after he wrote to the Justices’ Conference that the case “involves only the expression of views on public issues” not support or opposition to political candidates.70 “No problem of ‘corruption’ is involved at all, using that term in the context of the Corrupt Practices Acts.”71 His later opinion noted the appellants were not challenging laws restricting corporate participation in candidate elections and argued that corporate speech regarding ballot propositions does not create the problem of “political debts.”72 A corporation’s right to speak on issues of public interest “implies no comparable right in the quite different context” of candidate election campaigns.73

In spite of Justice Powell’s efforts to confine Bellotti to ballot propositions, a generation later the Court would reject the distinction between ballot propositions and candidate elections in Citizens United. That decision relied heavily upon the concepts set out in Bellotti.74

A. The Right to Receive Expression

The appellants in Bellotti argued that the key point of the First Amendment is to protect the right of the listener to receive expression.75 In language that Justice Powell’s opinion would mimic, the appellants wrote that from the listener’s perspective, “it is of little or no significance whether the source of the information is a media or non-media source. It is the right to receive the message which counts.”76 Justice Powell’s papers reveal that from the very outset of his consideration of the case

71. Id.
73. Id.
74. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 347 (2010) (holding that a ban on corporate independent expenditures in candidate elections is unconstitutional under Bellotti’s central principle that “the First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity” (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85)). Citizens United led to an extensive body of work on political speech by corporations. For a collection of that literature, see WINKLER, supra note 58, at 405 n.5.
75. Brief for Appellants at 41–42, Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (No. 76-1172).
76. Id.
during the summer of 1977, the right to receive expression was central to his analytical framework. For example, in an August 1977 memo written after Justice Powell had reviewed the briefs, he noted that regardless of whether a corporation’s rights are “co-extensive with or different from the rights of individuals,” the case raised the question of whether the statute impinged upon the right to receive information referred to in recent cases.77

Justice Powell’s clerk Nancy Bregstein prepared a bench memorandum for Justice Powell, concluding the statute to be unconstitutional, but admitting that the “harder task is to choose the best ground or grounds for invalidating the statute.”78 If one places predominant emphasis on the view that corporations are unique because of their artificial existence and their status as creatures of state law, “it is not difficult to conclude that their rights are not infringed” by the Massachusetts statute.79 If, on the other hand, one conceives of the problem as one of “what is prohibited rather than who is guaranteed a certain right, . . . then the fact that appellants are corporations takes on a different significance.”80 Bregstein recommended that the central question in the case should not be whether corporations have First Amendment rights, but whether the law “abridges a kind of expression that the First Amendment was


79. Id. at 1. This conclusion derives from “either of two minor premises: that corporations do not have First Amendment rights, or that the scope of their First Amendment rights may be defined by their creator, the state.” Id. at 2.

80. Id. at 2.
meant to protect.” 81 Bregstein said it “puts the cart before the horse to inquire first whether a particular speaker ‘has’ First Amendment rights. The better approach is to look first at the speech itself, and then to determine whether the identity of the speaker makes any difference.” 82 Justice Powell wrote “Yes” in the margin beside this argument. 83

After Justice Powell was assigned the opinion in December 1977, Bregstein wrote a memorandum recommending that “The opinion need not address whether corporations’ . . . First Amendment rights are ‘coextensive’ with those of individuals.” 84 She suggested the heart of the opinion would be the following: “It would be antithetical to the First Amendment to judge whether speech is protected by looking to its source. This may be why there is little discussion in the cases of whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights, even when those rights have been afforded corporations. Speech presumptively is protected . . . .” 85

Hence, from the first draft to the published opinion, Justice Powell emphasized that the First Amendment “goes beyond the protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.” 86

Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court shifted the analysis away from the interest in self-expression, which would have required confronting whether corporations can speak, and instead focused on the “informational purpose of the First Amendment.” 87 Thus, the most memorable passage in Bellotti is

81. Id. at 11.
82. Id. at 14.
83. Id. Similarly, he also wrote “Yes” in the margin and underlined a passage stating freedom of speech is “concerned as much with society’s interest as it is with the individual.” Id. at 12.
85. Id. at 9.
87. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 782 n.18.
the following: “The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”

Additionally, the paramount danger Justice Powell perceived in *Bellotti* was government action that interferes with the ability of audience members to make informed political choices; that is, the self-governing function of free speech. Massachusetts had “single[d] out one kind of ballot question—individual taxation—as a subject about which corporations may never make their ideas public.” Legislatures are “constitutionally disqualified from dictating . . . the speakers who may address a public issue,” especially where the suppression “suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage.”

**B. Counting to Five**

Justice Powell’s *Bellotti* opinion can be criticized for its failure to address questions such as whether human behavior—speech—can be attributed to corporations and its naïve reliance on “procedures of corporate democracy” to protect dissenting shareholders. Justice Powell clearly understood that human beings—management—controlled corporate speech, as he expressed to then-Justice Rehnquist in a private correspond-

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88. Id. at 777.
89. Justice Powell wrote “[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.” Id. at 791; see also id. at n.31 (“Government is forbidden to assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern themselves”).
90. Id. at 784.
91. Id. at 784–85; see also id. at 793 (“The fact that a particular kind of ballot question has been singled out . . . suggests . . . the legislature may have been concerned with silencing corporations on a particular subject.”).
92. See O’Kelley, *supra* note 58, at 1351 (stating that speech is a human act and is the product of human thought; to believe that a corporation is capable of physical acts is a “category-mistake”).
ence,94 so it is intriguing that his only reference to management making speech decisions is in a footnote where he discussed the chilling effect created by the statute’s “materially affecting” requirement.95

Justice Powell looked beyond corporations and framed the case as one involving harm to the public. A related theme was the danger created by legislation determining the participants in public dialogue. By framing the case in this manner, the path to five votes was easier than if it had been framed as a discussion of the nature of corporations.

The corporations faced an uphill battle at the Supreme Court. Their application for a stay of enforcement of the statute in 1976 was denied by the Court.96 Justice Blackmun’s papers reveal that only Justice Powell voted to grant that application.97 When the Court again considered the case at its April 18, 1977, conference, it postponed a decision on jurisdiction and asked the parties for briefs addressing the issue of mootness.98 Four justices at that time voted to dismiss for a lack of a substantial

94. Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to William H. Rehnquist, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 2 (Apr. 17, 1978) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy) (noting that “management believes the corporation must speak out to protect the long term viability of its business”). During the Bellotti oral argument, the attorney for the appellants stated the following in response to a remark that a corporation cannot have opinions: “I had rather say that whatever positions or opinions the corporation may have must really be those of some individuals who are acting in their representational capacity.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (No. 76-1172), reprinted in 101 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 265, 273 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1979). This meant “management.” Id.

95. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785 n.21 (stating that valuable information would remain unpublished because management would not be willing to risk the substantial criminal penalties resulting from uncertainty about whether a court would agree that particular referendum issue affected the corporation’s business). He also referred to management decisions when he stated that Massachusetts had failed to explain why the interests of shareholders were entitled to greater solicitude in this context than in many others involving controversial management decisions. Id. at 794 n.34.


federal question. After the Court heard oral argument, Justice Powell was the only Justice who argued at the Court’s November 11, 1977, discussion of the case that both provisions of the statute were unconstitutional. Thus, when the opinion was reassigned to Justice Powell after Justice Brennan’s announcement that he could not find the general ban on corporate expenditures to be invalid, it was clear there was little support for a broad statement of corporate First Amendment rights.

To be sure, there was a well-established body of cases where the Court found infringement on the speech of corporations in the communication business, such as newspaper publishing, but as Justice Powell wrote in the margin of a memo from one of his clerks, “Court has never held [corporations] are included in [First Amendment] freedoms—but this has been assumed.”

The nature of corporations had been confronted in cases involving other constitutional rights, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, but the Court in the First Amendment context had never explicitly confronted issues such as Massachusetts’s argument that a corporation was a legal fiction that did not possess the “peculiarly personal rights” of human owners and managers. Ignoring this question and focusing on the rights of listeners, which had been established in earlier cases, presented a less complicated path to a majority.

A perverse aspect of a right to receive expression is its use by the government to compel speech to promote a well-informed

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99. Bregstein, Bellotti Bench Memo, supra note 78, at 2 (stating the four votes to “DFWSFQ” (dismiss for want of a substantial federal question) show others have adopted the premise that corporations do not have First Amendment rights or that their First Amendment rights may be defined by the state). Conference notes kept by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell show the four were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. See, e.g., Conference Notes, William J. Brennan, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (Feb. 24, 1977) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy).

100. Powell, Bellotti Conference Notes, supra note 67.

101. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); see also cases cited supra note 52.

102. Bregstein, Bellotti Bench Memo, supra note 78, at 3.


Justice Powell’s *Bellotti* opinion is clear that the government may not limit “the stock of information from which members of the public may draw,”106 but a right to receive expression that is not strongly grounded in a theory of speaker autonomy supports government efforts to enhance the presentation of different views.107 It is one thing for the government to add its voice to the public debate,108 it is quite another when the government compels a private speaker to present a government-mandated message or to serve as a platform for the speech of government-favored speakers. Although the latter actions do not restrict speech in the *Bellotti* sense of limiting the range of views available to the public, these actions nonetheless interfere with the freedom of speakers and promote government-prescribed orthodoxy. The Court addressed a government policy designed to expose the public to divergent views in *PG&E*, and Justice Powell developed a significant limitation on the right to receive expression that strengthens the First Amendment rights of corporations.

III.  **PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC**

*Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (PG&E)* began as a dispute over a utility company publishing political statements in *Progress*, its newsletter included in its monthly billing envelopes.109 A group called Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), which had intervened in ratemaking proceedings, asked the California utility commission to prevent PG&E from including political editorials in the bills, but the commission instead ordered PG&E to periodically include the

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105. See William E. Lee, *The Supreme Court and the Right to Receive Expression*, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 306 (noting the right to receive expression has been important in two distinct types of cases: “where the government restricts communication between private parties” and where the government “seek[s] to enhance the flow of expression by limiting the exercise of ‘private censorship’”).


108. See, e.g., *Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C.*, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) (stating that instead of compelling private speakers to publish information the state believes to be useful to the public, the state could itself publish the information, and that this “procedure would communicate the desired information to the public without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech”).

109. 475 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) (plurality opinion).
expression of TURN in its billing envelopes.\(^\text{110}\) In those months when TURN was given access to the envelopes, PG&E could include its own newsletter only if it paid additional postage.\(^\text{111}\) The commission maintained that it is “reasonable to assume that the ratepayers will benefit more from exposure to a variety of views than they will from only that of PG&E.”\(^\text{112}\) The utility company countered that it had a First Amendment right not to spread a message with which it disagrees.\(^\text{113}\)

Justice Powell and his clerk William Stuntz readily concluded that corporations like PG&E have a negative First Amendment right not to disseminate the views of other speakers.\(^\text{114}\) The difficulty was finding precedents to support this position because PG&E did not have a conscience, nor was it a newspaper publisher. Thus, Justice Powell, Stuntz, and the other Justices engaged in an extensive dialogue about how to fit a corporation like PG&E into the framework established by cases involving newspaper publishers and individuals raising conscience-based objections to compelled speech. To understand this dialogue, it is necessary to briefly explain the precedents Justice Powell relied upon in his \textit{PG&E} opinion.

\textbf{A. Miami Herald v. Tornillo and Wooley v. Maynard}

In the landmark \textit{Pentagon Papers} case,\(^\text{115}\) the Court emphasized freedom to publish.\(^\text{116}\) Freedom not to publish was added to the protections afforded the press in \textit{Miami Herald Publishing

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\(^{110}\) Id. The regulatory commission maintained that the “extra space” remaining in the billing envelope after inclusion of the bill and any required notices was the property of the rate payers. \textit{Id.} at 5–7. TURN was given access to the space four times a year. \textit{Id.} at 6. The commission reserved the right to grant other groups access to the envelopes, but had denied one group because its speech was not related to ratemaking proceedings. \textit{Id.} at 7 & n.5.

\(^{111}\) \textit{Id.} at 6.

\(^{112}\) \textit{Id.} (internal quotation marks omitted). TURN argued government action increasing the range of sources of information for consumers promotes an “informed citizenry.” Brief for Appellees TURN, et al. at 39, \textit{PG&E}, 475 U.S. 1 (No. 84-1044).

\(^{113}\) Reply Brief of Appellant PG&E at 18–19, \textit{PG&E}, 475 U.S. 1 (No. 84-1044) (arguing that the speech of PG&E could not be restricted to enhance the relative voice of TURN).

\(^{114}\) \textit{See infra} note 155.

\(^{115}\) N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

\(^{116}\) \textit{Id.} at 714.
Co. v. Tornillo,117 where the Court rejected a Florida statute granting candidates access to a newspaper that had attacked them.118 The extension of negative speech rights to newspaper corporations in Miami Herald basically ignored that corporations were involved;119 at no point in the consideration of the case did any member of the Court comment on the corporate status of the appellant.120 As Justice Blackmun wrote in a personal memo he prepared summarizing the case, despite the possibility that the Florida statute encouraged speech:

We are, however, dealing with newspapers here. Much as I detest their deficiencies and their slanting of news, particularly in the East (Washington and New York), the fact is that it has never been the province of the Government to insure that the newspapers present the news fairly. For better or worse, by the First Amendment, we have opted for the free press. This means “free” and not government control of the press.121

Even Justices White and Rehnquist, the fiercest opponents of First Amendment protection for speech by non-press corporations, contended there was something special about press corporations.122 One sees the special regard for newspapers in

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118. Id. at 256–58.
120. In particular, the available notes of the Court’s April 19, 1974, conference discussion of Miami Herald are bereft of any mention of the corporate ownership of the newspaper. All of the Justices voted to reverse the lower court and many agreed with Chief Justice Burger’s statement that, “telling a paper what to publish is not too different from saying what not to publish.” Conference Notes, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo (Apr. 19, 1974) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy); see also Conference Notes, Harry A. Blackmun, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo (Apr. 19, 1974) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy) (reporting Chief Justice Burger’s belief that what must be published was equal to what cannot be published).
122. For reasons ranging from their historic role as conveyors of ideas, PG&E, 475 U.S. at 33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), to freedom being essential to the conduct of their business, First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), or because shareholders have invested in “an enter-
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Wooley v. Maynard, which described Miami Herald as illustrative of the “freedom of thought” that protects both the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking at all. Although a newspaper is a vehicle for humans to express thoughts, the newspaper itself is incapable of thought. Yet Chief Justice Burger described the statute at issue in Miami Herald as depriving a “newspaper of the fundamental right to decide what to print or omit.” Chief Justice Burger’s references to the Miami Herald newspaper were really references to the humans making editorial decisions.

This language was identical to that used by the newspaper’s attorneys who wrote, “Conscientious newspapers will be reluctant to print anything concerning impending elections if in doing so they become obligated to provide free space for ‘replies’ that may be antithetical to the newspapers’ views.” Given this venerated treatment of newspapers, it was not surprising that Massachusetts sought to defend its restriction on the

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125. As Justice Scalia wrote in his Citizens United concurring opinion, “The power to publish thoughts, no less than the power to speak thoughts, belongs only to human beings, but the dissent sees no problem with a corporation’s enjoying the freedom of the press.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392 n.7 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also McConnell, supra note 51, at 417.

126. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714. He was more to the point in quoting a passage from Miami Herald referring to the decisionmaking of editors. Id. (quoting Miami Herald Pub’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974)).

127. Similarly, Justice White in a concurring opinion in Miami Herald used language that ascribed decisionmaking to the newspaper, while obviously referring to editors. 418 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring) (stating that the Florida law “runs a foul of the elementary First Amendment proposition that government may not force a newspaper to print copy which, in its journalistic discretion, it chooses to leave on the newsroom floor”). Justice Blackmun also used similar language in a case memo he prepared, stating that “the statute would force the private newspaper to print material it does not want to print.” Blackmun, Miami Herald Memo, supra note 121, at 5.

speech of “business corporations” in *Bellotti* in part because communication by corporate members of the press was entitled to greater protection than the same communication by entities such as banks.\(^{129}\)

In *Wooley v. Maynard*, two Jehovah’s Witnesses covered the motto “Live Free or Die” on the license plates of their cars because the motto was “at odds” with their deeply held religious beliefs.\(^{130}\) The district court ruled that the covering up of the motto was protected symbolic speech,\(^{131}\) but the Court passed on that issue and instead ruled that the government may not force individuals to display ideological messages on their private property.\(^{132}\) An individual’s freedom of mind, Chief Justice Burger wrote, includes the right not to “be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.”\(^{133}\)

Initially, the Court voted 7-2 on May 27, 1976, to summarily affirm the district court’s ruling,\(^{134}\) prompting a draft dissent by Justice Rehnquist who feared the majority’s reasoning represented an unwarranted extension of the Court’s symbolic speech cases and imperiled federal statutes which prohibit defacing the words “In God We Trust” on currency.\(^{135}\) Justice Rehnquist’s advocacy of setting the case down for oral argument was successful and the Court voted 6-3 to note probable

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129. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781, 782 n.18 (1978). The *Bellotti* Court did not address the possible application of the Massachusetts statute to the press because none of the litigants contended to be members of the press, and this issue was not addressed by the lower court. *Id.* at 781 n.17. However, the Court announced that the press “does not have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten.” *Id.* at 782.


133. *Id.* at 715.


jurisdiction at its June 17, 1976, conference. After hearing arguments, the Court voted 7-2 to affirm with Chief Justice Burger advancing the idea at the conference that the state cannot compel citizens to convey a message contrary to their religious views.

Chief Justice Burger’s first draft opinion for the Court had a section arguing that the covering of the motto was not symbolic speech but alternatively found that the individuals may not be forced to disseminate state-mandated ideological messages. The treatment of symbolic speech prompted Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall to inform Chief Justice Burger that they would not join that part of his opinion. Chief Justice Burger then canvassed the Justices’ Conference, asking for a “show of hands” on deleting the symbolic speech section; Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens voted for de-

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Justice Rehnquist wrote to Chief Justice Burger that deletion of the symbolic speech section meant the Court was not addressing the issue that the district court decided but was deciding the case on a First Amendment issue that the district court never considered.

The right not to speak in *Wooley* is derived from *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* where public school students were required to salute the flag of the United States while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Jehovah’s Witnesses, who regard the flag as a graven image, refused to participate in the flag salute, and the Court found “individual freedom of mind” was preferred over “officially disciplined uniformity.” The Bill of Rights, “which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind,” does not allow public authorities “to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.”

Chief Justice Burger’s *Wooley* opinion admitted that the compelled flag salute was “a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the difference is essentially one of degree.” Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, criticized Chief Justice Burger’s attempt to put this case in the ambit of *Barnette*, noting that there was no affirmation of belief in *Wooley*; the state was not placing citi-

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143. 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
144. Id. at 629, 637.
145. Id. at 634.
zens in the position of “asserting as true” the state-mandated message.\textsuperscript{147}

Justice Rehnquist, however, did not criticize Chief Justice Burger’s use of \textit{Miami Herald} as an illustration of the “individual freedom of mind.” In fact, none of the Justices objected to Chief Justice Burger’s reference to \textit{Miami Herald}. Certainly the opinion drafts were closely scrutinized and Chief Justice Burger was open to changes requested by Justices. For example, Justice Stewart threatened to withdraw his \textit{Wooley} vote because Chief Justice Burger’s early drafts used language stating that a sufficiently compelling interest justified infringement of First Amendment rights.\textsuperscript{148} Justice Stewart said he could not agree that any governmental interest could ever justify “infringement” of First Amendment rights.\textsuperscript{149} Where “free expression must be subordinated to strong societal policies,” Justice Stewart argued, “there is no infringement of First Amendment rights.”\textsuperscript{150} Chief Justice Burger told Justice Stewart that he was “quite willing to modify” the language and rewrote it to secure Justice Stewart’s vote.\textsuperscript{151}

During the Court’s consideration of \textit{Wooley}, Justices Stevens and Blackmun questioned the importance of the case. Justice Stevens wrote to the Justices’ Conference that he could not get over “the fact that the case really involves nothing more than

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the masking of two license plates.”152 Justice Blackmun, in a memo prepared just for his use, wrote the following:

Sometimes I wonder how important cases of this kind are, and I am appalled at the amount of energy that is expended processing them. This seems to me to be an aberration case that is not very important. Yet, in all fairness it may not be a foolish case and could prove to be a very significant one so far as rights to free speech are concerned.153

As will be shown, Wooley has become a key part of the right not to speak and in particular played a critical role in PG&E.

B. Writing the PG&E Opinion

At the Court’s October 11, 1985, conference, the Justices voted 5-3 to reverse the utility commission order.154 Justice Powell voted to reverse for the following reasons: (1) regulated corporations have First Amendment rights to disseminate their own views under Bellotti and Consolidated Edison, (2) Miami Herald and Wooley recognized a “negative” First Amendment right, and (3) counsel for the utility commission admitted at oral argument that the purpose of the order was to afford an opportunity for rate opponents of PG&E to have a forum.155 Chief

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155. Justice Powell used notes he had prepared after hearing oral argument. Post-Argument Notes, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n (undated) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy). In an earlier memo, Stuntz suggested the access rule was neutral “in the sense that any group interested in speech about utility/energy issues is free to apply to use the space.” Memorandum from William Stuntz, Law Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 5 (Oct. 2, 1985) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy). After counsel’s admission at oral argument, Stuntz wrote to Justice Powell “it appears that the only goal of the access program is to permit groups that oppose PG&E in ratemaking proceedings to raise money by using PG&E’s billing envelope. So characterized, the case looks almost easy (and your clerk’s initial views almost dumb).” Memorandum from William Stuntz, Law Clerk, U.S. Supreme
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and O’Connor agreed with Justice Powell that the utility company had First Amendment rights but could not agree on the relevant precedents or principles. According to Justice Powell’s notes, Chief Justice Burger said that compelling PG&E to transmit the “views of others is too troubling” and that “Miami Herald is close—but not controlling. Same is true of Wooley.” Justice Brennan remarked that Miami Herald and Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins “make clear there is negative [First Amendment right].” Justice O’Connor said there was “no clear answer” but that the utility commission’s order was “a form of ‘forced association.’” Justice Marshall also voted to reverse, but Justice Powell’s notes merely say “On first amend.” Justices White, Stevens, and Rehnquist voted to af-

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156. As Stuntz wrote to Justice Powell on October 29, after looking at Justice Powell’s notes and talking with a few clerks in other chambers, it “isn’t clear that the other Justices who voted to reverse agreed on this (or any other) rationale.” Memorandum from William Stuntz, Law Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 1–2 (Oct. 29, 1985) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy).


158. 447 U.S. 74, 96–101 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). The Court ruled that individuals who engaged in expressive activities in a privately owned shopping center did not violate the First Amendment rights of the center’s owner. Id. at 88 (majority opinion). Justice Powell’s concurring opinion said that although the record in PruneYard did not show that the access burdened the owner’s First Amendment rights, there could be circumstances where an impermissible burden occurred. Id. at 98–101 (Powell, J., concurring).

159. Powell, PG&E Conference Notes, supra note 157. Justice Blackmun also recorded Justice Brennan as stating the order was a “trespass” on PG&E’s negative First Amendment rights. Blackmun, PG&E Conference Notes, supra note 154.

160. Powell, PG&E Conference Notes, supra note 157.

161. Id. Notes taken by Justices Blackmun and Brennan do not elaborate on Justice Marshall’s reasoning. See Blackmun, PG&E Conference Notes, supra note 154; Brennan, PG&E Conference Notes, supra note 157.
No. 1]  Conscience of Corporations  185

firm, arguing that corporations have limited rights that were
not violated in this case.162

1.  Grappling with the Precedents

To understand Justice Powell’s opinion, it is important to
separate the issue of TURN’s access to PG&E’s billing enve-
lopes (the forced association issue), from the impact of that
access on PG&E’s publication of Progress (the forced response
issue). Justice Powell described Progress as “no different from a
small newspaper” with a blend of energy saving tips, stories
about wildlife conservation, and commentary on political is-
issues.163 PG&E’s publication of Progress explains in part the
opinion’s reliance on Miami Herald. TURN’s access to the bil-
ing envelopes explains the reliance on Wooley.

The parties “hotly debated” the applicability of Wooley and
Barnette, the flag salute case.164 After Justice Powell was as-
signed the opinion on October 14, he and his clerk William
Stuntz grappled with Wooley in particular. PG&E, as Stuntz
wrote to Justice Powell, “cannot sensibly be said to have a ‘con-
science’ or ‘deeply held beliefs’ in the sense that the individual
claimants in Wooley and Barnette did.”165 In early drafts of the
opinion, Stuntz wrote that it was not necessary to determine
whether Wooley and Barnette provide an “independent basis for
prohibiting a state-compelled access to corporate property for
purposes of disseminating speech. In our view, the Commission’s
order is invalid not because it infringes on any right of con-

162. Blackmun, PG&E Conference Notes, supra note 154; Brennan, PG&E Con-
ference Notes, supra note 157; Powell, PG&E Conference Notes, supra note 157.
(plurality opinion).
Comm’n Opinion 13 (Oct. 29, 1985) (unpublished draft) [hereinafter PG&E First
165. Bench Memorandum from William Stuntz, Law Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court,
for Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 22 (Sept. 27, 1985) (on
file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy); see also Memorandum from
William Stuntz, Law Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc.
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 7 (Oct. 2, 1985) (on file with the Harvard Journal of
Law & Public Policy) (arguing that the freedom of conscience interest is “simply
not applicable to a large, publicly traded corporation”).
science or belief, but because it constitutes a forced association that impermissibly deters protected speech.”

Stuntz relied most heavily on *Miami Herald*, explaining to Justice Powell that simply arguing that sharing envelope space was impermissible begs the question why a publicly traded business corporation has a right not to associate with the speech of others. Stuntz asserted that under *Miami Herald*, a viewpoint-based access scheme can be seen as deterring the property owner from speaking out. “It doesn’t matter who owns the extra space, nor does it matter that PG&E is a corporation rather than an individual.” Justice Powell agreed that no other opinion was as helpful as *Miami Herald*.

The draft opinion circulated to the Justices’ Conference on November 14, explicitly stated that the Court was not deciding whether *Wooley* and *Barnette* were applicable. Justice Rehnquist responded with a draft dissenting opinion, remarking that “the majority expressly disavows any reliance on the argument that corporations, like individuals, have a right not to speak against their ‘consciences.’” Further, Justice Rehnquist argued that *Miami Herald* was inapplicable: “PG&E is not an individual or a newspaper publisher; it is a regulated

166. Stuntz, *PG&E* First Typescript Draft, *supra* note 164, at 14. Justice Powell deleted the references to conscience in this passage so that the emphasis was on forced association. William Stuntz & Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Second Typescript Draft of Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Opinion 13 (Nov. 9, 1985) (unpublished draft) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy). He wrote the following in the margin on the second draft: “Bill—I think one can read *Wooley* and *Barnette* broadly enough to lend support to our view. I’d not argue this, but I don’t want to imply that these cases are limited to conscience.” *Id.*


168. *Id.* at 4.

169. *Id.* at 5.


utility. The insistence on treating identically for constitutional purposes entities that are demonstrably different is as great a jurisprudential sin as treating differently those entities which are the same.”173 Justices White and Stevens quickly joined Justice Rehnquist’s dissent,174 but Justice O’Connor joined Justice Powell’s opinion.175

2. Accommodating Justice Brennan

After reading both Justice Powell’s and Justice Rehnquist’s draft opinions, Justice Brennan wrote a seven-page letter to Justice Powell, admitting he had struggled with the “difficult”

173. Id. at 7.
issues raised by the case.\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Miami Herald} was not the appropriate analytical framework for the case; the “cardinal defect” of the order “is that it compels PG&E both to associate with, and carry the messages of, a speaker with which it may violently disagree. . . . My sense is thus that the case is most readily analyzed” under \textit{Wooley} and Justice Powell’s \textit{PruneYard} concurring opinion.\textsuperscript{177} It was not necessary “to delineate the precise scope of a corporation’s right not to speak,” but the commission’s order was “well beyond the line of permissible regulation.”\textsuperscript{178}

Stuntz opposed Justice Brennan’s idea of relying on \textit{Wooley} because it would “needlessly expose us to the argument that (i) \textit{Wooley} rested on individuals’ freedom of conscience, while (ii) a large, publicly traded corporation like PG&E has no ‘conscience’ to protect.”\textsuperscript{179} Justice Powell responded that despite his full agreement that “\textit{Wooley} can be viewed as essentially a ‘freedom of conscience’ case, it may not be unreasonable (as an accommodation to WJB’s views!) to recognize that by analogy it also supports our position.”\textsuperscript{180} Justice Powell concluded by telling his clerk that “as often happens where the views of five Justices must be met to obtain a Court, the author of an opinion has to make some accommodations.”\textsuperscript{181} He asked Stuntz to make changes to “satisfy WJB without detracting significantly from the soundness of our opinion.”\textsuperscript{182}

Stuntz deleted the section that expressly declined to apply \textit{Wooley} and \textit{Barnett} to the case and added language from \textit{Wooley}
concerning a right not to speak. When Justice Powell shared these changes with Justice Brennan he commended Justice Brennan for suggesting that Wooley “lends support to our position.”

He added:

I have thought it unwise, however, to rely on Wooley as a primary authority, and thereby invite a strong dissent. The section of Wooley that discusses the Maynards’ right not to speak ties that right to “freedom of thought” and “freedom of mind,” and does not rely in its holding on the Maynards’ affirmative right to speak. In this case, we tie appellant’s affirmative right to be free from forced association with TURN to appellant’s affirmative right to speak. Tornillo is plainly the single most relevant authority to such an analysis.

The changes made to Justice Powell’s opinion satisfied Justice Brennan and he joined it on December 26. Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion on January 10 but added a concurring opinion stating that Wooley was sufficient authority to decide this case.

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185. Id. (citations omitted).


Justice Rehnquist revised his dissenting opinion to address the new references to Wooley, calling the analysis flawed. 188 “This Court has recognized that natural persons enjoy negative free speech rights because of their interest in self-expression; an individual’s right not to speak or to associate with the speech of others is a component of the broader constitutional interest of natural persons in freedom of conscience.” 189 He continued, “Extension of the individual freedom of conscience decisions to business corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the breaking point.” 190 Stuntz proposed adding material to make clear that the opinion was not giving corporations “conscience” rights, but Justice Powell felt that addition was unnecessary. 191

C. Understanding PG&E

Justice Powell’s PG&E opinion can be read in two distinct ways. First, the opinion sets out a corporate right to be free from state-imposed burdens on expression. A related but ancillary point concerns the freedom of a corporation to control its property for expressive purposes, including the power to grant or deny access to third parties. 192 Second, the opinion limits the

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189. Id. at 8. Justice Rehnquist added, “To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.” Id.

190. Id. at 3. Justice Rehnquist added, “To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality.” Id.

191. Memorandum from William Stuntz, Law Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court 2–3 (Jan. 31, 1986) (on file with the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy). Justice Powell wrote that he would prefer not to make any further change unless Justice Brennan was concerned. Id. at 3.

192. Although the utility commission maintained that the “extra space” within the billing envelopes belonged to the ratepayers, the envelopes, the bills, and PG&E’s newsletter remained PG&E’s property. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (plurality opinion). Thus, the access order required PG&E “to use its property as a vehicle for spreading a message with which it dis-
power of government to promote diverse views, especially when those actions are viewpoint-based.

Although Justice Powell began the First Amendment analysis by referring to both *Bellotti* and *Consolidated Edison* as cases in which the state sought to abridge speech in ways that harm the “public’s interest in receiving information,” the rhetoric shifted quickly when addressing *Miami Herald*. The Florida statute harmed the newspaper by forcing it “to tailor its speech to an opponent’s agenda, and to respond to candidates’ arguments where the newspaper might prefer to be silent.” Justice Powell wrote that the same concerns that invalidated the compelled access rule in *Miami Herald* “apply to appellant as well as to the institutional press.” The state is not free, Justice Powell wrote, to force PG&E “to respond to views that others may hold.”

This shift was more than rhetorical. Unlike *Bellotti*, where Justice Powell avoided discussing the rights of corporations, PG&E sets out a corporation’s right to be free from state-imposed burdens on expression. PG&E, therefore, had both a right to control how its property is used by others for expressive purposes (the forced association issue) and a right to define what it communicates to the public through an outlet such as *Progress* (the forced response issue). To Justice Powell, the forced association provoked a forced response; because TURN had been given access “to create a multiplicity of views in the envelopes, there can be little doubt that appellant will feel compelled to respond to arguments and allegations made by TURN in its messages to appellant’s customers.” Although Justice Powell was well aware of the danger of ascribing a conscience

agrees.” *Id.* To Justice Powell, the implications of the order were extensive; extra space could be found “on billboards, bulletin boards, and sides of buildings, and motor vehicles.” *Id.* at 18 n.15; see also *id.* at 6 n.4 (quoting dissenting Public Utilities commissioner who noted the sweeping ramifications of the order).

193. *Id.* at 8.
194. *Id.* at 10. Although the *Miami Herald* was owned by a corporation, the dominant actors in the Court’s opinion were editors. See *supra* notes 3, 120–121, 127 and accompanying text.
195. 475 U.S. at 11 (plurality opinion).
196. *Id.*
197. *Id.* at 16 (emphasis added).
to a corporation on the forced association issue, he discussed the forced response issue as if he were describing a natural person.

There was also a chilling effect caused by the viewpoint-based access mandated by the utility commission. The public was not given access to the envelopes. Rather, access was limited “to persons or groups—such as TURN—who disagree with appellant’s views as expressed in Progress and who oppose appellant in Commission proceedings.” Thus, PG&E “must contend with the fact that whenever it speaks out on a given issue, it may be forced... to help disseminate hostile views.” As in Miami Herald, the “safe course is to avoid controversy.”

Apart from the impact of the access order on PG&E’s speech, Justice Powell also criticized the commission’s order on the ground that it compelled PG&E to be a courier for messages with which it disagreed. Justice Powell relied in part on Wooley, absent any reference to conscience, for the idea that the right to speak necessarily includes the right not to speak. Justice Powell wrote that if the government were “able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree, [the First Amendment’s] protection would be empty, for the government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.”

198. See id. at 14.
199. Id. at 13. Justice Powell stated that TURN was free “to use the billing envelopes to discuss any issue it chooses” and if it argued in favor of legislation that could harm PG&E, the company may be “forced either to appear to agree with TURN’s views or to respond.” Id. at 15. This statement reflects the views he stated in his concurring opinion in PruneYard. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 98–99 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Moreover, a disclaimer on TURN’s message “does nothing to reduce the risk that appellant will be forced to respond when there is strong disagreement with the substance of TURN’s message.” 475 U.S. at 15 n.11 (plurality opinion).
200. 475 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion).
201. Id. (quoting Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id. at 16 n.13 (“[A] system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.” (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
203. Id. at 16.
Although Justice Powell sought to read *Wooley* as resting on broader concerns than “individual freedom of mind” at issue in *Barnette*,® implicit in his analysis is management’s disagreement with the ideas of TURN. Stated differently, although a corporation is incapable of thought, its management may deploy corporate resources to promote certain ideas, and under Justice Powell’s theory, refuse to allow those resources to be used to promote ideas management finds repugnant.

Justice Powell was not the first to look through a corporation and see the humans making choices about speech. As noted above, Chief Justice Burger’s *Wooley* opinion described *Miami Herald* as illustrative of the “freedom of thought” that protects “both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”® Chief Justice Burger’s references to the newspaper’s “fundamental right to decide what to print”® were surely about the humans making editorial decisions. It is striking that Justice Rehnquist attacked Justice Powell for extending freedom of conscience decisions to PG&E, but accepted the idea that newspapers have freedom of thought.®

Justice Rehnquist also criticized Justice Powell for departing from the “right to receive” rationale of *Bellotti*, stating that because “the constitutional protection of corporate speech” rests on “the societal interest in receiving information and ideas, the constitutional interest of a corporation in not permitting the presentation of other distinct views” is “de minimis.”® To Justice Powell though, the commission’s viewpoint-based order distorted the marketplace. The key statement from his opinion is the following: “By protecting those who wish to enter the mar-

® 207. 475 U.S. at 35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that PG&E is not an individual or a newspaper).
® 208. *Id.* at 33–34. This rationale was especially true in the case of PG&E, a regulated monopoly. “Any claim it may have had to a sphere of corporate autonomy was largely surrendered to extensive regulatory authority when it was granted legal monopoly status.” *Id.* at 34. *But see id.* at 17 n.14 (plurality opinion) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.1 (1980)) (noting that status as a regulated monopoly does not decrease the informative value of its speech).
ketplace of ideas from government attack, the First Amendment protects the public’s interest in receiving information.” Stated differently, the freedom of a corporation cannot be burdened to enhance the voice of its opponents.

Justice Powell’s *PG&E* opinion is the foundation for the ruling in *Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.*, in which the Court unanimously held that the organizers of the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day Parade in South Boston had a First Amendment right to exclude a gay, lesbian, and bisexual group (GLIB) from the parade. Forcing the parade organizers to include GLIB “violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” Quoting *PG&E*, the *Hurley* Court said the principle of speaker autonomy simply meant that “one who chooses to speak may also decide ‘what not to say.’” Although the Court could have referred to the burden on the consciences of the individuals comprising the unincorporated association that organized the parade, it did not do so. Instead, it announced that the principle of speaker autonomy applied to the press, business corporations, and “ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated expression.”

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211. *Id.* at 560–61, 580–81.
212. *Id.* at 573.
213. *Id.* (quoting *PG&E*, 475 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion)); see also *Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.*, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (noting that the term “freedom of speech . . . necessarily compris[es] the decision of both what to say and what not to say”). *Riley* involved a challenge by a coalition of professional fundraisers, charitable organizations, and potential donors to a law requiring that professional fundraisers disclose to potential donors the percentage of charitable contributions collected during the previous twelve months that were actually turned over to a charity. 487 U.S. at 785–87. Discussion of the corporate identity of some of the challengers was strikingly absent from the Court’s discussion of the case. The papers of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and White do not reveal any consideration of corporate status.
214. The parade organizer, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, was comprised of individuals elected from various South Boston veterans groups. *Hurley*, 515 U.S. at 560.
215. *Id.* at 574; see also *Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc.*, 570 U.S. 205, 213–21 (2013) (holding that nongovernmental organizations may not be forced to adopt a particular belief as a condition of receiving government funding).
The principle of speaker autonomy having priority over the right to receive expression would be again before the Court in *NIFLA*, but with an unusual conscience argument.

IV. *NIFLA*

According to its author, the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT),\(^\text{216}\) was part of California’s legacy of “forward-thinking.”\(^\text{217}\) The law was designed to promote well-informed “personal reproductive health care decisions,”\(^\text{218}\) but the Supreme Court found the law “targets”\(^\text{219}\) pro-life pregnancy centers that seek to discourage women from seeking abortions.\(^\text{220}\)

FACT required licensed facilities, whose primary purpose was to offer “family planning or pregnancy-related services,”\(^\text{221}\)
to disseminate onsite a government-drafted notice stating that California has “free or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services” including abortion.\footnote{Id. at 5–6. The staff includes “two doctors of obstetrics and gynecology, one radiologist, one anesthesiologist, one certified midwife, one nurse practitioner, ten nurses, and two registered diagnostic medical sonographers.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 2016).} Unlicensed facilities, which do not offer medical services, were required to distribute to clients onsite and in any print and digital advertising a notice that the facility was not licensed as a medical facility.\footnote{Health & Safety § 123472(a)(1). The notice could be posted “in a conspicuous place,” printed and distributed to all clients, or distributed digitally at the time of check in. Health & Safety § 123472(a)(2).} Because the unlicensed facility provision of FACT was not attacked on freedom of conscience grounds, this discussion focuses on the licensed facility requirement, which was attacked as a burden on the conscience of clinics.

FACT exempted those licensed clinics enrolled in the State’s Family Planning, Access, Care, and Treatment (PACT) program of family planning and comprehensive reproductive health care including the provision of abortifacients,\footnote{Health & Safety § 123471(c)(2). The law also did not apply to physicians in private practice, general practice clinics, and a wide variety of clinics, such as student health centers operated by public institutions of higher education, not licensed in the state. Health & Safety § 123471(c)(1).} but the petitioners, incorporated as nonprofit religious organizations to

Further, the law covered a “curiously narrow subset of speakers.” \footnote{Id. at 2378.} Finally, because the law required that the notice appear in multiple languages, in some instances as many as thirteen different languages, it “drowns out the facility’s own message.” \footnote{Id. at 2377.}
advocate pro-life beliefs, “cannot in good conscience participate in the Family PACT program.” The petitioners vowed to never disseminate the state-mandated message and sought a preliminary injunction before FACT’s effective date. The district court’s denial of the motion was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, concluding the licensed notice was a permissible regulation of “professional speech.”

Unlike the law at issue in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey that required physicians to communicate government-mandated information to patients, FACT did not refer to physicians or other individuals. Rather, FACT specified that “facilities” shall disseminate the required notice,

225. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 221, at 5. The petitioners were the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA), PCC, and FPRC. Id. NIFLA provides legal counsel, education, and training to more than 1,400 pro-life pregnancy centers. About NIFLA, NIFLA, https://nifla.org/about-nifla/ [https://perma.cc/Z3GR-VCN7] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). As a faith-based nonprofit, NIFLA “seeks to advance the cause and culture of life in America” and “envisions achieving an abortion-free America.” Id. “FPRC is committed through Christian advocacy to strengthen the hearts and lives of moms feeling inadequate to carry their babies to birth.” Hope Clinic for Women, FPRC, http://www.fprcforlife.com/About-FPRC/ Hope-Clinic-for-Women [https://perma.cc/G35V-GDPN] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019); see also supra note 223. PCC describes itself as a “front line ministry supported by local churches and donors.” Church/Group Volunteer Opportunities, PREGNANCY CARE CLINIC, http://www.supportpcc.com/get-involved/church-involvement/ [https://perma.cc/2V6G-4T2S] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019); see also supra note 221. As summarized by Heartbeat International, pro-life pregnancy centers are “the service arm of the pro-life movement.” Brief of Heartbeat International, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140) [hereinafter Brief of Heartbeat International].

226. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 221, at 9.
228. Id. at 844.
230. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (West 2015). This law requires oral disclosures by a physician to a woman concerning the nature of the abortion procedure, the probable gestational age of the unborn child, and the medical risks associated with carrying the child to term. Id. (a)(1). In addition, the physician or someone delegated by the physician must inform the woman that printed materials are available which describe, among other things, the unborn child and list agencies which offer alternatives to abortion. Id. (a)(2). Physicians who violate this law face suspension or revocation of their medical licenses. Id. (c). A plurality of Justices in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, found these requirements did not interfere with the First Amendment right of physicians not to speak. 505 U.S. at 884.
which meant the nonprofit corporations eligible for licenses to operate primary care clinics. Furthermore, although the law at issue in *Casey* threatened physicians with suspension or revocation of their licenses for violating the Pennsylvania law, only “facilities” were subject to FACT’s civil penalties. California, though, argued that some physicians were indirectly subject to FACT because every licensed clinic had to be directed by a licensed physician who under a separate state regulation was responsible for supervising all interactions between patients and clinic employees. Thus, California argued the licensed disclosure provision was a permissible burden that “occurs as part of the overall ‘regulation’ of physicians in ‘the practice of medicine.’”

Although California’s argument opened up the possibility of arguments about the law’s impact on the conscience of those physicians who were clinic directors, the petitioners chose to challenge the law on the grounds that it violated their consciences. Thus, one of the issues raised in the case was whether human traits, such as a conscience, can be found in a nonprofit corporation. At the outset, it is important to reiterate that the petitioners were not arguing FACT burdened the conscience of the individuals who work or volunteer at the clinics. The petitioners’ argument ascribed a conscience to the nonprofit corporations operating the clinics.

None of the Justices, however, addressed the idea of a nonprofit corporation having a conscience. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion sidestepped the petitioners’ conscience argument by emphasizing that “[g]overnments must not be allowed to force persons to express a message contrary to their deepest convic-

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231. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1204(a)(1) (West Supp. 2018) (specifying that “community” and “free clinics” are operated by tax-exempt nonprofit corporations and that no natural person shall operate these clinics).
232. Id. § 123473.
235. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, *supra* note 221, at 9. Despite the petitioners’ lack of any reference to the conscience of physicians, they did agree that FACT was “indirectly” applicable to physicians practicing at certain clinics. Brief for Petitioners, *supra* note 33, at 32 n.14.
tions,” which presumably meant the clinics’ employees and volunteers. Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court ignored the conscience arguments and applied traditional content-based analysis, finding the law was improperly drawn. The content-regulation issues will be discussed first.

A. Content-Based Analysis

The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the lower court’s refusal to grant a preliminary injunction, ruled the notice was “professional speech” defined as “speech that occurs between professionals and their clients in the context of their professional relationship.” Although the appellate court drew heavily upon cases involving the regulation of physician speech, the “professional” it was referring to was the clinic. Hence, it did not matter if the licensed notice was disseminated by receptionists in the waiting room or by nurses or doctors in the examining rooms: “All the speech related to the clinics’ professional services that occurs within the clinics’ walls, including within in [sic] the waiting room, is part of the clinics’ professional practice.”

The Ninth Circuit’s extraordinarily broad conception of professional speech was rejected by the Court. As in other Roberts

237. Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion found that other state regulations made FACT applicable to “medical professionals.” Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He believed the notice was permissible under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see supra note 230. He wrote, “If a State can lawfully require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion about adoption services, why should it not be able, as here, to require a medical counselor to tell a woman seeking prenatal care or other reproductive healthcare about childbirth and abortion services?” NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For the argument that disclosure requirements are pervasive and do not violate the First Amendment, see Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7–17, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140).
239. Id. at 837–39.
240. Id. at 840 (referring to “the professional nature of the licensed clinics’ relationship with their clients”).
241. Id. at 840. One may question the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of a clinic as a “professional.” See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Pregnancy Care Centers in Texas in Support of Petitioners at 24–25, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140) (arguing that a pregnancy center is not a person).
Court decisions that have rejected new categories of unprotected speech, the Court in NIFLA emphasized that there was no precedential support for the concept of “professional speech.” Most importantly, the FACT requirement went far beyond the permissible regulation of the practice of medicine recognized in Casey. Justice Thomas wrote:

The notice does not facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure. In fact, it is not tied to a procedure at all. It applies to all interactions between a covered facility and its clients, regardless of whether a medical procedure is ever sought, offered, or performed. If a covered facility does provide medical procedures, the notice provides no information about the risks or benefits of those procedures.

Justice Thomas referred to the “dangers” associated with content-based regulations of professional speech, such as the risk that the government is actually seeking to suppress unpopular ideas. In language that has powerful implications for other compelled speech cases, Justice Thomas stated that “people lose when the government is the one deciding which ideas should prevail.”

Justice Thomas found it telling that many other facilities that provide services to pregnant women were not required to provide the licensed notice. Shifting to intermediate scrutiny to assess whether the law was “sufficiently drawn” to serve the interest in “providing low-income women with information about state-sponsored services,” Justice Thomas concluded that the law’s exemptions made it “wildly underinclusive.”

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244. Id. at 2373; see also Brief Amici Curiae of the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al. in Support of Petitioners at 18–20, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140) (explaining why the mandated disclosure lacks the elements necessary for informed consent).

245. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2374.

246. Id. at 2375.

247. Id. at 2374.

248. Id. at 2375 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
Family PACT providers from the licensed notice. “If the goal is to maximize women’s awareness of these programs,” Justice Thomas wrote, “then it would seem that California would ensure that the places that can immediately enroll women also provide this information.” The exemptions “demonstrate[d] the disconnect” between the Act’s stated purpose of informing women and its actual scope.

The petitioners attacked the exemptions in FACT, arguing the law targeted pro-life centers because of hostility to their pro-life views. Although Justice Thomas did find the exemptions would likely be ruled unconstitutional, and raised the risk of viewpoint discrimination, he expressly declined to rule on whether FACT was viewpoint discriminatory because the law was unconstitutional either way. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that “the apparent viewpoint discrimination here is a matter of serious constitutional concern.” Justice Kennedy added, “This law is a paradigmatic example of the serious threat presented when government seeks to impose its own message in the place of individual speech, thought, and expression.”

Finally, Justice Thomas noted that California could inform women through a variety of methods, such as state-funded advertising campaigns, without “co-opt[ing] the licensed facilities to deliver its message for it.” Although Justice Thomas maintained that this portion of the opinion applied intermediate scrutiny, he gave no deference to the California legislature’s judgment about the necessity of reaching women at licensed

249. Id. at 2376.
250. Id.
251. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 8–10, 31–34; Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4–5, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140).
252. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (“Such ‘underinclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.’” (quoting Brown, 564 U.S. at 802)).
253. Id. at 2370 n.2.
254. Id. at 2378 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy feared that finding the law viewpoint discriminatory might lead some legislators to infer that “if the law were reenacted with a broader base and broader coverage it then would be upheld.” Id. at 2379. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
255. Id. at 2379. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
256. Id. at 2376.
This portion of NIFLA reads just like Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., in which Justice Brennan, applying strict scrutiny, found that North Carolina had “more benign and narrowly tailored options” available than requiring “that professional fundraisers disclose to potential donors . . . the percentage of charitable contributions collected during the previous 12 months that were actually turned over to charity.” Justice Brennan wrote that the state itself could publish the information: “This procedure would communicate the desired information to the public without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech during the course of a solicitation.”

The overriding theme in Justice Thomas’s opinion, like that of PG&E, is the impermissible harm to the marketplace of ideas when the government alters the content of a speaker’s speech. Stated differently, the autonomy of speakers is more important than the rights of listeners. Justice Thomas’s opinion does not engage in any substantive analysis of corporate free expression rights or the distinct status of nonprofit advocacy corporations. Indeed, Justice Thomas’s opinion does not even acknowledge that the petitioners were corporations; instead, it repeatedly refers to “clinics” or “licensed facilities” affected by the law. NIFLA fits with other First Amendment cases, such as Consolidated Edison and Riley, where the Court focused not on the corporate status of the speaker, but on the dangers of content regulation. If the Court is serious about the dangers of

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257. See id. at 2375–76. California argued that despite statewide marketing campaigns and other methods to reach vulnerable populations, “many eligible Californians do not know about their publicly funded healthcare options.” Brief for the State Respondents, supra note 223, at 5. Pregnancy requires time sensitive decisions, and California argued the licensed notice enhanced awareness of public health programs. See id. at 6.
259. Id. at 800.
260. Id. at 795.
261. Id. at 800.
262. See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (“By requiring petitioners to inform women how they can obtain state-subsidized abortions—at the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from choosing that option—the licensed notice plainly ‘alters the content’ of petitioners’ speech.” (quoting Riley, U.S. at 795)).
263. See, e.g., id. at 2368–72, 2374–76.
compelled speech, the principles applied in *NIFLA* would allow abortion providers to challenge state-mandated disclosures.264

By ignoring the petitioners’ conscience arguments,265 Justice Thomas avoided examining the nexus between a nonprofit corporation and its members. Justice Kennedy’s brief concurring opinion, though it maintained the law was harmful to individual conscience, raised more questions than answers about which for-profit corporate speakers could assert harm to the conscience of shareholders.

**B. Freedom of Conscience**

Nonprofit advocacy corporations have standing to assert harm to their members,266 but the petitioners’ briefs are striking in that there is no discussion of the burden of the licensed notice on the conscience of individuals, such as physicians, nurses, or volunteers.267 Instead, the petitioners stressed that FACT “forces licensed centers to utter speech that violates their conscience.”268 In terms that humanize the nonprofit corporations operating the clinics, the briefs repeatedly refer to “individual freedom of mind.”269 For example, the petitioners said the Act “intrudes


265. Only in the most cursory way did Justice Thomas describe the anti-abortion mission of the petitioners. He quoted the author of a report commissioned by the California State Assembly who described crisis pregnancy centers as run by “pro-life (largely Christian belief-based) organizations” whose goal is to oppose abortion. *NIFLA*, 138 S. Ct. at 2368 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 2371 (petitioners are “devoted” to opposing abortion). Given that the licensed notice altered the content of the petitioners’ speech, see *supra* note 262, an extended discussion of the petitioners’ beliefs was unnecessary to his analysis.

266. *Supra* note 40.

267. In contrast, the amicus brief filed by Heartbeat International, a nonprofit whose mission is to support the pro-life cause, emphasized the burden FACT placed on the staff and volunteers of pregnancy centers. See *Brief of Heartbeat International, supra* note 225, at 20 (“[C]ompelled speech violates the deeply held religious beliefs and/or moral convictions of the staff and volunteers of pro-life centers.”). 268. Reply Brief for Petitioners, *supra* note 251, at 6.

269. E.g., *Brief for Petitioners, supra* note 33, at 24 (quoting *Wooley v. Maynard*, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
upon private thought by mandating that Petitioners mouth ideas that contradict their own convictions.\footnote{270} “This creates duplicity of thought and mental conflict for Petitioners . . . .”\footnote{271}

If one replaces individuals for clinics, the petitioners’ arguments read much like Justice Alito’s \textit{Janus} opinion finding compulsory union dues unconstitutional because individuals are coerced into betraying their convictions.\footnote{272} But by contending that the clinics had consciences, the petitioners were making an assertion that was dismissed out of hand by Justice Stevens when he wrote the following in \textit{Citizens United}:

\begin{quote}
[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their “personhood” often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of “We the People” by whom and for whom our Constitution was established.\footnote{273}
\end{quote}

Justice Stevens’s view, though, does not acknowledge that there can be such a close nexus between a nonprofit advocacy corporation and its members that the corporation and its

\footnote{270. \textit{Id.} at 24.}
\footnote{271. \textit{Id.} at 25. Similarly, the Cato Institute argued that the licensed disclosure burdens the freedom of conscience of pregnancy centers because it “forces them to promote services they morally oppose.” Brief for the Cato Institute as \textit{Amicus Curiae} in Support of Petitioners at 12, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140).}
\footnote{273. \textit{Citizens United} v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); \textit{see also} Greenwood, supra note 46, at 1067 (“[A] corporation is directed not to balance conflicting political and moral goals but rather to pursue one end—profit maximization—without considering alternative or competing goals.”); Strine & Walter, supra note 93, at 384 (arguing that for-profit corporations are fundamentally different from human beings in terms of their range of concerns; unlike human beings, “corporations must have only one end that motivates their political spending: what will produce the most profit for them in the purely monetary sense”). For a different point of view, see Justice Alito’s \textit{Hobby Lobby} opinion which countered the Third Circuit’s holding that business corporations “do not, separate and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion.” \textit{Burwell} v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707 (2014) (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Alito wrote, “All of this is true—but quite beside the point. Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.” \textit{Id.}}
members are in essence identical. Thus, the NIFLA petitioners’ conscience argument makes more sense if the petitioners are regarded not as a corporation or a clinic, but as an association of individuals who share a pro-life view. In effect, incorporation does not diminish the First Amendment protections of the humans who use the corporate-owned clinics as vehicles for advocacy.

This conclusion may have been what Justice Kennedy meant in his brief concurring opinion that embedded respect for speaker autonomy into a bold rejection of California’s assertion that its law was “forward thinking.” Without acknowledging that the petitioners were corporations, Justice Kennedy warned of the dangers inherent when government intervenes in the marketplace of ideas:

[I]t is not forward thinking to force individuals to “be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view [they] fin[d] unacceptable.” It is forward thinking to begin by reading the First Amendment as ratified in 1791; to understand the history of authoritarian government as the Founders then knew it; to confirm that history since then shows how relentless authoritarian regimes are in their attempts to stifle free speech; and to carry those lessons onward as we seek to preserve and teach the necessity of freedom of speech for the generations to come. Governments must not be allowed to force persons to express a message contrary to their deepest convictions.274

Justice Kennedy could have omitted the references to individuals and still forcefully rejected compelled speech, à la PG&E, without tying it to freedom of conscience. But his references to conscience pierce the corporate veil without acknowledging the most important precedent supporting such action, NAACP v. Alabama,275 in which the Court viewed the NAACP and its members as identical.276

The NAACP, a nonprofit membership corporation, engages in expressive activities that make a “distinctive contribu-

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274. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2379 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715).
276. Id. at 458–59.
tion... to the ideas and beliefs of our society.” During the 1950s, the NAACP, one of the principal advocates of desegregation, angered Alabama officials by actions such as supporting the boycott of the segregated Montgomery bus system. Alabama’s attorney general, seeking to oust the NAACP from the state, filed suit against the NAACP and received a court order compelling the group to reveal the names and addresses of all its Alabama members. The NAACP refused and was held in contempt and fined $100,000.

Before the Supreme Court, the NAACP argued that it “may assert, on behalf of its members, a right personal to them” to be protected from disclosure of the membership lists. The Court agreed because the NAACP and its members “are in every practical sense identical.” The NAACP “is but the medium through which individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views.” Given the “manifestations of public hostility” members of the NAACP had previously experienced when their membership had been revealed in the Jim Crow era, the Court concluded compelled disclosure “is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate.”

277. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963). One of the NAACP’s activities, litigation, was described by the Court as “a form of political expression.” Id. at 429.
278. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 452.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 454.
281. Id. at 458.
282. Id. at 459.
283. Id. The Court said there was a reasonable likelihood that the NAACP would be adversely affected by disclosure of its membership lists. Id. at 459–60. This was a “further factor pointing towards our holding that petitioner has standing to complain of the production order on behalf of its members.” Id.
284. Id. at 462–63 (emphasis added); see also Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961) (noting that economic reprisals followed disclosure of membership lists); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523–24 (1960) (noting that the record shows public identification of NAACP members has been followed by “harassment and threats of bodily harm”). In a later case involving a Virginia law affecting the solicitation of legal business, the Court held that in addition to asserting the associational rights of its members, the NAACP could assert the right of the NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress for infringement of their con-
Justice Harlan’s opinion in *NAACP v. Alabama* emphasized the “nexus” between the corporation and its members. That case, along with others involving the NAACP, show the Court’s sensitivity to an organization facing hostility from the government because it was challenging government-enforced norms. Similarly, because California is often described as having the “gold standard” for abortion rights, the *NIFLA* petitioners are directly in conflict with government norms.

Moreover, like the NAACP, there is a tight nexus between the clinics and their supporters; the mission-oriented nonprofit corporations are a vehicle through which individuals with shared religious beliefs act upon those beliefs. For example, the Pregnancy Care Clinic challenging the law in *NIFLA* does not have constitutional rights. *NAACP v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963). “We think petitioner may assert this right on its own behalf, because, though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those activities” curtailed by the statute. *Id.*; see also *In re Primus*, 436 U.S. 412, 427–28 (1978) (describing the similarities between the NAACP and the ACLU).

285. 357 U.S. at 458–59; see also *NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers*, 377 U.S. 288, 309 (1964) (“This case, in truth, involves not the privilege of a corporation to do business in a State, but rather the freedom of individuals to associate for the collective advocacy of ideas.”). Although both Justices White and Rehnquist wrote dissenting opinions in *Bellotti*, both accepted the idea that corporations such as the NAACP had First Amendment protection. Justice White acknowledged that “there are some corporations formed for the express purpose of advancing certain ideological causes shared by all their members . . . . Under such circumstances, association in a corporate form may be viewed as merely a means of achieving effective self-expression.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. *Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765, 805 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). In his separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist read *NAACP v. Button* as meaning that, “where a State permits the organization of a corporation for explicitly political purposes, this Court has held that its rights of political expression, which are necessarily incidental to its purposes, are entitled to constitutional protection.” *Id.* at 825 n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing *Button*, 371 U.S. at 415).


more than offer medical services; it is a “front line ministry” that also offers religiously-based parenting classes and support groups.288 The staff and volunteers “are trained to present the gospel to the women and men who come to the clinic.”289 For purposes of compelled speech analysis, the nonprofit Pregnancy Care Clinic and its supporters are identical. Thus, in a sense, Justice Kennedy’s comments in NIFLA are not out of place in a case where the petitioners, although organized as nonprofit corporations, are in effect a community of believers.290

Given that PG&E established that speaker autonomy, rather than conscience, is a sufficient basis for judicial hostility to compelled speech, Justice Kennedy could have disregarded any reference to conscience without blunting the forcefulness of his concurring opinion.291 By referencing conscience, however,

288. Church/Group Volunteer Opportunities, supra note 225.
289. Id. Pregnancy Care Clinic’s website states:

Pregnancy Care Clinic is a front line ministry supported by local churches and donors. We ask that your church add us to your list of missionaries that your congregation supports in prayer, financial giving, and involvement. Our volunteers are trained to present the gospel to the women and men who come to the clinic. Once they have accepted Christ, we begin a discipleship program with them and contact a partner church to hand them off to. It is our goal to see these new Christians firmly planted in their own church home.

Id. For additional discussion of the services beyond pregnancy counseling offered by pregnancy care centers, see Brief of 13 Women and The Catholic Association Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 32–34, NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (No. 16-1140).

290. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Justice Ginsburg dissented, contending that Justice Alito did not recognize that for-profit corporations are unlike religious organizations that “exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to the same religious faith.” 573 U.S. 682, 754 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She criticized the majority’s inability to perceive the “distinction between a community made up of believers in the same religion and one embracing persons of different beliefs.” Id.

291. Another way of attacking the compelled speech requirement without referencing conscience comes from Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Bellotti. Drawing upon Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), where Chief Justice Marshall wrote that a corporation “possesses only those properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence,” id. at 636, Justice Rehnquist maintained that “when a State charters a corporation for the purpose of publishing a newspaper, it necessarily assumes that the corporation is entitled to the liberty of the press essential to the conduct of its business.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Similarly, when the state charters a corporation for explicitly political purposes, such as the NAACP, “the rights of political
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is susceptible of two distinct readings. Read narrowly, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion merely reiterates that nonprofit advocacy corporations have standing to assert harm to affiliated individuals. Read broadly, the harm of compelled speech is not confined to nonprofits and may be challenged by closely held for-profit corporations on behalf of their shareholders. The latter reading has far-reaching implications for the ongoing compelled speech litigation involving Masterpiece Cakeshop and Arlene’s Flowers. To pierce the veil for these entities, though, would raise a host of significant questions about which corporations could assert the beliefs of their shareholders. By not defining when reverse veil piercing is appropriate, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion raises more questions than it answers.

expression, which are necessarily incidental to its purposes, are entitled to constitutional protection.” Id. at 825 n.5 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963)). Because the petitioners in NIFLA were incorporated as religious organizations to advocate pro-life beliefs, dissemination of a state-mandated message about the availability of abortion, runs counter to their purpose. Professor Kent Greenfield asserts that asking what rights are incidental to the very existence of a corporation is the proper analysis of corporate constitutional rights. Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 322 (2015).


293. See Brief of Amici Curiae Corporate Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 12, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (“The Court should not assume it can disregard this principle of separateness with closely held companies such as Masterpiece Cakeshop and not cause significant uncertainty, infighting, and litigation with regard to other companies.”).

294. Similarly, commentators have criticized the Hobby Lobby opinion for not specifying the meaning of “closely held.” See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, What is a “close corporation” for purposes of the new Hobby Lobby rule?, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE’S J.L. RELIGION POL. & CULTURE (July 1, 2014), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/07/what-is-a-close-corporation-for-purposes-of-the-new-hobby-lobby-rule.html [https://perma.cc/P3B5-S47P]; see also Hobby Lobby, 373
Although Chief Justice Roberts recently declared that he has replaced Justice Kennedy as the Court’s “most aggressive defender” of First Amendment rights, and that he believes business corporations have views on public issues, it is unlikely he will push veil piercing as a First Amendment doctrine. Compelled speech cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop present sufficiently complex issues, such as whether designing a custom cake is protected artistic expression, which can be answered without the added complexity of veil piercing. Stated differently, the content-based analysis of PG&E and NIFLA focuses the Court on harm to speaker autonomy irrespective of corporate identity and presents a less problematic analytical track than veil piercing.

CONCLUSION

Throughout its consideration of the First Amendment rights of corporations, the Court has varied the significance it ascribes to corporate identity. Citizens United heralds the marginalization of corporate identity to a majority of the Roberts Court, and NIFLA adds further emphasis to this doctrine. Justice Thomas’s NIFLA opinion does not even acknowledge the petitioners’ statuses as corporations, signaling that the case was a pure free expression case, rather than an intersection of corporate and First Amendment law.

In Bellotti, corporate status was front and center in the Court’s deliberations, but Justice Powell’s opinion avoided addressing the nature of corporations, instead adopting an unsatisfying rationale—listener’s rights—that unwittingly opens the door to compelled speech cases such as PG&E. In constructing

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297. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S 310, 342–43 (2010) (rejecting the argument that the political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment).
his PG&E opinion, Justice Powell downplayed conscience and created a compelled speech doctrine that emphasizes speaker autonomy, regardless of whether the speaker is a business corporation, the press, or an individual. Justice Powell’s PG&E opinion lays the foundation for NIFLA by removing any concern for conscience from compelled speech cases involving corporations.298

Justice Thomas’s NIFLA opinion does not present the complex questions about veil piercing that Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion raises.299 The methodology used by Justice Thomas, anchored in the Court’s longstanding aversion to content discriminatory regulation, focuses the Court’s attention on matters it has more competence addressing than veil piercing. In the context of a nonprofit advocacy corporation, veil piercing is an appropriate way of protecting the members, but there are complex line-drawing questions when the shareholders of for-profit corporations seek to pass their beliefs to the corporation.300

Despite the shifting rationales and methodologies of Bellotti, PG&E, and NIFLA, these cases display a consistent aversion to laws that cast certain corporate speakers in a disfavored status. “Forward-thinking” government efforts to fine-tune the flow of information by compelling private speech should be rejected, not on the basis of conscience, but because these efforts promote government-defined orthodoxy.301 The First Amendment, “[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power,”302 requires

298. As Janus shows, the Court is still open to conscience arguments in compelled subsidy cases involving individuals.

299. That is not to say that Justice Thomas’s opinion does not raise questions. His opinion said it was not questioning the legality of “health and safety warnings long considered permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Beccerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2376 (2018). Justice Breyer found that this disclaimer “would seem more likely to invite litigation than to provide needed limitation and clarification.” Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

300. See supra notes 293–294.

301. Indeed, one may say that the value of speaker autonomy mandates that compelled speech cases are not resolved “in favor of those in authority.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636 (1943).

302. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340; see also id. at 335 (stating that the FEC’s business is to censor); id. at 349 (holding that the “assertion of brooding governmental power cannot be reconciled with the confidence and stability in civic discourse that the First Amendment must secure”); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 482 (2007) (“[W]e give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censor-
that decisions about what views are voiced are best left in “the hands of each of us,”\textsuperscript{303} including those who use corporate resources to speak.

\textsuperscript{303} Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED:

A CONSTITUTIONAL NORM THAT THE COURT
SHOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ENFORCE

DAVID SCHOENBROD*

INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 214
I. THE CONSENT-OF-THE-GovernED NORM ........219
   A. The Norm's Provenance ............................... 219
   B. What the Original Norm Would Require of
      Congress ......................................................... 222
II. THE IMPEDIMENTS TO JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
    THE ORIGINAL NORM............................................ 224
   A. The Impediments' Evolution ....................... 224
   B. The Impediments Today .............................. 236
III. CONGRESS FLOUTS THE NORM............................. 238
   A. Congress's Duty to Comply with the Norm
      to the Extent Practical ............................... 238
   B. Congress Could Comply with the Norm to a
      Substantial Extent...................................... 240
   C. How Flouting the Norm Benefits Legislators
      Politically ..................................................... 244
   D. How Flouting the Norm Harms the
      Legislators' Constituents.............................. 248

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Ronald A. Cass, Christopher C. DeMuth, Douglas H. Ginsburg, C. Boyden Gray,
Philip Hamburger, David R. Johnson, Gary S. Lawson, Michael B. Mukasey,
Joseph Postell, Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Lawrence G. Sager, Ross Sandler, James F.
Simon, Richard B. Stewart, Jerry Taylor, and Peter J. Wallison provided insightful
comments. So too did the participants in the faculty workshop at New York Law
School, the research roundtable and symposium on “Delegation, Nondelegation,
and Un-Delegation” at the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of the Administrative
State at George Mason University, a panel at the New Civil Liberties Alliance, a
panel at the Federalist Society’s National Lawyers Convention, and Professor E.
Donald Elliott’s seminar at Yale Law School. William Mills of the New York Law
School Library, Reza Ravangard, New York Law School class of 2019, and Ethan
Clarkson, New York Law School class of 2020, solved many difficult research
problems. I decline to delegate responsibility for any errors that remain.
INTRODUCTION

The Declaration of Independence proclaims that governments derive “their just powers from the consent of the governed.”\(^1\) To condition the federal government’s powers upon such consent, the Constitution vested responsibility for exercising certain basic powers, including the power to make rules of private conduct, in the branch of government most directly accountable to the governed, Congress.\(^2\) Members of Congress would then bear personal responsibility for the exercise of these legislative powers, and the governed could withhold consent by refusing to reelect these legislators. This arrangement was central to the compact that the Framers of the Constitution offered to the people.\(^3\) As James Madison wrote in *Federalist No. 51*, “A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government . . . .”\(^4\)

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1. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. See infra Part I.
That members of Congress bear such personal responsibility is a constitutional norm. As originally conceived, this norm required Congress to make all the rules of private conduct. Given the quantity of rules now being issued, it is hard to believe Congress could bring itself to make them all. This limitation on Congress’s ability to provide rules impedes the courts from fully enforcing the norm as originally conceived.

The Supreme Court has, however, erred in how it dealt with this impediment to judicial enforcement. It has held that Congress does not delegate its legislative powers so long as it states an “intelligible principle” to guide agency rulemaking. Thus, though the norm as originally understood required Congress itself to make the rules of private conduct, the “intelligible principle” test allows Congress to leave such rulemaking to agencies so long as Congress says enough about the goals that the agency should pursue in making the rules. “Enough,” however, is a question of degree. Judges would inevitably have difficulty in comparing the degree to which statutes guide agency rulemaking given the quite different topics of regulation. The test is therefore mush and, as such, judicially unmanageable and unenforceable. The upshot is that Congress can outsource responsibility for the laws by giving lip service to the vaguest of goals.

Emblematic of this trivializing of the norm, some of the Justices’ opinions began a half century ago to call it the “nondelegation doctrine.” This label conceals the norm’s vital consent-of-the-governed purpose, much as if equal protection of the laws was.

5. My past scholarship on delegation minimized the need for Congress to delegate legislative powers, at least after a period of transition. See, e.g., DAVID SCHONBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 135–52, 165–79 (1993) [hereinafter POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY] (arguing delegation creates incentives for Congress to make regulation more complex and that, without those incentives, Congress could enact a simpler set of rules that would achieve regulatory objectives more effectively and efficiently); see also DAVID SCHONBROD, RICHARD B. STEWART & KATRINA M. WYMAN, BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION THAT WILL WORK (2010) [hereinafter LOGJAM]. Nonetheless, I now see that the Court could not enforce the original norm completely without risking overwhelming political opposition, as discussed in Part II of this Article.


7. See infra Part II.
called the “nondifferentiation doctrine” or freedom of the press was called the “nonfiltering principle.”

The “nondelegation doctrine” label thus makes congressional responsibility sound like a technicality beloved only by cranks who oppose regulatory protection, although the overwhelming majority of the governed want such protection. In my own experience as an environmental advocate, I concluded that delegation often allows members of Congress to avoid blame for failing to deliver regulatory protection. Because the governed overwhelmingly want both protection and a Congress accountable for the rules of private conduct, I refer to the “consent-of-the-governed norm” rather than the “nondelegation doctrine.”

Yet, if the Court suddenly began enforcing the norm, even a less stringent version than the original norm, the reversal could cast a pall of doubt over the validity of a massive number of rules in the Code of Federal Regulation. It would take many years of litigation to determine the validity of these rules and years more, if not decades, for Congress to repair the resulting chinks in the regulatory system. Thus, our nation’s reliance on massive delegation also impedes enforcement of the norm.

This Article argues that the Court could find a path through the impediments, including Congress’s inability to provide all the needed rules and the present reliance on delegation, to enforce the norm to a substantial, though incomplete, extent. The path should begin by distinguishing between the original norm and the impediments to its full judicial enforcement. The distinction between the norm and the impediments to its judicial enforcement would make clear that, regardless of the inability of the Court to fully enforce the norm, members of Congress, having sworn to uphold the Constitution, are honor bound to comply with the norm to the extent practical.

The Court would then be left with a constitutional duty to follow a path that enables it to enforce the norm to the extent permitted by the impediments to judicial enforcement. One

8. The earliest use of the term “nondelegation doctrine” or “non-delegation doctrine” in a Supreme Court opinion is in a passage citing with approval Professor Kenneth Culp Davis’s call to explicitly abandon the doctrine. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 274 n.27 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01–2.05 (1958)).

9. For the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra Parts II–III.

10. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
step on this path would be to hold that the Court will strike down significant new regulations whose promulgation the legislative process has not approved. The idea that Congress should vote on significant new regulations has a bipartisan pedigree, yet both parties in Congress—each in its own way—assiduously avoid putting the idea into practice. As Part IV.B will show, the Court can construct a test of the significance of regulations that is judicially manageable. The Court should forewarn Congress of its intention to take this step so that Congress could organize itself to vote on the promulgation of these significant new regulations. A subsequent step might be to force Congress to gradually take responsibility for the most important preexisting regulations.

Implicit in this approach is that impediments to judicial enforcement often require the Court to adopt tests that are less stringent than the norms themselves. Such underenforcement of constitutional norms may seem strange because the Court does not exactly advertise it, but it happens nonetheless. An example discussed in Part III.A is the equal protection norm, which forbids states from treating people unequally without fair reason. Impeded by concern for usurping the policymaking prerogatives of states in run-of-the-mill cases, the Court uses a deferential test allowing some violations of the norm. Part IV.A shows that the Court changes the tests it applies when it perceives better ways to skirt impediments to the judicial enforcement of constitutional norms. Thus, by “constitutional norm,” I mean a requirement of the Constitution and by “test” I mean a standard that courts use to avoid impediments to full enforcement of a constitutional norm.

This Article’s proposed approach to judicial enforcement would provide less complete compliance with the consent-of-the-governed norm than the approach advocated in my earlier scholarship. Since my earlier publications, I have had the benefit of private communications with sitting Justices from the left, right, and center—none still on the Court. These discussions gave me the impression that they would have liked to do more to enforce the norm, but given the impediments, they

11. For the points summarized in this paragraph, see infra Parts III–IV.B.
12. This Article suggests a method of enforcement quite different than strict enforcement of the norm after a period of transition. See Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility, supra note 5, at 170–91.
were unsure of how to do so. This Article responds to such concerns.

The Court’s recent disposition of *Gundy v. United States*\textsuperscript{13} suggests five Justices might be willing to revive judicial enforcement of the consent-of-the-governed norm.\textsuperscript{14} All Justices should join in reviving the norm, especially now that the Presidency of Donald Trump has made starkly evident what was true before: legislators have long shirked their constitutional duty to take responsibility for the exercise of legislative powers and the result is often harm to their constituents. The Court’s failure to enforce the norm has resulted in Congress and Presidents under both parties devising and imposing new ways of delegating power that allow incumbents to take credit for popular promises yet shift blame for unpopular consequences.\textsuperscript{15} By so doing, the incumbents avoid the hard choices needed to deliver more effective regulatory protection and reduce pointless regulatory burdens.\textsuperscript{16} Examples with deadly consequences for the governed are discussed in Part III.D. Such disgraceful legislative behavior, made possible by the Court’s failure to enforce the norm, has contributed to loss of trust in government.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{13} 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).

\textsuperscript{14} The dissent by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, calls for reinvigorating the norm. *Id.* at 2135 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Alito stated in his concurring opinion that, “If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support the effort.” *Id.* at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in the decision. Later, Justice Kavanaugh wrote an opinion in which he stated that Justice Gorsuch’s “scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his *Gundy* dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases.” *Paul v. United States*, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). For discussions of the likelihood that *Gundy* would lead to the enforcement of the norm, see Nicholas Bagley, Opinion, ‘Most of Government is Unconstitutional’, *N.Y. Times* (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html [https://nyti.ms/2Y7UsXg]; David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Opinion, *Alito Teases a Judicial Revolution*, *Wall St. J.* (June 23, 2019, 3:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/alito-teases-a-judicial-revolution-11561317002 [https://perma.cc/K8HZ-EPP7].


\textsuperscript{16} *Id.*

\textsuperscript{17} See Howard Dean & David Schoenbrod, *Populism is powerful because Washington deserves a kick in the pants*, *USA Today* (Oct. 23, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://usat.ly/2zwIrnL [https://perma.cc/N2X6-RZC7].
three-quarters of voters in 1964 to one-third in 1980 and only one-fifth in 2015, and one-sixth in 2019.18

Part I of this Article explains the original concept of the consent-of-the-governed norm. Part II discusses the evolving impediments to judicial enforcement of the norm. Part III shows that members of Congress should comply with the norm to a substantial extent, and their failure to do so causes grievous harm to their constituents. Part IV shows how the Court could and should substantially achieve the purpose of the norm. Part V argues that the many rationales for ignoring the norm are flimsy.

I. THE CONSENT-OF-THE-GOVERNED NORM

A. The Norm’s Provenience

To require the consent of the governed, the Constitution empowered voters to sack the key policy makers. Article I vests “All legislative Powers herein granted,” including making regulatory law, in a Congress, including a House of Representatives directly elected at two year intervals, legislating in tandem with a President.19 To make members of Congress personally responsible, Article I requires how they vote—“the Yeas and Nays”—be published when requested by one-fifth of the legislators present.20 So, these directly or indirectly elected officials would be accountable for the hard legislative choices.21 Such accountability would enable the governed to withhold their consent in response to the decisions of elected officials.22 That was the deal that the Framers offered the people.

Members of Congress would bear personal responsibility even though voters may pay little attention until a vote for or


21. The Constitution does not, of course, call for the President to be popularly elected, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2–3, and did not do so for senators until the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. Nonetheless, even without direct elections, popular sentiment could result in either Presidents or senators failing to get reelected.

22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 50, supra note 4, at 314–17 (James Madison).
against a rule directly affects them. As Justice Kagan, quoting James Madison, wrote in a powerful dissent from the Court’s refusal to take on political gerrymandering:

To retain an “intimate sympathy with the people,” [members of Congress] must be “compelled to anticipate the moment” when their “exercise of [power] is to be reviewed.” Election day—next year, and two years later, and two years after that—is what links the people to their representatives, and gives the people their sovereign power. That day is the foundation of democratic governance.23

Debate at the Constitutional Convention proceeded on the premise that Congress had to make the law itself rather than delegate that job to others.24 John Locke, who influenced many of the Framers, thought a people’s grant of legislative power was “only to make laws, and not to make legislators” because “when the people have said, [w]e will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for them.”25

Making the regulatory law meant not just passing statutes but passing statutes that state the rules of private conduct.26 In Federalist No. 75, Alexander Hamilton wrote “The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society . . . .”27 In Fletcher v. Peck,28 decided in 1810, the Supreme Court wrote, “It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments.”29

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27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 4, at 449 (Alexander Hamilton).
28. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
29. Id. at 136; see also, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2138 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
And in *Gibbons v. Ogden*,30 decided in 1824, the Court wrote that the power to regulate commerce, which Article I includes in the legislative power, is “to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.”31 It is no wonder then that school civics courses once taught that it is Congress’s job to make the laws and that its members are called “lawmakers.”

In *Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States*,32 decided in 1813, the Court recognized in dicta that Congress may not delegate the power to make the rules of private conduct.33 The statute in question conditioned a rule imposing a maritime embargo on the President’s findings on whether other nations respected American neutrality.34 Based upon the President’s findings, the embargo took effect.35 The attorney for the party charged with violating the embargo argued, “Congress could not transfer the legislative power to the President. To make the revival of a law depend upon the President’s proclamation, is to give to that proclamation the force of a law.”36 The Court responded that the President was not making a rule but rather applying a legislated rule by determining “the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.”37 This was not rulemaking but rather, as *Fletcher* put it, “the application of [legislated] rules.”38 The Court thus suggested that Congress could not delegate the power to make rules of private conduct to the executive branch.

31. *Id.* at 196.
32. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).
33. *Id.* at 388.
34. *Id.* at 382–83.
35. *Id.* at 382.
36. *Id.* at 386.
37. *Id.* at 388. The passage in full is:
[W]e can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of March 1st, 1809, either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct. The 19th section of that act declaring that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer, could not restrict their power of extending its operation, without limitation upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.

*Id.*

38. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
B. What the Original Norm Would Require of Congress

To discharge its responsibility to make the rules of private conduct as the norm originally required, Congress must itself state the rules binding society in understandable terms, such as a rule limiting pollution from designated factories. The rules must be understandable so that voters can hold their representatives responsible in future elections. Understandability is thus essential to serve the bedrock purpose of Article I.

In contrast, a statute like the modern Clean Air Act that tells an agency to make rules to achieve some goal like “protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety” states a goal rather than a rule. Stating goals is insufficient because Congress can state goals yet avoid responsibility to the governed for how the agency resolves major political controversies in drafting the rule. As such, allowing Congress to do no more than state goals conflicts with the original consent-of-the-governed norm. For example, “protect the public health” is a pleasing goal yet, when this language was inserted in the statute in 1970, the statute’s chief author, Senator Edmund Muskie, knew that the agency could not fully achieve the goal. As he later admitted after the air pollution problem was safely in the lap of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA):

Our public health scientists and doctors have told us that there is no threshold, that any air pollution is harmful. The Clean Air Act is based on the assumption, although we knew at the time it was inaccurate, that there is a threshold. When we set the standards [the responsibility for whose setting Congress in fact left to the EPA], we understood that below the standards that we set there would still be health effects.

Yet, Congress took credit for unconditionally protecting health. Nor did Congress decide, in the overwhelming majority of cases, how to allocate the cleanup burden among the sources

42. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: HOW CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE 70–72 (2005).
that contribute to unhealthy pollution. So, the legislators had plausible deniability for almost any unpopular consequences of the rules announced on agency letterhead.

A statute that takes the form of a rule but in fact fails to state a rule of conduct in understandable terms, such as one that bars large factories from emitting “unreasonable” pollution, violates the original consent-of-the-governed norm. What was unreasonable was understandable when early courts instructed juries in tort actions that the standard of reasonable care was how people in their community customarily behaved, but it would not be understandable when applied to a modern factory. Custom is no guide to the meaning of “unreasonable” when we confront newly understood threats and learn of newly invented means to deal with them. Such a statute fails to achieve the objective of Article I: to make the elected lawmakers responsible for the politically salient choices.

Of course, even a forthright rule will require interpretation in some cases. Yet, interpreting the law is distinct from policymaking. Interpretation calls for an inquiry into how the enacting legislature would have clarified the law’s ambiguities; policymaking calls for an inquiry into what makes sense to the policymaker. In deciding how the Congress that passed the statute would have resolved an ambiguity, a judge can get information from many sources. One such source is that, by dictating clear outcomes in most cases, the rule usually reveals the relative weight the legislature gave to conflicting policy

43. Id. at 26. The singular exception is that the 1970 statute did require auto manufacturers to reduce emissions from new cars by 90 percent. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1690. The 1970 statute called for the EPA and the states to regulate other sources, but in sufficiently general terms that members of Congress could deny responsibility for the specific emission limits imposed. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012) (requiring the EPA Administrator to regulate new stationary sources).


goals, such as enhancing regulatory protection versus avoiding regulatory burdens.47

The original consent-of-the-governed norm is thus based upon legal principles that courts routinely apply. The harder question is how courts should deal with modern impediments to the original norm’s full enforcement.

II. THE IMPEDIMENTS TO JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL NORM

A. The Impediments’ Evolution

Wayman v. Southard48 decided by the Supreme Court in 1825 exemplifies the difficulty Congress encountered in legislating all the rules of private conduct.49 The statute at issue instructed the various federal district courts to adopt rules of procedure that track state court procedural rules, but authorized the federal courts to make “alterations and additions.”50 It would have been arduous for Congress to go through the procedural rules of each state court system and adapt them to the needs of the federal court. The Supreme Court saw no difficulty in allowing the federal courts to adopt the rules regulating the courts rather than private persons:

It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself. . . . [Either the courts or Congress,] for example, may make rules, directing the returning of writs and processes, the filing of declarations and other pleadings, and other things of the same description.51

47. Congress could call upon an agency to interpret a rule stated in a statute. For example, a statute might require that, starting five years hence, no fossil-fueled power plant may emit sulfur at more than half the current average emission rate for such plants and direct the agency to issue a binding regulation stating the future limit in numerical terms. The agency would need to interpret and apply the statute, but Congress would have faced the salient policy choices. A court could then review the agency’s interpretation. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2018). The agency would be applying a rule rather than making it.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 31.
51. Id. at 42–43.
The complaint in the case, however, objected to rules that governed private persons—in particular, a rule on the enforcement of judgments.52 The Court went on to state:

The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details.53

So, the opinion continued, other officials could “vary minor regulations, which are within the great outlines marked out by the legislature in directing the execution.”54 “Fill up the details” in this context could be understood to be a test to accommodate the inability of Congress to state every last rule—“minor” as well as major—as required by the state-the-rule definition of the norm articulated in *Fletcher v. Peck*, *Brig Aurora*, and *Gibbons v. Ogden*.55

Congress’s difficulty in complying with the original norm compounded as the need for new federal rules grew with the growth in the nation’s land area, population, technological prowess, and interstate activity. Take, for example, a problem that came from railroad lines stretching across many states. State-by-state ratemaking and litigation were no way to regulate an interstate railroad. Yet, Congress itself could not set the rates for all the railroads. So, a wide range of interests including the railroads themselves urged Congress to establish an agency to deal with rates.56 The result was the Interstate Commerce Act of 188757 establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission.58

52. *Id.* at 11.
53. *Id.* at 43.
54. *Id.* at 45.
55. “Fill up the details” might also be a somewhat different statement of the norm. Rather than pausing to analyze which version is better or trying to reconcile them, this Article will use the state-the-rule version. The reason is that Congress now comes nowhere close to complying with either version, as the earlier discussion of the Clean Air Act illustrates, and the point of this Article is to show how the Court could begin to bring Congress much closer to the consent-of-the-governed norm rather than to define it exactly.
58. *Id.* at 383.
This statute was an early example of a new way of thinking about regulation. The new way was brought on by the Progressive Movement, quite different from what “progressive” means today. As Professor Robert Wiebe’s excellent history of the rise and decline of self-rule in the United States explains, the end of the nineteenth century brought exciting new technologies, as well as firms doing business on a national scale, such as the railroads.\(^5\) In addition to their national outlook, the firms’ executives prided themselves on the quasi-scientific systems they developed to operate on a national scale.\(^6\) They hired junior executives from universities that instilled such pride in their students.\(^7\) Professor Wiebe calls the group with this outlook the “national class” as distinguished from the “local middle class,” which comprised the leading lights of the older, more parochial order.\(^8\) The Ivy League rather than Podunk College was the path to success among the national class.\(^9\) According to Professor Wiebe, the national class sought to shift power from the state and local level to the national and from legislatures beholden to voters to commissions and courts insulated from political pressure and staffed by experts—in other words, to people more like themselves.\(^\)\(^10\)

In empowering federal agencies, the Progressives began to push the republic down a slippery slope towards Congress systematically evading responsibility, but evasion was not the common objective. To the contrary, many of the Progressives believed in separation of powers, including a Congress that makes the law, and thought they were honoring these beliefs.\(^\)\(^11\) For example, they conceived of the Interstate Commerce Act as authorizing experts to apply a legislated rule on railroad rates rather than to make rules. Whether the standards in various statutes left so much wiggle room as to constitute delegations of legislative power was not apparent to many of the Progressives because they saw their statutes as empowering experts in agen-

\(^6\) See id. at 143.
\(^7\) See id. at 142–43.
\(^8\) Id. at 145.
\(^9\) See id. at 142–43.
\(^\)\(^10\) Id. at 141–46.
cies insulated from politics to use scientific methods to find correct ways to apply statutes. The Court rebuffed assertions that the Progressives’ statutes empowering agencies violated the consent-of-the-governed norm.

Whether the Supreme Court failed to notice violations of the norm in cases concerning delegations to expert agencies or decided that they should not enforce it in such cases, the Court did enforce it in other sorts of cases. In United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., decided in 1921, the Court struck down a federal statute on the grounds that it delegated lawmaking power to the courts. The statute made it a crime to charge “unjust or unreasonable” prices for “any necessaries.” With a delegation to the courts rather than experts, there could be no pretense science had made the indefinite definite. The Supreme Court held, “Congress alone has power to define crimes against the United States.”

Similarly, in two other cases—Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, decided in 1920, and Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., decided in 1924—the Court struck down statutes that instructed federal courts to apply state workman’s compensation statutes in admiralty cases. The Justices reasoned that Congress could not delegate to state legislatures the power to enact the federal law.

The Court first used the “intelligible principle” language in J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States decided in 1928, stating, “If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligi-

66. See WIEBE, supra note 59, at 175–76.
68. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
69. Id. at 91–93.
70. Id. at 86.
71. Id. at 87–88 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocer Co. 264 F. 218, 220 (E.D. Mo. 1920)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Delegation of the power to make rules of private conduct may be particularly concerning when they are backed by criminal sanctions, but many statutes that authorize agencies to make rules of private conduct give these agencies the option of enforcing them criminally. See JOHN G. MALCOLM, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: THE PROBLEM WITH CRIMINAL REGULATIONS 1–2 (Heritage Found., Legal Memorandum No. 130, 2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/LM130.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5NR-L7XK].
72. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
73. 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
74. Id. at 227–28; Knickerbocker, 253 U.S. at 166.
75. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
ble principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."76 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in *Gundy v. United States*, argues that:

No one at the time thought the phrase ["intelligible principle"] meant to effect some revolution in this Court’s understanding of the Constitution. While the exact line between policy and details, lawmaking and factfinding, and legislative and nonlegislative functions had sometimes invited reasonable debate, everyone agreed these were the relevant inquiries. And when Chief Justice Taft wrote of an "intelligible principle," it seems plain enough that he sought only to explain the operation of these traditional tests; he gave no hint of a wish to overrule or revise them . . . . There’s a good argument, as well, that the statute in *J. W. Hampton* passed muster under the traditional tests.77

Whether *J.W. Hampton* applied an "intelligible principle" test, it did state, “In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination.”78 Such fixing sounds like a policy decision better left to the political branches. An editorial in *The Constitutional Review* said that the statute upheld was “the most dangerous advance in bureaucratic government ever attempted in America.”79

Nonetheless, Justice Gorsuch’s contention that the “intelligible principle” language was not meant to weaken the test of delegation is buttressed by the Court’s response to the National Industrial Recovery Act80 passed only five years later. The statute granted the President sweeping powers to regulate industry in response to the Great Depression but did little to control how he used those powers.81 The Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini stated admiringly of President Franklin Roosevelt’s sway under the statute, “Ecco un dittatore!”—that is, “Behold a dicta-

76. Id. at 409 (internal quotations omitted).
81. Id.
tor!”82 In 1935, in *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*,83 a divided Court struck one delegation in the statute.84 Later that year, in *A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*,85 a unanimous Court, including Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone, struck another of its delegations.86 Then, in 1936, in *Carter v. Carter Coal Co.*,87 citing *Schechter*, the Court struck down a delegation of rule-making power to an association of coal mining companies.88 Thus, the Court struck down three delegations for violating the consent-of-the-governed norm in the seven years after *J.W. Hampton*.

After winning reelection in 1936, President Roosevelt famously struck back at the Court, which had defied him on delegation and other issues, by proposing a statute authorizing him to appoint additional Justices.89 Congress did not pass this court-packing plan,90 but the President nonetheless prevailed. One of the Court’s changes of position was derisively labeled the “switch in time that saved nine,” suggesting that change was to protect the Court.91 Yet, the evidence shows that the change came before the President announced his plan and was made public only afterwards.92 Nonetheless, the Justices did seek to insulate the Court from political turmoil.93 The judicial

83. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
84. Id. at 419–33.
85. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
86. Id. at 529–42.
87. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
88. Id. at 310–12 (citing *Schechter*, 295 U.S. at 537).
90. Id. at 333–34.
91. Id. at 327.
93. Chief Justice Hughes worked to frame decisions to minimize the likelihood of the Court’s independence being crimped. See SIMON, supra note 89, at 299–300, 302–06, 323–29, 332, 335–37, 392. For another example, Justice Frankfurter wrote in a concurrence in a decision not to take on malapportionment of legislative districts, “It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the law.” *Colegrove v. Green*, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of im-
unmanageability of the intelligible principle test, of course, let
the Court sidestep the potentially troublesome issue of delegation.

With retiring Justices replaced by President Roosevelt ap-
pointees and the nation facing the emergencies of the Great
Depression and World War II, the Court rejected every con-
stitutional challenge to regulatory statutes on consent-of-the-
governed grounds.\textsuperscript{94} Whatever the Court originally meant by
“intelligible principle,” it came to mean next to nothing. As Justice
Kagan stated in her opinion for the Court in \textit{Gundy v. United
States}, “we have over and over upheld even very broad delega-
tions” including “to regulate in the ‘public interest.’”\textsuperscript{95}

Professor Bruce Ackerman argues the confrontation between
President Roosevelt and the Court, President Roosevelt’s sub-
sequent reelections by overwhelming margins, and the Court’s
subsequent rulings constituted a “‘constitutional moment’” that
amended the Constitution to, among other things, allow dele-
gation of legislative power.\textsuperscript{96} I dispute this argument in Part
V.D. Nonetheless, as Part IV.A shows, sufficiently strong
public opinion can, as long as it persists, keep the Court from
fully enforcing constitutional norms despite the hope that the
Constitution is a counter-majoritarian imperative.

Whatever strong public opinion in favor of delegation there
was no longer persists. According to Professor David Mayhew,
in polls conducted in 1958, 1977, and 2004 to 2005, by a margin
of three to one, voters prefer Congress rather than the President
to “make policies.”\textsuperscript{97} A poll taken in January 2019 found that
“eighty-two percent (82%) of voters believe Congress should
review and approve regulations rather than allowing agencies
to set them up on their own.”\textsuperscript{98} In this poll, the support for

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States,
287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932)).
\item 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 306–11 (1991); Bruce A.
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering The Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
\item DAVID R. MAYHEW, THE IMPRINT OF CONGRESS 8 (2017).
\item Scott Rasmussen, 82% Say Congress Should Review & Approve Federal Regulations,
SCOTTRASMUSSEN.COM (Jan. 24, 2019), https://scottrasmussen.com/82-say-congress-
should-review-approve-federal-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/W7GD-EVXU]; see also
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Congress to shoulder responsibility was much the same regardless of party affiliation, race, or political ideology.99

One manifestation of public opinion against congressional buck passing came along with the first Earth Day in 1970. A book documenting a study funded by Ralph Nader had charged that people died from air pollution because Congress, starting with Senator Muskie, had written ineffective air pollution legislation that gave an agency broad discretion to regulate pollution and thereby avoided the hard choices.100 In response, Senator Muskie authored the 1970 Clean Air Act, which he asserted “faces the air pollution crisis with urgency and in candor. It makes hard choices . . . .”101 As a result, he vowed, “all Americans in all parts of the country shall have clean air to breathe within the 1970’s.”102 Instead of openly granting an agency broad discretion on how to regulate, the new statute supposedly ordered the EPA to make rules fully sufficient to protect health by deadlines and granted citizens the right to enforce this order in federal court.103 The statute did not deliver what Senator Muskie maintained it did. It left almost all the hard choices to the agency, as Part III.D will show. Congress’s need to pretend otherwise evidences public opinion against Congress passing the buck.

When the dust settled from the emergencies of the Great Depression, World War II, and the Korean War, Justices expressed concern for the consent-of-the-governed norm. In Kent v. Dulles104 decided in 1958, five Justices invoked it as a reason to narrowly construe a statute that otherwise threatened protected freedoms, and in so doing, the Court limited the authority


102. Id.


the statute conferred to the executive branch. Then, in *National Cable Television Ass’n v. United States*, decided in 1974, the Court invoked the norm to reject an interpretation of a statute that gave an agency the power to tax those it regulated to cover the cost of regulation. This was the first time the consent-of-the-governed norm had been applied in a case regarding regulatory control of business in four decades. The Justices citing the norm in these cases and others were from both sides of the political spectrum.

The norm also played a role in the Supreme Court’s handling of a challenge to the Occupational Safety and Health Act. It, like the Clean Air Act, was passed in 1970 and made high-sounding promises. It directed the agency to ensure “safe . . . places of employment” and reduce occupational exposure to toxic materials “to the extent feasible,” without making clear what these requirements meant. In its decision in *Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute* (often called the *Benzene case*), the Court held invalid a regulation that the agency promulgated to limit benzene levels in workplaces. Arguing that the statute might otherwise be an unconstitutionally broad delegation, three Justices construed the statute to require the agency to base the limit on harms the agency determined are significant. The agency had failed to require that the harm be significant. A fifth Justice, then-Justice Rehnquist, voted to declare the Act unconstitutional for dele-

105. *Id.* at 129 (“Where activities . . . often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.”). In *Arizona v. California*, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), three Justices dissented on the grounds that the Court should have invoked the norm to construe a statute narrowly. *Id.* at 625–27 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
107. *Id.* at 342–43.
109. *Id.* §§ 3(8), 6(b)(5) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 655(b)(5) (2012)).
110. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
111. *Id.* at 661–62 (plurality opinion).
112. *Id.*
gating legislative power, a position with which Chief Justice Burger agreed in a later case. In 1996, in Loving v. United States, the Court praised the consent-of-the-governed norm in dicta. A soldier sentenced to death invoked the norm to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that empowered the President to establish the criteria for such sentences in military tribunals. He lost, in part because of the special authority that the President has in military matters, but the Court stated:

Articles I’s precise rules of representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking. Ill suited to that task are the Presidency, designed for the prompt and faithful execution of the laws and its own legitimate powers, and the Judiciary, a branch with tenure and authority independent of direct electoral control. The clear assignment of power to a branch, furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance.

Yet, the “clear assignment of power” does not result in the Court enforcing the norm in most cases and, where the Court does enforce the norm, it asserts that it is not invoking the consent-of-the-governed norm. Take the case cited, INS v. Chadha. It struck the legislative veto which, depending upon the statute in which it appears, allowed one or two houses of Congress to veto designated administrative actions. The stated rationale was that the legislative veto cuts the President out of legislative actions in contravention of the Article I legislative process, which involves the House, the Senate, and the President. Yet, as Justice Byron White argued in dissent, the legislative veto was being struck because it delegates legislative power to

113. Id. at 671–88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 757–58.
117. Id. at 751–52.
118. Id. at 757–58 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
119. 462 U.S. 919.
120. Id. at 959–60.
121. See id. at 946–48.
a process other than that of Article I, but that reasoning would also invalidate delegation of lawmaking authority to agencies. The Loving dicta did, however, hint that Chadha could be viewed as, in part, a delegation case.

Similarly, in Clinton v. City of New York decided in 1998, Justices from the left and right joined in striking down the line-item veto, which allowed the President to reject line items in appropriations statutes. The Court reasoned that this procedure contravened Article I’s legislative process, which limits the President to accepting or not the entire bill passed by the House and the Senate. Yet, the line-item veto could also be conceived as delegating some of Congress’s power over appropriations to the President acting alone. Concerns of practicality were no barrier in striking a delegation of the appropriations power because Congress likes to hand out the money itself. Spending, after all, usually brings credit to its members. In contrast, Congress often delegates the power to impose rules of private conduct because they bring blame as well as credit.

Thus, the Court faced a case fraught with more political and practical difficulty in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns decided in 2001, in which trade associations had argued that a popular regulatory statute, the Clean Air Act, unconstitutionally delegated legislative power. Specifically, they argued the “protect the public health” provision delegated legislative power because it gave no guidance as to the extent to which the agency must protect health. A D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel had held that the Clean Air Act as construed by the agency did delegate power unconstitutionally.

122. Id. at 984–89 (White, J., dissenting).
123. See id. at 985–87.
125. Id. at 417–20.
126. Id. at 436–41.
128. Id. at 458–59.
129. See id. at 463.
130. Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (per curiam), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded sub nom. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457. The Wall Street Journal reported that this aspect of the original court of appeals decision was influenced by Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility, supra note 5. John J. Fialka, Professor Seeks to Limit Congress Ability to Delegate Tasks to Federal Agencies, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 1999, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB92715003543484024 [https://perma.cc/2XLS-FN9Y]. The panel held, however, the statute might be
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court stated that the text of the Constitution “permits no delegation of [legislative] powers.”131 Yet, having seemingly vowed that the Court would stop Congress from abdicating its legislative power, the Court trivialized that vow by stating, “we repeatedly have said that when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’”132 Indeed, the opinion, like Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court in Gundy quoted earlier, noted that even goals as mushy as “the public interest” had counted as an “intelligible principle.”133 The opinion concluded by stating that “we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’”134 The quotation is from an earlier opinion in which Justice Scalia argued that “intelligible principle” was not a judicially manageable test.135 In effect, Whitman allows members of Congress to judge whether they have made themselves sufficiently responsible to their constituents, despite their self-interest in avoiding responsibility.136 In sum, when it comes to the rules of private conduct, the consent-of-the-governed norm has become a farce.

131. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472.
132. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
133. Id. at 474.
134. Id. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 (majority opinion)).
135. Id. (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). This passage was cited with approval in the Court’s opinion in Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019).
136. American Trucking could have won a minor victory for the constitutional norm along the lines of Benzene by adopting the argument that Professor Marci Hamilton and I advanced in an amicus brief. Brief of the Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI Inc. et
B. The Impediments Today

Believing that Congress cannot fully comply with the consent-of-the-governed norm, the Court has concluded that it cannot enforce the norm as originally understood. Many, if not most, of the regulatory statutes in the United States Code would fail to comply with the norm as originally understood.

The Court, of course, purports to limit delegation through the “intelligible principle” test, but it is judicially unmanageable and so no limit on delegation in practice. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy suggests important strides in the direction of the Court overcoming this impediment to enforcing the norm. His dissent calls for discarding the “intelligible principle” test, which he calls a “misadventure,” and replacing it with a judicially manageable test. The dissent also recognizes that Chief Justice Marshall’s 1825 opinion in Wayman v. Southard could provide precedential support for such a test. Justice Gorsuch writes that Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion “distinguished between those ‘important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,’ and ‘those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to

al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (No. 99-1257). We argued that to reduce the scope of the delegation, the statute should be construed to require the agency to set the standard to protect against harms to health that it found to be significant and in the rulemaking it had expressly refused to make such a finding. Id. at 15–20. There was strong support for this reading of the statute in its legislative history. Id. Seemingly driven by profits more than constitutional principle, American Trucking preferred to argue that the statute be construed to minimize costs to its members. See David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle That Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 270–75 (2003). Professor Hamilton and I filed amicus briefs on the delegation issue in Clinton, Jorion, and other cases.

137. As stated in Mistretta v. United States, “[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” 488 U.S. at 372.

138. See Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 327 (1987). Even if such a ruling were made prospective, Congress and agencies would have to struggle to meet the need for ongoing changes in statutes and regulations.

139. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

those who are to act . . . to fill up the details.” 141 The dissent goes on to make a convincing case that the statutory provision at issue in Gundy left far more than details to the delegate.142 Nonetheless, additional strides are needed before the test discussed in the dissent would be a workable test for a majority. If Justice Gorsuch had been writing for the Court, his use of the statutory-invalidation guillotine would threaten huge swathes of the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations. His test would be a threat because it would be hard to know in advance how the Court would draw the line between “important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,” and “those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act . . . to fill up the details.” 143 This formulation leaves many questions open. Does the test mean that Congress must state the more important rules, the more important goals, or some combination thereof? Whichever it is, it would also be unclear how to define the level of importance. Indeed, it would be much more difficult to construct a judicially manageable test along these lines in 2020 than it would have been in the simpler world of 1825.

Even if the Court could construct a judicially manageable test along the lines that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent suggests, doing so would take many years of case-by-case adjudication. Meanwhile, federal regulators as well as businesses, state and local governments, nonprofits, and others subject to federal regulation have come to rely upon regulation as we now have it. More agencies with more power have produced a Code of Federal Regulations with twelve times more words than it had when first codified in 1938.144 The reliance is massive.

During the years of uncertainty that Justice Gorsuch’s test would produce, stakeholders would have to predict which regulations would be found valid and which would not. The uncertainty would plague both large organizations and smaller organizations and individuals without ready access to legal

141. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (omission in original) (quoting Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43).
142. See id. at 2143–48.
143. Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43.
144. Email from Ethan Clarkson, Research Assistant, N.Y. Law Sch., to author (Oct. 10, 2019) (on file with author).
advice. After all, individuals who farm, practice dentistry on their own, or operate gas stations, to name just some examples, are subject to many federal regulations. The approval process for many projects, big and small, could take much longer than it does now. On top of the uncertain status of old regulations would come uncertainty in issuing new ones. All this uncertainty would harm the economy generally. Meanwhile, advocates for various regulatory causes would upset voters by saying that the Court had stripped them of essential regulatory protection.

To avert such a catastrophe, the Court would need to explain to the governed and elected officials how to transition to what most of the people want—regulatory protection that is both workable and subject to the consent of the governed. I will suggest how the Court could do so but first will discuss what Congress should do on its own.

III. CONGRESS FLOUTS THE NORM

A. Congress’s Duty to Comply with the Norm to the Extent Practical

Even if impediments prevent even partial judicial enforcement of the consent-of-the-governed norm, members of Congress are honor bound to do their best to comply with it. As Dean Lawrence Sager argues in an article on underenforced constitutional norms, “[C]onstitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits, and federal judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be understood as delin-

145. However, Justice Gorsuch suggests, “Congress can also commission agencies or other experts to study and recommend legislative language.” *Gundy*, 139 S. Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Yes, it might, but his optimism takes no account of the gridlock in Congress.

146. All the uncertainty and upset would arouse political antagonism against the Court and so add to the current speculation about court packing. James Freeman, Opinion, *Justice Ginsburg Kicks Buttigieg*, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2019, 4:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-ginsburg-kicks-buttigieg-11564084993 [https://perma.cc/8NMJ-N7JM]. Indeed, four aspirants to the Democratic Party’s nomination for President—Mayor Pete Buttigieg and Senators Kirsten Gillibrand, Kamala Harris, and Elizabeth Warren—say they are open to court packing. *Id.*
eating only the boundaries of the federal courts’ role in enforcing the norm . . . .”147

Dean Sager also calls for courts to distinguish norms from the impediments to their full enforcement.148 He illustrates the distinction with the “equal protection” norm,149 which he defines this way: “A state may treat people differently only when it is fair to do so.”150 The impediment to its full enforcement is that federal courts should not second guess policy decisions the Constitution assigns to states.151 To accommodate this impediment, federal courts developed a test for judicial enforcement that differs from the equal protection norm: an inequality is permitted if it bears a “rational relationship” to the government’s justification for it, unless the inequality involves a dubious classification such as race.152 This test ends up crediting some pretextual justifications, thus permitting some unfair inequalities. Dean Sager shows that by recognizing that the rational relationship test allows some violations of the equal protection norm, federal courts can allow state courts and Congress, which do not face the same impediment as do the federal courts, to augment the federal courts’ incomplete enforcement.153 Thus, the norm and the test for its judicial enforcement differ. As Professor Thomas Nachbar writes, “There is no textual basis in the Constitution to justify reviewing legislation for its rationality.”154

147. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221 (1978). Dean Sager also states the following:
This obligation to obey constitutional norms at their unenforced margins requires governmental officials to fashion their own conceptions of these norms and measure their conduct by reference to these conceptions. Public officials cannot consider themselves free to act at what they perceive or ought to perceive to be peril to constitutional norms merely because the federal judiciary is unable to enforce these norms at their margins.
Id. at 1227.
148. Id. at 1212.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
150. Sager, supra note 147, at 1215, 1263–64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See id. at 1216.
152. See id. at 1216–17.
153. See id. at 1212.
Dean Sager’s article does not discuss the underenforced consent-of-the-governed norm.\textsuperscript{155} He did write, however, that a norm’s status as underenforced is “particularly apparent when the absence of ‘judicially manageable standards’ is cited as a reason for the invocation of the political question doctrine.”\textsuperscript{156} This is a reason that the Court gives for underenforcing the consent-of-the-governed norm.\textsuperscript{157}

Because, as Dean Sager argues, underenforced norms are valid to their full conceptual limits and the consent-of-the-governed norm bars delegation of the power to make rules of private conduct, Congress should do its best to take direct responsibility for such rules. Congress would aim too low if it sought to provide no more than an insipid “intelligible principle.”

\textbf{B. Congress Could Comply with the Norm to a Substantial Extent}

Congress could do much more than it now does to comply with the consent-of-the-governed norm. One way that Congress could shoulder more of its constitutional responsibility while still making use of agency expertise was suggested by James Landis, once the New Deal’s leading expert on administrative law and later dean of Harvard Law School. He suggested that Congress could require new “administrative action . . . of large significance” not take effect until Congress explicitly approves it.\textsuperscript{158} He wrote that for administrative officials, “it was an act of

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\item \textsuperscript{155} Whether the ultimate reason for underenforcement of a norm is an institutional constraint on the courts or on Congress, the consent of the governed should be viewed as an underenforced constitutional norm. \textit{See} Sager, \textit{supra} note 147, at 1227. A search of law reviews found seven publications that both cited Dean Sager’s article and mentioned the “delegation doctrine” or “nondelegation.” Email from William Mills, Professor & Assoc. Librarian, N.Y. Law Sch., to author (Nov. 30, 2018) (on file with author). None of these publications discussed the possibility of using Dean Sager’s recommendations to improve enforcement of the consent-of-the-governed norm. \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{156} Sager, \textit{supra} note 147, at 1226.
\item \textsuperscript{157} \textit{See}, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001). The reliance on the lack of a judicially manageable standard is clearer in the opinion that the Court quotes there, \textit{Mistretta v. United States}. 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{158} JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 77, 79 (1938). Landis alternatively suggested the legislative veto, which was struck down in \textit{Chadha}. \textit{Id.} at 77.
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political wisdom to put back upon the shoulders of Congress” responsibility for such actions.  

In 1984, Stephen Breyer, then a court of appeals judge, showed how Congress could structure a statute to efficiently implement Dean Landis’s idea. The statute would force Congress to vote on bills to approve agency actions. If approved by both houses, the bill would be presented to the President for signature, thus avoiding the objection that doomed the legislative veto in Chadha. The statute would set deadlines by which the House and Senate must vote, limit debate, and bar filibusters on such votes. Instead of using gridlock or statutes mouthing platitudinous goals to avoid responsibility for hard choices, the legislators would have to vote on specific regulations. Then-Judge Breyer framed his proposal as a way for Congress to reclaim the power that it lost when Chadha struck down the legislative veto and so confined it to actions previously subject to a legislative veto. To serve the purpose of the consent-of-the-governed norm, it would be better to aim the proposal at significant regulations. The proposal could target regulations defined as “significant regulatory action” for the purpose of review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget. There would be about as many such regulations as current votes on symbolic public laws such as those naming post offices. President William Clinton issued the executive order containing the current definition, and it has remained largely unchanged under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump.

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159. Id. at 76.
161. Id. at 794.
162. Id. at 793.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 793.
166. Schoenbrod, supra note 15, at 153.
on significant regulations would require legislators to shoulder more responsibility than voting on the names of post offices, but the Constitution includes voting on regulatory rules in Congress’s job description, not naming post offices.

Members of Congress could find the time for such work. Starting with House Speaker Newt Gingrich in the late 1990s, congressional leaders began to push their members to spend most of their time back home in their districts to, in effect, campaign for reelection, reserving only two to three days per week in Washington and only in weeks when Congress is in session. Moreover, even when in Washington, party leaders push their members to spend far more time raising campaign contributions (much of which are donated to the party leaders’ war chests) and campaigning for reelection rather than working on legislation. The upshot is that most “lawmakers” spend much less time lawmaking than many weekend golfers spend golfing. Were members of Congress responsible for regulations, however, even party leaders would want them to spend more time considering the regulations on which they would cast votes. In voting on regulations, members of Congress and their staffs would have the benefit of the agency’s rulemaking record.

There will, of course, sometimes be major fights over regulations in Congress, but that is where the fighting is supposed to be. Congress passing the buck does not stop the fights but rather displaces them to other venues, such as hearings over the confirmation of judicial nominees.

The statute implementing the Landis-Breyer proposal should make clear that a bill on a regulation would approve the agency’s promulgation of it rather than enact it. That way, the regulation once approved would still be subject to judicial review.

168. SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 89–90.
169. Id.
especially on whether the agency acted within its statutory authority.\footnote{172. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2018).} Moreover, the agency could amend the regulation on its own if the amendment is not so important as to constitute “significant regulatory action.”

It may seem strange that a regulation reviewed by both houses of Congress and the President could be reviewed again by a court or amended by an agency. Recall, however, that the legislative process has approved the agency’s promulgation of the regulation rather than enacted the regulation. Surely, Congress can approve the promulgation of a single, known regulation when it now has on the books statutes that approve in advance and wholesale the promulgation of future, and thus unknown, regulations. The former, by making Congress accountable, complies with the consent-of-the-governed norm. Moreover, Congress is within its power to approve an action for one purpose but leave it to the courts to decide its legality for other purposes. For example, in \textit{Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill},\footnote{173. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).} the Supreme Court rejected the Tennessee Valley Authority’s argument that Congress’s appropriation of money to build the Tellico Dam insulated the project from objection under the Endangered Species Act.\footnote{174. See id. at 172–73, 189–90. In this case, the Court used tools of statutory construction to find that Congress did not intend to insulate the dam from scrutiny under the Endangered Species Act. See \textit{id.} at 188. The statute implementing the Landis-Breyer proposal could make the courts’ work easier by stating explicitly that judicial review would be preserved. No Justice in \textit{TVA v. Hill} opined that Congress could not decide one issue (appropriation) and leave another issue unresolved (whether building the dam violated the Endangered Species Act).}

Judicial review is desirable because otherwise an agency could increase its own statutory authority by gaining congressional approval of a regulation exceeding its previous authority under the enabling statute. Such increase of authority would shift the initiative in increasing agency authority from Congress to agencies. Moreover, growing the agencies’ authority implicitly by Congress approving a regulation would create uncertainty as to the scope of agencies’ authority in issuing later regulations.\footnote{175. For more on the desirability of preserving judicial review, see Schoenbrod, \textit{supra} note 171.}

For a final wrinkle, the statute might approve the promulgation of all earlier regulations. Such wholesale approval would
not do much to make members of Congress accountable for any old regulation but would acknowledge Congress’s failure to do its duty for many decades and so be an initial step toward atonement. The wholesale approval would also shield the old regulations from challenge on consent-of-the-governed grounds and thereby greatly reduce the uncertainty and upset that would arise if the Court began to enforce this norm as to significant regulations.

C. How Flouting the Norm Benefits Legislators Politically

Let us call the resulting statute the Responsibility for Regulation Act. Congress has failed to adopt a statute forcing it to comply substantially with the consent-of-the-governed norm because the legislators do not want the responsibility. Consider what happened after some members asked me in 1995 to help design a bill that would increase Congress’s responsibility for regulations. I suggested the Landis-Breyer proposal. The result was a bill that members of both parties introduced called the Congressional Responsibility Act.176

When the bill began to get support, the growing possibility of its passage worried party leaders because legislators would end up with responsibility for hard choices. To avoid responsibility while assuaging popular opinion calling for it, Congress passed in 1996 a sound-alike bill, the Congressional Review Act, and President Clinton signed it.177 It gives Congress the option of voting on regulations, but not surprisingly the legislators hardly ever opt to take that responsibility. All but one of the exceptions came after the Obama Administration postponed controversial regulations until after the 2016 election to avoid angering voters before they went to the polls and, assumedly, elected Hillary Clinton.178 As a result, the Obama Administration failed to give Congress notice of many regulations in time to safeguard them from annulment by the Republican President

176. Congressional Responsibility Act of 1995, H.R. 2727, 104th Cong. This bill, unlike my present proposal, was not limited to significant regulations.
and Congress that took over in 2017. Yet, the leaders of the Republican majorities in Congress allowed votes on only that small portion of these vulnerable regulations that would not require their members to make hard choices.

Long before 2017, however, it became apparent that the Congressional Review Act failed to make elected lawmakers responsible to voters. To ward off blame for failing to take responsibility for regulations, Republicans in the House have repeatedly passed a bill based in part upon the original Congressional Responsibility Act. Unfortunately, the new bill is another sham, starting with its new title, Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS). The title suggests that the regulations stem from overzealous agencies despite the many statutes requiring agencies to promulgate regulations. Worse still, the bill is full of poison pills that ensure it will never get significant Democratic support, thus making its enactment improbable. Indeed, of the thirty-nine cosponsors of the bill in the Senate in the 115th Congress, none was a Democrat. The upshot is that

182. One poison pill: all existing regulations would expire in ten years unless expressly approved by Congress. Id. § 809(b). Moreover, the bill lacks realistic procedures to consider the immense pile of regulations in that time frame. In the meantime, people, businesses, and governments of the United States will have little idea which of their existing regulatory protections and obligations will drop dead in a decade. Well before then, the uncertainty would crimp the economy.

Another poison pill bars an agency from presenting a regulation to Congress for approval when the same Congress failed to approve another regulation on the same subject. Id. § 801(a)(5). So, if the agency discovers that a rejected regulation would have been approved if worded somewhat differently, the agency cannot present a new version to the same Congress. That would keep majorities in both houses from approving a regulation they would otherwise support. This is antiregulation rather than pro-responsibility. I discuss another poison pill in the text.
REINS’s sponsors can contend that they want to be responsible without ever having to take responsibility.

One poison pill requires agencies to cut the cost of existing regulations to offset the cost of new regulations.\(^{184}\) So, even if REINS were enacted, Republican legislators could take credit with their party’s base for wanting to control regulatory costs while shifting blame to agencies for any reduction in regulatory protection. Meanwhile, so long as some version of the Landis-Breyer approach is not enacted, the Democrats who support existing regulatory statutes can take credit with their party’s base for wanting regulatory protection while shifting blame to agencies for the regulatory burdens. This stalemate is a perfect recipe for polarization.

If either the Democratic or Republican leaders in Congress really wanted to submit to “the consent of the governed,” they could introduce a bill that strips the REINS Act of its poison pills, make clear that it applies to regulations reducing or increasing regulatory protection, and give it a new title. One example would be the Responsibility for Regulation Act described in Part III.B.

Such a statute would make Congress a more functional, less polarized legislature. In voting on specific regulations, members would have to take responsibility for both the level of regulatory protection and the level of regulatory burdens. So, they would have to face hard choices about trade-offs instead of simply spouting slogans about polarizing positions. Now, in contrast, majority leaders of both parties try to keep hard choices off the floor in Congress. For example, former Republican House Majority Leader Dennis Hastert adopted the so-called Hastert Rule that prevented a bill from reaching the floor unless it was supported by a majority of the majority party.\(^{185}\) The Democrats, for their part, are adept at structuring bills and designing procedures to hide the hard choices.\(^{186}\)

\(^{184}\) H.R. 26 § 808.

\(^{185}\) See Mickey Edwards, The Parties Versus the People: How to Turn Republicans and Democrats into Americans 104 (2012).

\(^{186}\) For example, the Democratic bill to cut emissions of climate change gases was assiduously structured to hide the hard choices to the detriment of controlling climate change. See David Schoenbrod & Richard B. Stewart, Opinion, The Cap-and-Trade Bait and Switch, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2009, 12:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203609204574314312524495276 [https://perma.cc/2DQV-RTP9]. Democratic Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi famously
The extra time members of Congress would need to spend on lawmaking in Washington to grapple with the hard choices would be of benefit because, working in Washington only a couple of days a week, members hardly get to know members of the other party. In contrast, before the 1990s, Congress worked longer in Washington, and members and their families lived in Washington and got to know each other, socially as well as at work. Respected observers of Congress argue that its members and their families spending more time in Washington would reduce the nastiness and gridlock that makes Congress so dysfunctional.

In sum, by taking responsibility for regulation, members of Congress would have to make hard choices but would gain personally to the extent they ran for office to have the satisfaction of serving their community. Given our understandably jaundiced view of politicians, it is difficult to bear in mind what psychology shows: that evolution has led most people to want to do the right thing (as well as benefit themselves personally) and this is so across the political spectrum, although our views of what is right differ. Yet, members of Congress cannot be knights questing to serve the public because the current regime forces them to be pawns in the campaign of their party’s leaders to become and stay the leaders of the majority. As columnist Peggy Noonan recently wrote, “Congress knows how hapless it looks, how riven by partisanship and skins-vs.-shirts dumbness. For many of them it takes the tang out of things. They know it lowers their standing in America. They grieve it.

said that “we have to pass the [health care] bill so that you can find out what’s in it,” but later asserted that she was misunderstood. See Jonathan Capehart, Opinion, Pelosi defends her infamous health care remark, WASH. POST (June 20, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/pelosi-defends-her-infamous-health-care-remark/2012/06/20/gJQAqch6qV_blog.html?utm_term=.d119562e2f20 [https://perma.cc/X8MH-EKL6] (alteration in original).

187. SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 89, 94.
188. Id. at 93–94.
189. Id.
It embarrasses them. They’d like to be part of something that works, something respected.”192

D. How Flouting the Norm Harms the Legislators’ Constituents

Many people believe the public is better served when agencies rather than Congress run regulation.193 This belief is understandable because Congress is less knowledgeable than the agencies and given to posturing or worse. However, the choice is not between the agencies or Congress running regulation but rather whether Congress will bear responsibility for the important role it now plays in regulation.

Most current regulatory statutes order agencies to deliver popular promises, such as health protection, but nonetheless sidestep the hard choices.194 That way, the members of Congress get much of the credit for the popular promises, and the agency gets much of the blame for the burdens needed to deliver on the promises and the failures to deliver.195

Take, for example, the pollution that came from refiners adding lead additives to gasoline. The statute enacted in 1970 promised that health would be protected from lead completely by 1976.196 As an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council in the 1970s, I won cases that aimed to push the EPA to do its duty of achieving this goal. Nonetheless, because of pressure on the agency from politicians on both the left and right, the EPA, during both Democratic and Republican administrations, failed to act vigorously to abate the health effects of lead in gasoline until the mid-1980s and then only after the big oil refiners found that they could save money if lead additives to gasoline were banned.197

193. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2018) (arguing that the traditional nondelegation doctrine may not “promote social welfare” based in part upon the superior knowledge of the agencies).
194. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 43.
195. See id. at 88–94.
196. Id. at 44.
197. On the lead litigation and its consequences, see generally SCHOENBROD, supra note 42, at 29–38.
To put the consequences in perspective, consider that in 2016, President Obama declared a state of emergency because nearly one-twentieth of the children aged five and under of Flint, Michigan, had blood lead levels of at least five micrograms. In the 1970s, the average blood lead level in children across the United States was three times that level. Back in the 1970s, medical experts told me that, although lead in paint caused fatally high lead levels in some children, the population-wide contamination came primarily from lead in gasoline. Congress’s unqualified promise that the Clean Air Act would “protect health” was a pious fraud.

I began to wonder what would have happened if Congress had itself enacted the rule that would set the pace at which to cut lead in gasoline. Doing nothing on lead was not an option because in 1970 “Get the Lead Out,” as some bumper stickers read, was a popular demand. Congress itself, in a singular exception to the statute’s general flight from responsibility, decided that new cars had to emit 90 percent less of a list of pollutants by 1975 but left lead off the list. The statute instead ordered the EPA to fully protect health from airborne lead by 1976. If Congress could not have passed the buck on lead, it would have required, I estimated, at least a 50 percent cut in the amount of lead in gasoline by 1975. Using the EPA health data, I showed that this quicker start on lead would have averted about 50,000 deaths in the United States, about equal to American deaths in the Vietnam War.

It is, of course, politically profitable for Congress to issue statutory orders to agencies that allow legislators to take credit but shift blame—so politically profitable that Congress radically increased the number of orders to the EPA in the 1990 version


201. Id. at 34.

202. Id. at 35.

203. Id. at 36.

204. See id. at 36–38.
of the Clean Air Act. The phrase “the administrator . . . shall” appears 940 times. Many of the orders must be performed repeatedly. The orders are lengthy, which helps explain why the statute’s text would fill a 450-page book. Long statutes full of complicated orders are not unusual.

The legislators are sufficiently skilled to issue many lengthy orders, yet still avoid blame for the hard choices. For example, when President Obama’s EPA issued a new ozone standard under the statutory mandate to “protect health” from air pollutants in 2015, Democratic legislators could criticize the regulation as insufficiently tough on pollution and Republican legislators could criticize the regulation as too tough on the economy.

One result of such narrow delegation is extraordinary complication. As said of the Clean Air Act by Gina McCarthy, whom President Obama appointed assistant administrator of EPA and then administrator, “[E]ach sector has 17 to 20 rules that govern each piece of equipment and you’ve got to be a neuroscientist to figure it out.” The complication requires big business to hire staffs of costly experts and suffer even more costly delays in getting permits. The consequences are worse for smaller businesses, farmers, state and local governments, and other entities subject to federal regulation but less able to afford the experts.

Another result is that the statutes’ orders grow obsolete quickly because they are based upon circumstances and understandings that change. Yet, because the statutes were de-

205. Email from Iain MacDonald, Research Assistant, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (July 19, 2009) (on file with author).
207. See Anthony Adragna, Republicans Criticize Ozone Rule for Impacts; Democrats Lament Lack of Tougher Standard, 46 ENV’T REP. 2901 (2015). Some members of Congress asserted the EPA went too far and that “it’ll be important for Congress to fight back,” id. at 2901 (quoting Senator Jeff Sessions) (internal quotation marks omitted), but others expressed disappointment with the EPA for the rule being “not as strong as [they] had hoped.” Id. (quoting Representative Frank Pallone) (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. Id.
signed to shift blame to the agencies, members of Congress have no incentive to revise the statutes, even as they grow increasingly dysfunctional for their constituents.210

Consider Congress’s failure to update the environmental statutes, almost none of which have been amended for nearly three decades despite rapid changes in our understanding of environmental problems and how to deal with them.211 In a project organized by New York Law School and New York University School of Law in 2007, some fifty environmental law experts from across the ideological spectrum set out to show Congress how to update these obsolete statutes. The project’s leaders—Professor Richard Stewart, former chair of the Environmental Defense Fund, his colleague on the New York University faculty, Professor Katrina Wyman, and I—summarized the results in a book, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Protection That Will Work.212 The focus was on how to get more environmental protection at lower cost rather than how clean is clean enough. Our proposals included greater use of market-based alternatives instead of inefficient command-and-control regulation, leaving essentially local issues to state and local government, and imposing direct federal regulation of national issues such as interstate pollution.

Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill told us in private they wished our reforms were already in the statutes, but that Congress would not enact them because doing so would require legislators to take responsibility. So, for example, Congress did not adopt the Breaking the Logjam proposal to deal with the large stationary sources of interstate major pollutants by enacting a national cap-and-trade system.213 That system would make it profitable to invent and use less expensive ways to cut pollution.214 Instead, the current statute requires the EPA to tell

210. Id.
212. SCHOENBROD ET AL., LOGJAM, supra note 5.
213. See id. at 87–94.
214. See id. at 88–89.
the upwind states to limit pollution sufficiently to reduce harm in downwind states.215

This wackadoodle system serves members of Congress by interposing the EPA and state officials between them and their constituents, all while making pollution control more expensive. The current system results in more pollution that kills constituents. During the Obama Administration, the EPA calculated that the existing statute would halve ozone and particulate pollution, which are the major air pollution killers, thereby adding six months to the lifespan of the average American. A congressionally imposed national cap-and-trade system could easily halve the pollution again and, based upon the EPA’s health analysis, add another three months to the average life.216 So, the average young person will die a quarter year sooner under the current statute.

In sum, with Congress exerting power over agencies, the choice is no longer whether experts in agencies or legislators should run regulation. Rather, the choice is whether Congress shall bear responsibility for its role in regulation. By delegating the legislative power to make regulatory law, members of Congress evade responsibility for how they wield power and, as a result, wield it irresponsibly.217

Consider how the incentives of members of Congress would change if they had to vote on regulations. They would then bear personal responsibility for the failure to deliver popular benefits and the imposition of unpopular burdens. A challenger in a future election could then blame the incumbent for inflicting bad consequences on voters. It is recorded votes on rules—not debate, sound bites, or votes for popular goals—that would make members of Congress responsible for regulations in future elections. The upshot: although the legislators themselves would spend much less time on each regulation than does the agency and voters would not read the regulations, the legisla-

215. See id. at 92.
217. They can, however, influence regulation in other ways, such as through the power of the purse and the power to investigate, as Professor Josh Chafetz convincingly shows. See generally JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017). Such influence can be wielded in ways that allow the legislators to escape responsibility for the hard choices.
tors would still fear the blame that they might come to bear for the consequences of their votes in the next election, or the next, or the next.

As Dean Landis wrote, his suggestion would “have the administrative as the technical agent in the initiation of rules of conduct, yet at the same time to have the legislative share in the responsibility for their adoption.” Responsibility for significant regulation would better align the interests of legislators and their constituents. With legislators bearing responsibility for the consequences of regulation for constituents, more of the skill that the legislators now employ to make themselves look good would be put in service of producing regulations that better please their constituents. Agency experts would become Congress’s allies in showing how to update statutes to allow agencies to promulgate regulations that produce better consequences for constituents. In sum, the interests of the legislators and their constituents would be better aligned.

Congress will not, of course, construct a monument in memory of the 50,000 victims of its failure on lead in gasoline even though it funded a monument in memory of the like number of American service members who died in the Vietnam War. Nor will it build monuments for the millions of other victims of its shirking. The Court should start to do its job and thereby stop endorsing Congress’s pious frauds.

IV. WHAT THE COURT SHOULD DO

A. The Court’s Job

A book published in May 2019 by Professor Lawrence Lessig, *Fidelity & Constraint: How the Supreme Court Has Read the American Constitution*, helps show how the Court could, and why it should, substantially enforce the consent-of-the-governed norm. In its almost 600 pages, the book provides a model of “the practice of the Supreme Court as it has interpreted our Constitution” that explains the work of Justices from across the ideological spectrum from the early years to modern times.

218. LANDIS, supra note 158, at 76.
219. LESSIG, supra note 93.
220. Id. at 2. Professor Lessig asserts that the model describes the behavior of Justices on the Left and Right. Id. at 17.
The model has two parts: “fidelity to meaning,” referring to the meaning of the Constitution’s provisions, and “fidelity to role,” referring to the constraints on the enforcement of that meaning imposed by the Court’s role in a republic.221 Professor Lessig writes that decisions prompted by constraints “are instances of infidelity (to meaning) in order to preserve or enable the capacity of the judicial institution more generally.”222

Professor Lessig does not himself apply this model to the consent-of-the-governed norm. Nonetheless, his analysis of fidelity to role is applicable to the impediments to that norm’s enforcement.223

The first impediment to full enforcement of the norm discussed in Part II is the inability of Congress to make all the federal rules of private conduct and thereby to fully conform to the original meaning of the norm. The Court requiring the impossible of Congress would jeopardize the authority of the Court.224 Originalists could avoid this impossibility by recognizing such impracticality as an impediment to judicial enforcement.225

The second impediment to enforcement discussed in Part II is the lack of a judicially manageable test. Professor Lessig states the Court bows out when it lacks a judicially manageable

221. See id. at 5. Fidelity to meaning asks, according to Professor Lessig, “How does a judge preserve the meaning of the Constitution’s text within the current interpretative context?” Id. at 16. Professor Lessig describes the process as one of “translation.” Id. at 49–67. He argues that both the Left and Right do it. See id. at 257.

222. Id. at 451 (emphasis added).

223. Professor Lessig does mention Schechter and Panama Refining, but does not use his model to analyze them. See id. at 88–89, 92–93.


225. Jurists who are not originalist could, according to Professor Lessig’s model, translate original meanings to achieve their purposes in the modern context. An example of such a translation is the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. That clause was meant to limit Congress’s power, but as the amount of interstate commerce grew, the original meaning of the clause put no substantial limit on Congress’s power. The Justices, Professor Lessig concludes, came to see this “effectively unlimited power of the federal government as inconsistent with the Framers’ design. They adopted an interpretive strategy to correct for that inconsistency—translation.” LESSIG, supra note 93, at 92. Similarly, a jurist who embraced Professor Lessig’s concept of translation might read the consent-of-the-governed norm to have made Congress responsible in a way thought feasible in early times. In our more complicated times, such a jurist could then translate the norm to mean that Congress must make itself responsible to a practical extent.
test because otherwise it would seem to be acting politically, thereby jeopardizing its credibility as a judicial institution.226 The state-the-rule definition of the norm is judicially manageable because it rides on a difference of kind (lawmaking versus law interpretation and application), but the “intelligible principle” test is not.227 The question is whether the Justices can come up with a judicially manageable way to deal with the first impediment. The answer will be discussed in Part IV.B.

The third impediment discussed in Part II is strong public opinion in favor of delegation. As was shown, there is no such strong opinion now. When overwhelming political opposition does exist, however, it is another constraint, according to Professor Lessig.228 That the Court would back down in the face of political opposition may seem strange given that the Constitution is supposedly counter-majoritarian. That is why Professor Lessig notes, “It is in [the nature of this constraint] that its nature cannot be announced.”229

Professor Lessig goes on to state that because political opposition sufficient to make the Court suppress the meaning of the Constitution “was a kind of force majeure, then it follows that when the force is removed, the obligation to return to the Constitution’s . . . meaning returns as well.”230

The fourth impediment to enforcement of the consent-of-the-governed norm discussed in Part II is reliance on Congress’s ability to delegate. The four impediments are related. The judicially unmanageable “intelligible principle” test was adopted as a way of avoiding giving Congress an impossible task, and in turn, it built reliance on the current regulatory system. The Court’s attempt to enforce the norm without showing how to cope with that reliance could then result in overwhelming political opposition.

226. See LESSIG, supra note 93, at 42. Thus, the Court cannot seem to be acting politically rather than judicially. Id. at 154–57.
228. See LESSIG, supra note 93, at 450.
229. Id. at 452.
230. Id. at 431. Professor Lessig cites other examples. See id. at 85–90, 357–63.
Professor Lessig shows that the Court has repeatedly adopted new ways to better enforce constitutional norms. As he argues, “[W]hat a court needs when it recognizes failure is the freedom to try again: ‘Our aim is to preserve X. We have tried techniques A and B; they’ve proven too costly. We’ll now try C.’” To enforce the consent-of-the-governed norm, the Court needs a judicially manageable test with which Congress could comply and a way to take account of reliance on the current regulatory system.

Searching for such a test is the Court’s job. The search can succeed.

B. How the Court Could Do Its Job

The design of such a test, and the choice of how Congress would comply with it, will have policy implications. To avoid intruding into policy more than necessary to enforce constitutional norms, courts often try to get political branches to tackle such policy choices in a way that is consistent with the norms before themselves taking more intrusive action. So, in cases where legislative districting violates the one-person, one-vote norm, courts give the state legislature an opportunity to reapportion the districts—a decision with profound effects on who gets elected—in a way that complies with the Constitution. As the Court stated in *Reynolds v. Sims*, “[J]udicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.”

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231. See, e.g., id. at 172 (“If [Justice] Jackson’s view was that the Court couldn’t enforce the limits of the Constitution because he couldn’t craft a judicially administrable rule, that left open the possibility that other, more creative, justices could do so later.”); id. at 192–94 (discussing the opinion by Chief Justice Roberts concluding that the Affordable Care Act exceeded Congress’s commerce power but upholding it under the taxing power); id. at 196–204 (discussing the doctrine of state and federal immunity and the process of translation in the Court’s analysis despite political pressures).

232. Id. at 269.

233. See generally ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003). We showed that courts can prompt a political branch to tackle a question of policy in a way that respects consent of the governed. See id. at 193–222.


235. Id. at 586.
The upshot from giving elected officials a chance can be, if all goes well, a division of labor in which the elected officials make most of the policy choices and the judges stick largely to enforcing rights. This approach might help the Court get Congress to take substantial responsibility for regulation even though the legislature in this matter sits high on Capitol Hill and prefers to avoid responsibility. One reason is that, as shown in Part II.A, the Court would have an ally that is even more powerful than Congress: public opinion.

Calling upon elected officials to help decide how, but not whether, to remedy the most significant violations of the consent-of-the-governed norm is better than starting by rolling out the guillotine to kill some statute found to violate the norm. The call should make the following points:

1. Members of Congress, having sworn to uphold the Constitution, are duty bound to bring themselves into compliance with the consent-of-the-governed norm to the extent practical;

2. It would be practical for them at the very least to vote on the regulations deemed significant under the longstanding executive order;

3. The process through which Congress organizes itself to cast such votes is up to Congress, but one option is the Landis-Breyer proposal;

4. That process must, however, comply with Article I, including its requirement that “the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal;”236 and

236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. Compliance with the Journal Clause is vital to make members of Congress personally responsible for the exercise of legislative powers. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670–71 (1892). Such responsibility is in turn vital to achieve the key purposes of Article I, including consent of the governed. Field v. Clark goes on to state in dicta that the Court has a duty “to give full effect to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the enactment of laws.” Id. at 670. The Court fulfilled that duty in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). In those two cases, the Court insisted that Congress must comply with the Article I legislative process in exercising legislative powers. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438–39; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945. There is no denying that a vote to comply with the consent-of-the-governed norm is the exercise of a legislative power or that the Journal Clause is part of the Article I legislative process. Although Chadha and Clinton dealt with departures from Article I, Section 7 and the Journal Clause invoked here is in Section 5, that is a distinction without a
(5) If the Court finds that Congress has failed to do its duty by a date certain, the courts, also duty bound to enforce the Constitution, will act. Such action would be to strike any new rule of private conduct brought before the Court whose promulgation by an agency has not been approved through the Article I legislative process, unless the government shows that the rule is not significant.

Optimally, but not necessarily, the Court would issue the call to Congress in a case that does not directly threaten the reliance interest in delegations to expert agencies. Chadha or Clinton suggest the kind of case I have in mind. Both involved statutes that, as I have argued, could be described as delegating legislative power but not to an expert agency.\(^\text{237}\) Other such cases could come along, as suggested by President Trump's supposed order to American companies to stop doing business in China.\(^\text{238}\)

If Congress does not respond to the call by the date certain, the Court would replace the judicially unmanageable “intelligible principle” test with one geared to whether the regulation is significant. A test based upon the significance of each rule has a strong foundation in precedent. As already noted, the Court in its 1825 decision in Wayman v. Southard stated that Congress may delegate power to issue “minor regulations.”\(^\text{239}\) This language in Wayman does not appear in Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy.\(^\text{240}\)

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237. See supra Part II.A.


239. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 45 (1825).

To define significant regulations in modern circumstances, the Court could rely upon the definition of “significant regulatory action” in the executive order that has been in force for more than a quarter century under two Democratic and two Republican Presidents.\(^{241}\) In particular, the Court could rely upon the first part of the executive order’s definition that defines significant regulations as having an “annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.”\(^ {242}\) So, a regulation would be deemed significant if it increased or decreased costs by such amount. The $100 million test does not, of course, appear in the Constitution, but the Court regularly adopts bright-line tests to make judicially manageable enforcement of norms that the Constitution states in amorphous terms.\(^ {243}\) The Court, however, would not need to adopt such a test if Congress itself adopts a definition that is at least as inclusive. And, even if Congress fails to so do and the Court adopts the $100 million definition,


\(^{242}\) Id. § 3(f)(1).

\(^{243}\) Here are some examples. Faced with enforcing the constitutional provision that requires the President to get the consent of the Senate for important appointments except “during the Recess of the Senate” but does not define “recess,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3, the Court decided that Senate confirmation is presumptively needed if it is out of session for less than ten days. NLRB v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 538 (2014). Faced with enforcing the Equal Protection Clause’s requirement that both houses of the state legislature must be apportioned based on population, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, but acknowledging that some deviations from population equality may be necessary, the Court decided that population deviations of 10 percent or less were insufficient to make a prima facie case of invidious discrimination. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983). Faced with enforcing the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial without defining the size of that jury, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, the Court decided that a jury with less than six members would impair the purpose and function of the jury. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978). Faced with enforcing the constitutional provision requiring probable cause for searches and seizures without defining a timeline for providing probable cause, U.S. CONST. amend. IV, the Court decided that determination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will as a general matter comply with the promptness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). The Court also deals with amorphous constitutional norms by adopting bright-line tests that are not numerical. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (holding that police cannot initiate an interrogation after a defendant has requested counsel), rev’d by Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699–701, 704–05 (1981) (finding an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement for temporary detentions when there is a warrant to search a house for drugs).
Congress could supplant it later by adopting a definition that is at least as inclusive.

The executive order’s definition goes on to include additional grounds for finding a regulation significant.244 These additional grounds are, however, amorphous and so would raise problems of judicial manageability. The Court should leave these additional grounds out of its own test of significance. Congress could, however, include them in any statute it passes in response to the Court’s call for action or later.

Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson have also suggested a test based upon the $100 million figure in the executive order.245 They helpfully point out that although this “line is concededly arbitrary . . . it is not obvious to us why an underinclusive arbitrary line is worse than no line at all.”246

Unlike the “intelligible principle” test, the $100 million test would be judicially manageable. “Intelligible principle” is unmanageable because it looks to how much the statute says about the goals that the agency must pursue. With statutes calling for agencies to pursue a wide variety of goals—such as protecting health, stopping unfair trade practices, or preventing discrimination—rank ordering how much the statutes say about goals would be like comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Nor is there any objective scale on which to set a cut-off as to how much intelligibility is enough.247

In contrast, the $100 million test does provide an objective scale. Of course, determining the economic impact of a regulation does involve estimating, but the courts could put the burden on the agency to show that its regulation has an impact:

244. The definition goes on to include regulatory actions that “adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 641. It would be consistent with the consent-of-the-governed norm if the President amended the definition to, say, define as significant regulations with annual benefits of $100 million or more or adjusted the $100 million cut-off to take account of inflation.


246. Id. at 857.

that is below the benchmark. Reviewing such a showing is standard judicial work. Alternatively, Congress could assign the estimation job to the Congressional Budget Office.248

The new test would be judicially manageable even under the strict concept of manageability the majority in Rucho v. Common Cause249 used to find that the courts could not judge claims of unfair partisan gerrymandering.250 The majority found that claims of political gerrymandering “have proved far more difficult to adjudicate” than those claiming violations of the one-person, one-vote rule.251 “The basic reason is that, although it is illegal for a jurisdiction to depart from the one-person, one-vote rule, or to engage in racial discrimination in districting, ‘a jurisdiction may engage in [some] constitutional political gerrymandering.’”252 In contrast, the original meaning of the consent-of-the-governed norm is every bit as absolute as that of the one-person, one-vote norm.

There are, however, impediments to complete judicial enforcement of both the one-person, one-vote norm and the consent-of-the-governed norm as originally defined. With one-person, one-vote, the impediment is that the state has a legitimate interest in matters other than complete equality in the populations of legislative districts. One such interest is making legislative boundaries correspond to municipal boundaries. So, courts presumptively uphold the districting if the deviations among the populations of districts do not exceed ten percent.253 With

248. Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 245, at 856 n.163.
249. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
250. See id. at 2500–02.
251. Id. at 2497.
252. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999)).

The Rucho majority goes on to argue that:

Even if we were to accept the dissent’s proposed baseline, it would return us to “the original unanswerable question (How much political motivation and effect is too much?).” Would twenty percent away from the median map be okay? Forty percent? Sixty percent? Why or why not? . . . The dissent argues that there are other instances in law where matters of degree are left to the courts. True enough. But those instances typically involve constitutional or statutory provisions or common law confining and guiding the exercise of judicial discretion.
the original meaning of the consent-of-the-governed norm, one impediment is Congress cannot enact all the rules, as discussed in Part II.

With the one-person, one-vote norm, the impediment to complete judicial enforcement—other legitimate state interests—guides how much deviation from equality to allow. With the consent-of-the-governed norm, the impediment to judicial enforcement—legislative practicality—could guide the choice of a cutoff on the significance of regulations.

Although deciding how best to circumvent the impediments to enforcement of the consent-of-the-norm would require the exercise of some discretion, requiring Congress to vote on significant regulations would circumvent the biggest embarrassment that would result from instructing the lower courts to distinguish between “important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,” and “those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act . . . to fill up the details.”254 The courts would not be seen to be picking and choosing among regulatory statutes or agency actions. Rather, the norm would apply to all new regulations with an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more under all statutes, whether they increase or decrease regulatory protection.

That Congress should vote on all significant regulations already has a certain bipartisan pedigree. As already noted, it came from a leading New Dealer (Dean Landis) and was elaborated by a Supreme Court Justice who is an expert in regulation and was appointed by a Democratic President (Justice Breyer). Subsequently, Republican legislators in the House have repeatedly passed the REINS bill, which incorporates a version of the Landis-Breyer proposal. Yet, as shown in Part III.C, both parties in Congress have worked to avoid subjecting their members to the responsibility the Landis-Breyer approach would impose.

Rolling out the guillotine would be easier after having called upon Congress to address the problem and when single regulations, rather than entire statutes, are to be struck. Previously

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having discussed the norm and Congress’s failure to adhere to it to the extent practical, the Court’s constitutional intervention would not come as surprise. Moreover, the Court will have made clear it prefers Congress to make the policy judgments needed to comply with the norm. Indeed, even if Congress initially fails to decide how it will bear responsibility and the Court holds that it will strike significant regulations Congress has not approved, Congress could come up with an alternative way of taking responsibility. Professor Lessig argues that the Court can allow such leeway.255

Congress might respond constructively to a call from the Court to honor the consent-of-the-governed norm despite the credit-claiming, blame-shifting advantage its members now reap from delegation. The call would highlight the clash between their current behavior and, as discussed in Part II.A, the public’s overwhelming desire for a government based upon a consent of the governed and, in particular, for a Congress that takes responsibility for policy. As such, failure of the lawmakers in Congress to take responsibility for the laws would bring blame. Still more blame would come from failing to adopt reforms that would remove the cloud of uncertainty as to the validity of existing regulations. If Congress fails to remove that cloud, the Court would have strong justification for itself deciding not to apply the new test to old regulations.256

255. Professor Lessig argues that courts should accede to a legislature’s way of complying with the meaning of the Constitution “where the legislature has done the important work of translation itself.” LESSIG, supra note 93, at 272.

256. The Court could avoid applying the new test to old regulations despite the statement in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), that:

> When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule. . . . [W]e now prohibit the erection of selective temporal barriers to the application of federal law in non-criminal cases.

*Id.* at 97. Yet, as previously described in Part III.C, applying a new and stronger test of the consent-of-the-governed norm to old regulations would cause great pain given the ensuing uncertainty about the validity of the huge volume of old regulations. Fortunately, however, *Harper* should not control here because the reasons the Court gave in that case either do not apply here or do so very weakly, especially given that *Harper* itself announced its own, new judicially created retroactivity rule. What the Court did there in one direction, it can do again in another direction on another quite distinct issue. One reason offered in Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in *Harper* is that the judicial function “strips us of the quin-
Moreover, both businesses and advocates of strong regulation would rankle at agencies being unable to change regulations. Incumbents could take credit now for enacting the reform, and responsibility for the hard choices on regulation could be postponed until after the next election. That responsibility would apply to both parties whereas now either party in Congress that unilaterally gives up the credit-claiming, blame-shifting advantages of delegation would put itself at an electoral disadvantage. Finally, a Congress whose approval ratings have dipped as low as the single digits in recent years lacks the credibility with the public to put up much of a fight. Moreover, a failure by Congress to respond constructively would legitimate more intrusive judicial action.

Eventual success in getting Congress to take responsibility for significant new rules would tend to reduce the impediments to the Court enforcing the norm and enable it to require Congress to begin gradually to take responsibility for the most important old rules. Moreover, as Christopher DeMuth has
tentially `legislative' prerogative to make rules of law retroactive or prospective as we see fit.” Id. at 95 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)). This point is too broad because, as Justice Scalia recognized, “[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action . . . .” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Another reason offered in Justice Thomas’s opinion is that “selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated [parties] the same.” Harper, 509 U.S. at 95 (alteration in original) (quoting Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet applying the consent-of-the-governed norm retroactively would, given the ensuing uncertainty and upset, harm just about everyone. Moreover, the parties subject to the old regulations did not rely upon the Court applying the new test of the norm and so have no reliance interest in the courts’ doing so. Finally, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Harper offers an additional reason for retrospectivity: “Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of judicial activism . . . .” Id. at 105 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Court’s earlier carving of a giant exception to the consent-of-the-governed norm constitutes massive judicial activism. In sum, if need be, a strong case can be made that the rule in Harper should not apply in the consent-of-the-governed norm’s application to old regulations.

suggested, a President who wants Congress to take responsibility for regulation has diverse means to force Congress to do so.258

V. FAR-FETCHED RATIONALES FOR IGNORING THE NORM

A. The Constitution Permits Congress to Leave Lawmaking to Agencies

Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule contend that “a statutory grant of authority to the executive branch or other agents never effects a delegation of legislative power” and that no authority to the contrary appears until the late 1800s.259 For example, they argue that Locke’s statement that a legislature may not delegate its legislative powers “is fully consistent” with their position that Congress may pass statutes that authorize the executive branch to make law but may not authorize it to pass statutes.260

Professors Posner and Vermeule’s article reveals the weakness of their argument by failing to even mention, let alone trying to distinguish, *Federalist No. 75*, *Fletcher v. Peck*, or *Gibbons v. Ogden*.261 The article also reveals its weakness by contending


261. Professors Posner and Vermeule do discuss *Brig Aurora* but, in quoting it, omit the language that indicates the Court upheld the statute on the basis that it gave the President the power to apply a rule by finding “the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events” rather than to proclaim a rule. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1737–38. In particular, they omit the sentence that suggests that the President’s job was to find facts rather than make law: “The 19th section of that act declaring that it should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer, could not restrict their power of extending its operation, without limitation upon the occurrence of any subsequent combination of events.” Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813). They may have missed the importance of this language because they looked for evidence of the “intelligible principle” in *Wayman v. Southard* and unsurprisingly not finding it, conclude the Court displayed no definitive signs of a concern with delegation until late 1892. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1722, 1738–39.

Professor Jerry Mashaw objects to characterizing the President’s role as one of rule application. “The Court’s description of the President’s role, which involved
that its argument is consistent with “[t]he Framers’ principal concern [of] legislative aggrandizement—the legislative seizure of powers belonging to other institutions.”\textsuperscript{262} That leaves out a concern that is at least as fundamental to the Framers—consent of the governed. As Justice Kagan recently wrote, “If there is a single idea that made our Nation (and that our Nation commended to the world), it is this one: The people are sovereign.”\textsuperscript{263} Yet, Professors Posner and Vermeule do not even mention \textit{Federalist No. 51} and its position that, to repeat, “[a] dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government.”\textsuperscript{264}

\textbf{B. Even Early Congresses Ignored the Norm}

Professor Jerry Mashaw contends that, whatever the people were told about consent of the governed in the late 1700s, early elected officials never felt obliged to comply with any such norm.\textsuperscript{265} He writes, “From the earliest days of the Republic, Congress delegated broad authority to administrators, armed them with extrajudicial coercive powers, created systems of administrative adjudication, and specifically authorized administrative rulemaking.”\textsuperscript{266}

He goes on to state that “any claim that early Congresses declined to delegate broad authority to others must . . . conjure with the First Bank of the United States. The Bank’s function, in effect if not in form, was essentially that now served by the delicate diplomatic negotiations, complex bilateral understandings, and uncertain compliance, was surely a model of understatement concerning the presidential discretion effectively conferred on him to find a fact.” JERRY L. MASHAW, \textit{CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW} 99 (2012). Yes, the President got to set the strategy to get other nations to respect American neutrality, but the President’s job with respect to the rule enforced in \textit{Brig Aurora} was far simpler: to find whether other nations were respecting American neutrality.

\textsuperscript{262} Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1733.
\textsuperscript{264} \textit{The Federalist No. 51}, supra note 4, at 319 (James Madison).
\textsuperscript{265} MASHAW, supra note 261, at 25. Though disagreeing with this argument, I nonetheless admire his book for showing that the early federal government had a larger administrative apparatus than previously understood and that the separations among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches were far from neat.
\textsuperscript{266} Id. at 5. Professors Posner and Vermeule make a similar argument, but I will focus on Professor Mashaw’s version because it is more detailed and was written more recently. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1732–41.
Federal Reserve Board in regulating the money supply. 267 Professor Mashaw’s example makes it seem that Congress granted the First Bank legislative power because the Federal Reserve does now impose rules regulating how much banks can lend in order, in part, to control the money supply. 268 Yet, the law establishing the First Bank did not give it the power to regulate other banks. 269 It did affect the money supply, but by deciding how much money it would lend. Congress could have taken that decision away from the First Bank but leaving it with First Bank was not a delegation of legislative power.

In this example and many others, Professor Mashaw fails to demonstrate that the early Congresses systematically delegated their power to make the rules of private conduct because he conflates (1) Congress ceding legislative powers which it alone was supposed to exercise (such as making the rules of private conduct) with (2) Congress letting others make decisions that Congress itself need not make but could and sometimes did (such as allowing a bank to decide how much money it would lend). The two are distinct, as Dean Ronald Cass shows. 270 Yet, Professor Mashaw applies the word “delegate” to both. That is semantically correct but is nonetheless confusing because only the first violates the norm that Article I establishes. 271

In his extended analysis of Professor Mashaw’s book, Professor Joseph Postell shows that early Congresses “largely refrained” from delegating legislative powers to administrators and did so because of their commitment to the constitutional principle of nondelegation. 272 There were some temporary deviations in which Congress granted lawmaking powers to administrators, most notably the infamous Embargo of 1807 to 1809. 273 Professor Mashaw writes that the embargo statutes “featured stunning

267. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 47.
269. An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191 (1791).
271. Many of Professor Mashaw’s examples of Congress delegating are of its letting others do what Congress itself did not have to do. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 261, at 46 (granting the President the power to decide how to distribute congressional appropriated funds to veterans).
272. POSTELL, supra note 24, at 78.
273. MASHAW, supra note 261, at 91–118.
delegations of discretionary authority both to the President and lower-level officials,” and therefore it “has much to teach us about early understandings of the nondelegation doctrine.”274

This embargo that began in 1807—the one in *Brig Aurora*275 arose under later legislation—was, as Professor Mashaw helpfully explains, borne out of desperation.276 In the course of a war with each other, Britain and France seized American merchant ships and kidnapped their crews.277 These were acts of war against the United States, which was neutral in the conflict, but American officials were afraid of responding militarily against great powers.278 As an alternative, President Thomas Jefferson recommended keeping American ships at home and depriving Britain and France of American exports.279 He asked Congress to authorize such action and it did so.280

It is, however, wrong to conclude that the Embargo of 1807 to 1809 signifies acceptance of delegation.281 The statute generated protest in Congress that led ultimately to cutting back the President’s power.282 As Professor Postell sums up, “[T]he embargo was a temporary deviation from the typical policy decisions of the early republic, one that was nearly universally acknowledged as a colossal failure, and thus is of very limited value as an indication of what early American politicians regarded as legitimate.”283 It certainly was not an example of the congressional buck passing that drives so much delegation today. Indeed, the embargo brought blame.

Another example that Professor Mashaw highlights is how Congress responded to the dangers of a new technology, steamboats.284 The boilers of early steamboats tended to explode
with fatal consequences.\textsuperscript{285} Congress passed the Steamboat Act of 1852, which Professor Mashaw cites as an instance of early Congresses freely delegating the power to make rules of private conduct.\textsuperscript{286} It was not such an early Congress, coming as it did six decades after the ratification of the Constitution, and not much of an example at that. The statute, as he describes it, used “administrative rulemaking as a principal technique for articulating regulatory standards.”\textsuperscript{287} Yet, Professor Postell finds only two sections of the statute where “[t]he supervising inspectors were given rulemaking power.”\textsuperscript{288} One called for the inspectors, as the statute put it, to make rules “for their own conduct” and that of the inspectors working under them.\textsuperscript{289} This power, Professor Postell aptly argues, was not to make rules governing private conduct, but rather to govern official conduct and so did not violate the consent-of-the-governed norm.\textsuperscript{290}

The other provision called for the inspectors to make rules for ships passing each other.\textsuperscript{291} The genesis of this provision suggests no comfort with Congress empowering others to make rules of private conduct. As Professor Postell recounts, the bill, as originally introduced, contained a section with detailed rules on this subject based upon traditional practices.\textsuperscript{292} Legislators objected because they did not understand the section and particularly how these practices, which varied with whether a ship was going upstream or downstream, applied when tides reverse the direction of the water’s flow, as can happen far inland in some rivers.\textsuperscript{293} At the end of the legislative process in the House, the House passed a bill which included 150 amendments, one of which gave the inspectors broad rulemaking authority over ships passing each other.\textsuperscript{294} The Senate

\begin{itemize}
\item 285. \textit{Id.} at 188.
\item 286. \textit{Id.} at 192.
\item 287. \textit{Id.} at 152.
\item 288. \textit{POSTELL, supra note 24, at 98.}
\item 289. \textit{Act of August 30, 1852, ch. 106, § 18, 10 Stat. 61, 70.}
\item 290. \textit{POSTELL, supra note 24, at 98–99.}
\item 291. \textit{Ch. 106, § 29, 10 Stat. 61 at 72.}
\item 292. \textit{POSTELL, supra note 24, at 99.}
\item 293. \textit{Id.} at 100.
\item 294. \textit{Id.}
\end{itemize}
acceded because it was left with the choice of the House bill or no bill at all dealing with the deaths from steamboat explosions.  

The original language suggests members of Congress expected to state the rules themselves. The great bulk of the bill showed them doing so. It is often highly specific, containing detailed rules on a wide range of issues bearing on steamboat safety, from availability of lifeboats and firefighting equipment to the pressure in boilers, and much more. Here is one example:

That every vessel so propelled by steam, and carrying passengers, shall have not less than three double-acting forcing pumps, with chamber at least four inches in diameter, two to be worked by hand and one by steam, if steam can be employed, otherwise by hand; one whereof shall be placed near the stem, one near the stern, and one amidship; each having a suitable, well-fitted hose, of at least two thirds the length of the vessel, kept at all times in perfect order and ready for immediate use; each of which pumps shall also be supplied with water by a pipe connected therewith, and passing through the side of the vessel, so low as to be at all times in the water when she is afloat: Provided, That, in steamers not exceeding two hundred tons measurement, two of said pumps may be dispensed with; and in steamers of over two hundred tons, and not exceeding five hundred tons measurement, one of said pumps may be dispensed with.

Such detailed provisions are more like a regulation that a modern agency would put in the Code of Federal Regulations than an enabling statute that a modern Congress would put in the United States Code. Yet, Professor Mashaw compares the 1852 statute with modern statutes creating “the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency in the 1960s and early 1970s.”

Professor Mashaw dismisses the specifics in the statute by stating that the steamboat inspectors had “considerable discretion.” The statute did leave some room for judgment calls, as

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295. _Id._
296. _Id._ at 101.
297. Ch. 106, § 3, 10 Stat. 61 at 62.
298. MASHAW, _supra_ note 261, at 21.
299. _Id._ at 192.
in the phrase “a suitable, well-fitted hose” in the section quoted at length above. Yet, the inspectors, who were expected to come from the steamboat business, could base their determinations on their knowledge of practices in their line of work,\textsuperscript{300} much as common law juries in that era would base their judgments about reasonable care on practices in their own communities. Thus, the judgments left to the inspectors could be of rule application rather than rulemaking. Alternatively, these judgments would be considered as rulemaking of the “fill up the details” variety. Either way, the legislators had taken responsibility for the politically salient choices. It was nothing like modern statutes in which members of Congress grant legislative powers to avoid personal responsibility for the laws.\textsuperscript{301}

In sum, for many decades after the ratification of the Constitution, members of Congress tried to make the rules of private conduct themselves, but sometimes fell short. As Professor Daniel Walker Howe chronicles, legislators in the early decades took positions on the hard choices.\textsuperscript{302} In contrast, as Part III.D shows, modern Congresses issue detailed instructions but still manage to skirt the hard choices.

C. The Court Enforced the Norm in Only One Year of Hundreds

Referring to Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry striking down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1935, Professor Cass Sunstein quipped that the constitutional bar on Congress delegating legislative power has “had one good year and 211 bad ones (and counting).”\textsuperscript{303} Yet, as Professor Mark Tushnet recently blogged, “It’s not true,” citing Carter in 1936.\textsuperscript{304} I have cited other examples: Knickerbocker Ice in 1920, L. Cohen Grocery Store in 1921, and Washington in 1924.\textsuperscript{305} One could also arguably cite Clinton in 1998 and Chadha in 1983, es-

\textsuperscript{300} Id. at 195.
\textsuperscript{301} SCHOENBROD, supra note 15, at 70–74.
\textsuperscript{305} See supra Part II.A.
especially in light of the gloss put on it by Loving.\footnote{See id.} Indeed, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in *Gundy* cites these cases along with the void for vagueness cases and other cases to show the Court has taken the norm seriously.\footnote{See supra Part II.A.} More importantly, Congress substantially honored the norm well into the 1800s.\footnote{1 ACKERMAN, supra note 96, at 306–11; Ackerman, supra note 96, at 1053–57, 1070–71; see also Cass R. Sunstein, *Constitutionalism After the New Deal*, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 432 n.40, 447–48 (1987) (arguing that the New Deal amended the Constitution to allow delegation). But see, Lawrence G. Sager, *The Incorrigible Constitution*, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 924–33 (1990) (rejecting Professor Ackerman’s theory).} *Brig Aurora* and *Wayman* upheld challenged statutes on reasonable grounds. That the cases were brought suggests litigants were willing to raise delegation arguments. That more cases were not brought suggests there was not much worth challenging.

D. The Constitution Was Amended to Eliminate the Norm

Professor Ackerman argues that the decisive reelections of President Roosevelt after his confrontation with the Court was a “constitutional moment” that amended the Constitution to allow Congress to delegate its legislative powers.\footnote{309. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 96, at 306–11; Ackerman, supra note 96, at 1053–57, 1070–71; see also Cass R. Sunstein, *Constitutionalism After the New Deal*, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 432 n.40, 447–48 (1987) (arguing that the New Deal amended the Constitution to allow delegation). But see, Lawrence G. Sager, *The Incorrigible Constitution*, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 924–33 (1990) (rejecting Professor Ackerman’s theory).} In contrast, Professor William Leuchtenburg concludes that whatever else the voters might have been doing in 1936, they were not consciously amending the Constitution.\footnote{William E. Leuchtenburg, *When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis*, 108 YALE L.J. 2077, 2111 (1999).} The public did not think of itself as amending the Constitution at the time, and the Court has not so regarded it since.\footnote{Id.; see also LESSIG, supra note 93, at 440 (stating in reference to Professor Ackerman’s theory, that “it is not obvious that it was a will to amend”). Also, as Professor Lessig argues, “The problem for Ackerman’s account . . . is that the Court has repeatedly tried to reset the balance that was itself reset in 1937–1942.” Id. at 430.}

More fundamentally, the Constitution is not just an agreement on how government should work in response to the will of the

\footnote{\textit{Loving} v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141–43 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Indeed, these cases tend to undercut the Court’s rationale that Congress does not delegate legislative power when it states an intelligible principle. Similarly, as Professor David Strauss argues, cases before *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), tended to undercut the “separate but equal” logic of *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). DAVID A. STRAUSS, *THE LIVING CONSTITUTION* 90–92 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2010). Professor Strauss states, “[T]he Court in *Brown* was taking one further step in a well-established progression.” Id. at 92.}
governed, but it is also an agreement on how the Constitution can be amended in response to the will of the governed. The Constitution, of course, includes an explicit, formal process for its amendment.\textsuperscript{312} Although there is something to be said for substance over form, form does have its uses. A formal amendment would have had to make clear whether the electorate opposed a procedural requirement that Congress take responsibility, or rather that it cared more about President Roosevelt’s policy objectives, whether any such change was meant to be permanent or only for the duration of the emergencies of the Great Depression and World War II, and whether the amendment permitted only the broad (“here’s a problem, fix it”) delegations that typified the New Deal or also the narrow (“we get the credit, the agency gets the blame”) delegations of the Clean Air Act and its aftermath discussed in Part III of this Article. Finally, if Professor Ackerman is correct that the Constitution was amended by a shift in public opinion, why is it not equally so that the Constitution was reamended when public opinion later began to call for Congress to take responsibility, and Congress feigned doing so, as discussed in Parts II.A and III.C?

E. Delegation Is Consistent with Consent of the Governed

Professors Posner and Vermeule argue that Congress is accountable for agency-made rules. They do so in several paragraphs of suppositions about how legislators and voters behave.\textsuperscript{313} But these suppositions are not supported by reference to the work of political scientists—the social scientists who systematically describe such behavior.\textsuperscript{314} To the contrary, political scientists conclude that, in many circumstances, delegation al-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{312} U.S. CONST. art. V.
  \item \textsuperscript{313} Posner & Vermeule, \textit{supra} note 26, at 1749–50.
  \item \textsuperscript{314} Professors Posner and Vermeule do cite political scientists David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, \textit{The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach}, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 961–62 (1999), but they cite these political scientists for the proposition that enforcing the nondelegation doctrine would drive Congress to delegate to legislative committees rather than administrative agencies and thereby undercut accountability another way. See Posner & Vermeule, \textit{supra} note 26, at 1749. This is not the proposition I dispute. The proposition for which Epstein and Professor O’Halloran are cited, if true, may be relevant to the issue of the extent to which courts should underenforce the norm, but not to whether it should, as Professors Posner and Vermeule recommend, be killed off altogether.
\end{itemize}
allows legislators to take credit for popular consequences and shift blame for unpopular ones.315

315. See, e.g., R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 101 (1990) (“Sometimes legislators know precisely what the executive will decide, but the process of delegation insulates them from political retribution.”); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 132 (2d. prtg. 1975) (“[I]n a large class of legislative undertakings the electoral payment is for positions rather than for effects.”); Morris P. Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 175 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985) (offering a mathematical assessment of when it pays legislators to delegate); Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 45–47 (1982) (stating that legislators may pick the regulatory form that makes them look best to their constituents rather than the one that does the most good for their constituents); Justin Fox & Stuart V. Jordan, Delegation and Accountability, 73 J. POL. 831, 843–44 (2011) (identifying conditions under which delegation to agencies can provide politicians with an element of plausible deniability); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 152, 173 (2010) (stating that well-organized business interests pushing for favors from legislators at the expense of the average voter “will seek to substitute symbolic actions for real ones, for example, or manipulate complex policy designs to produce more favorable yet opaque distributional outcomes”); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371, 375, 386–87 (1986) (stating that politicians pass the buck as a means to avoid blame for unpopular actions).

In addition, researchers have used experimental subjects to test whether delegation of authority enables legislators to shift significant amounts of blame to agencies and found that it can. See, e.g., Adam Hill, Does Delegation Undermine Accountability? Experimental Evidence on the Relationship Between Blame Shifting and Control, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 311 (2015) (answering the question affirmatively on the basis of experiments by multiple researchers). Of his own experiments, Hill wrote, “Even in these cases, where the agent is effectively powerless to change the outcome, participants blame principals significantly less than in cases where the principal brings about the outcome directly.” Id. at 312.

Professors Posner and Vermeule also float the idea that delegation must be acceptable because delegation is used pervasively in public and private life. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1744–45. Here, they attack an argument that no one makes: delegation is invariably bad. The beef is only with delegation that deflects blame from where it should lie rather than to achieve economies of specialization or scale. Delegation to deflect blame is a ploy used in in business as well as government. See Andy Kessler, Opinion, Where in the World Is Larry Page?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2018, 10:59 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-in-the-world-is-larry-page-l1546199677 [https://perma.cc/CSFL-NTZC] (identifying some of the corporate leaders who work through surrogates to deflect blame).

In addition, Professors Posner and Vermeule argue that legislators will engage in “happy talk” regardless of whether they delegate. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1748. Perhaps, but spin is less effective than spin plus arranging to have the bad news come on the letterhead of an agency rather than from a vote in Congress.
Professors Posner and Vermeule also argue that the accountability of the President as executive preserves the consent of the governed.316 Yet, a President serving a second term escapes accountability at the polls altogether because the Constitution bars a third term.317 And even a first term President largely escapes blame for the burdens imposed by agencies. Some agencies are independent of presidential control. And although most are subject to it, Presidents usually will personally announce only those rules that the White House political advisors think will be popular.318 Otherwise, the President leaves the announcement to the agency head. The agency head can usually shift some of the blame to the statute or the court decisions that structured the agency’s decision making. Everyone is responsible, so no one is.

Moreover, few if any regulatory issues become important in a national presidential election because they are usually overshadowed by the President’s work as commander in chief, diplomat in chief, economic strategist, and national leader. These roles generally let the President appear aloof from choices about regulation. In contrast, how members of Congress would vote on such regulatory issues could be important in many of their reelection campaigns.

One might argue that voters should do the homework necessary to see through such trickery, but they will not and they should not have to. As Professor Jeremy Waldron writes, “[T]he agent-accountability that is involved in democracy puts the onus of generating that transparency and the conveying of the information that accountability requires on the persons being held accountable. . . . [T]he agents owe the principal an account.”319

317. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
F. Canons of Statutory Construction
Serve the Purpose of the Norm

Professor Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court has replaced the constitutional bar on delegation with various “non-delegation canons” of statutory construction, which he calls collectively “The American Nondelegation Doctrine.” Professor Sunstein sees consent of the governed as an underenforced norm but applauds far more underenforcement than I think necessary.

Professor Sunstein also gives arguments against the traditional doctrine. First, he states that it is not judicially manageable because it requires courts to answer a question of degree: “how much discretion is too much discretion?” Id. at 1182. This is true of the intelligible principle test, yet Professor Sunstein’s own canons require judgments of degree. The “elephants-in-mouseholes doctrine,” invoked when agencies find big powers in obscure grants of authority, requires courts to make two judgments of degree: how big is an elephant and how obscure is a mousehole. Generally, his canons are changeable, id. at 1184 (“[T]hey change over time.”), and unclear in application, id. at 1200 (“The passage is not without ambiguity . . . .”). Meanwhile, Chevron is of doubtful manageability because there are several conflicting versions of the doctrine. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 783, 817–29 (2010).

Second, Professor Sunstein’s argues that the traditional doctrine is of “uncertain constitutional pedigree” because, citing Professor Mashaw, it clashes with “actual practice during the early period of the American republic.” Sunstein, supra note 193, at 1183 (citing MASHAW, supra note 261, at 5). Yet, as I argued in Part V.B, Professor Mashaw is wrong. Professor Sunstein also relies upon Professors Posner and Vermeule for the related proposition that the norm lacks “clear roots . . . in the text and in founding-era debates.” Id. (citing Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1723). But the roots were clear enough to persuade the early Supreme Court in cases such as Fletcher v. Peck, Brig Aurora, and Gibbons v. Ogden. See supra Part I.A.

320. Sunstein, supra note 193, at 1181.
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322. Sunstein, supra note 193, at 1191.
323. Id. at 1181, 1185.
Clear statement requirements are often, but not always, sensible tools in statutory interpretation. However, clear statement requirements do little to stop shirking by Congress. An example is the 1970 Clean Air Act, which, as discussed in Part III.D, plainly authorized the agency to protect health, but allowed politicians to take credit for healthy air while shifting blame to the EPA and the states for failing to deliver and the economic burdens concomitant with pollution reduction. That is why legislators of both parties voted for it almost unanimously in 1970.

So, yes, members of Congress are elected and must authorize agencies to make law. But with great skill they shift blame to the agencies for the unpopular consequences such as regulatory protection not delivered or regulatory burdens imposed. That is not consent of the governed.

In sum, Professor Sunstein asserts that Congress can delegate sweeping power to agencies if it does so bluntly. That is bizarre because he would treat purposeful violations of the consent-of-the-governed norm more leniently than inadvertent violations even though the harm to the government is apt to be particularly great where Congress is most insistent that it wants to evade responsibility.

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That so many highly intelligent scholars can do no better than make such far-fetched arguments for ignoring the consent-of-the-governed norm bolsters the argument for recognizing it.

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324. To the extent that clear statement requirements are used to curb delegation rather than to divine the intent of Congress, they may lead the courts away from the intent of Congress. See John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1557–59 (2008).


326. The Senate version of the act passed unopposed, 116 CONG. REC. 33,120 (1970) (73 for, 0 against); the House version provoked a lone dissenting vote, id. at 19,244 (375 for, 1 against). The conference report was agreed to by both the Senate and House without opposition. See id. at 42,395 (Senate); id. at 42,524 (House).

327. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy cites these delegation-related statutory construction canons to show ongoing judicial concern with the constitutional norm rather than to argue that the canons are an adequate substitute for the norm. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141–42 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
CONCLUSION

We like the administrative state. After all, most people want the regulatory protection we were promised agencies would provide. That is why Congress passed the regulatory statutes.

Nonetheless, we also dislike the administrative state. After all, most people want members of Congress to take personal responsibility for regulations and thus to be accountable for both the burdens imposed and the shortfalls in regulatory protection. By failing to take such responsibility, Congress pits us against ourselves.

Many influential people benefit from Congress’s failure to take responsibility: the agency officials who get the power, lawyers whose income and sense of importance come from their role in the abstruse processes that now have the last word on regulation, and most importantly the members of Congress who prefer to avoid responsibility for hard choices so long as members of the opposing political party do.

The job of securing the consent of the governed the Declaration of Independence promised, and the Constitution requires, thus falls to the Supreme Court. It has no duty more supreme than judging compliance with the Constitution. None of the Constitution’s norms is more supreme than the consent of the governed. As Justice Kagan recently wrote, “[T]he need for judicial review is at its most urgent in cases” where “politicians’ incentives conflict with voters’ interests, leaving citizens without any political remedy for their constitutional harms.”

Yet, in response to assertions that Congress violates the consent-of-the-governed norm by outsourcing responsibility, the Court currently outsources its own responsibility for judgment to Congress. That is poetic injustice. It should stop. Once the Court does its duty, Congress can do its duty.

COUNTERACTING MARBURY:

USING THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE TO OVERRULE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

INTRODUCTION: THE LEGISLATIVE LIMITS OF MARBURY

The case provides the foundation for modern constitutional law. It contains arguably the most recognizable quote in the Supreme Court’s history. In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed, “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Such judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation has since become a hallmark of the American legal tradition. And the Supreme Court has consistently and vehemently reaffirmed what Marshall and the rest of Marbury’s unanimous Court deemed “the very essence of judicial duty.” No doubt, the fortress Marbury built to cement the Court’s authority to strike down unconstitutional statutes has been repeatedly attacked: from scholarly commentary, from state officials, from the modern administrative state, and from Congress itself. However, Marbury has survived, and indeed, Marbury has thrived. As the Supreme Court explained in the wake of a state’s refusal to implement one of the Court’s landmark decisions:

1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Id. at 177.
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
6. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1958) (holding that Arkansas state officials were bound by the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and thus had to desegregate schools).
7. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 316 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Marbury’s declaration of the judicial responsibility and adding that “[t]he rise of the modern administrative state has not changed that duty”).
8. In the aftermath of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Congress passed a statute providing for the admissibility of statements made voluntarily, even if the defendant was not first read his or her so-called “Miranda rights.” See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). The Court deemed this statute unconstitutional. Id. at 437.
The Constitution is "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation" ... [Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.9

Thus, the suggestion that Congress might act on behalf of the federal government as the final arbiter for a law’s constitutionality is ostensibly at odds with Marbury. The idea of a single body wielding the power both to make the law and to interpret its validity seems to conflict squarely with our contemporary conception of separation of powers.10

Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, the Constitution explicitly permits this type of congressional aggrandizement. An infrequently litigated provision in Article III provides that:

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.11

Plainly read, this latter declaration—the so-called “Exceptions Clause”—instills Congress with the unqualified power to restrict the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. So long as a case does not fall within the few enumerated classes of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction,12 a simple majority of Congress (with the President’s approval) could use this provision to legitimately strip the Court of its most powerful check on the legislature—the ability to declare a law unconstitutional.

Given that “hyperpartisanship has led Congress—and the United States—to the brink of institutional collapse,”13 this is understandably disturbing. A targeted invocation of the Exceptions

9. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
10. Of course, this does not always hold true in the interpretation of statutes or regulations. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). But that is largely irrelevant to the issue of constitutional interpretation.
12. Those being “all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party.” Id.
Clause for pure political gain could be imminent. For example, what is to stop the Republican Party from passing a statute banning abortion and preventing the Court from reviewing the law’s constitutionality? On the flip side, could anything prevent Democrats from statutorily overruling Citizens United v. FEC with a similar judicial review prohibition, in an effort to gain and entrench partisan advantage? Would the first invocation of such a blatantly partisan strategy result in a Constitution whose meaning effectively shifts whenever Congress changes hands? If so, the fundamental judicial role espoused in Marbury may soon be under constitutionally legitimate—although deeply disconcerting—legislative attack.

Part I of this Note provides an overview of the sparse historical dialog between Congress and the Supreme Court with respect to the Exceptions Clause. Part II then scrutinizes both the text and original understanding of the provision and argues that the Constitution grants Congress the near-plenary power to curb the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Finally, although most of this Note seeks to show that Congress could legitimately remove a statute from the Court’s appellate oversight, Part III will close by arguing why Congress generally should not do so.

I. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE

A. Congressional Reluctance

The motivation for Congress to invoke the Exceptions Clause power is clear and tantalizing. Via a procedural device, the legislature can unilaterally rewrite substantive law to comport with majoritarian values, and then shield the act from federal judicial review. In doing so, Congress could bypass the inher-

14. At first glance, given the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), this would seem to conflict squarely with the holding in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“Congress may not legislatively supersede [the Supreme Court’s] decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.”). However, if the court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of the statute superseding the abortion cases in the first place, the Supreme Court would have no constitutional authority to ever render a ruling striking it down. See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 907 (2018) (plurality opinion) (“[A] congressional grant of jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power.” (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998))).

ent difficulty of the amendment process, and, in some instances, it could smoothly recalibrate the Constitution with modern ideals. Yet historically, Congress has nonetheless proved hesitant to flex its Exceptions Clause muscles to strong-arm federal legislation into force. Although textually the power to restrain the judiciary certainly resides with the legislature in some fashion, two primary external considerations have provided a deterring force: constitutional uncertainty and political anxieties.

As to the former, Professor Mark Tushnet argues that an emergent “scholarly consensus” supporting the unconstitutionality of such measures provides “a political force that keeps Congress from enacting jurisdiction-restricting legislation.” This cannot, however, be the sole restraint. For one, there is far from a “consensus” in the scholarly literature; some have gone so far as to proclaim a narrow reading of the Exceptions Clause as “antithetical to the plan of the Constitution for the courts.” And although judicial review provides a cornerstone of our modern separation-of-powers framework, one must also keep in mind that *Marbury* was not a foregone conclusion. Its holding does not inevitably flow from any explicit textual provisions, and “nowhere in *Marbury* did [Chief Justice Marshall] suggest that other branches of government were precluded from interpreting the Constitution for themselves.” Indeed, this Note seeks to show that the Exceptions Clause limits *Marbury* in a significant way. It provides the people with a necessary safeguard aimed at reconciling the institution of judicial review

16. *But cf.* THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“[W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former.”).


with democratic values; and it offers the legislature a tool to counteract blatant Supreme Court overreach.20

Beyond constitutional uncertainty, fears of political repercussions also inhibit Congress’s use of the Exceptions Clause. And this is likely the overriding reason why targeted jurisdiction-stripping proposals have all failed to become law in the past. The mere idea of invoking such a drastic option for short-term political gain—even if fully consonant with the constitutional text—may be repugnant to participants in the two-party system. After all, the balance of power shifts nearly every election cycle, and as the adage goes, “what goes around comes around.”21 Playing constitutional hardball with the Exceptions Clause could ultimately backfire. That is not to say Congress members have never tried. Many have attempted to restrict the Court’s ability to hear cases on school prayer,22 desegregation busing remedies,23 state reapportionment challenges,24 the composition of the military,25 the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (a measure which did in fact pass the House),26 Miranda issues,27 antipornography measures,28 the Pledge of

20. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) ("The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects."); Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 286 n.76 (1996) (concluding that "judicial review and expansive congressional authority under the Exceptions Clause" can "not only . . . coexist," they are "also necessary correlates in a constitutional democracy"). Respect for the Court may, however, be another reason Congress has not yet exercised its full authority.

21. See, e.g., JUSTIN TIMBERLAKE, WHAT GOES AROUND . . . COMES AROUND (Jive Records 2006); see also infra Part III.


25. See id. at 992 n.18.


27. See Baucus & Kay, supra note 24, at 991 nn.13–15.

Allegiance,29 and state abortion regulations,30 just to name a few.

But given the infrequency with which Congress has historically employed the Exceptions Clause, its modern use to prohibit Supreme Court review of, say, state abortion restrictions would almost certainly trigger retaliatory cries of hyperpartisanship and unfairness.31 Because the method for enactment would no longer conform with the rules of historical practice, a party exploiting this perceived “constitutional loophole” to try to dissolve a court-announced right—successful or not—might prove simply unpalatable to voters. And that could very well push America’s large moderate contingent towards the other side of the aisle.32 As such, pragmatic inertia has likely set in on Capitol Hill. The continued vitality of one’s own party restrains even the most politically fervent from using the Exceptions Clause to overturn Supreme Court precedent. And each year this partisan strategy lays dormant only serves to increase the potential for political backlash if it is ever deployed in the future.

Historical practice aside, this then leads to the ultimate question: Even if Congress has never actually leveraged the Exceptions Clause to remove a statute’s constitutionality from Supreme Court review, can it still legitimately do so? The answer, as re-

31. This parallels the public reaction to the Republican Party’s refusal to consider Judge Garland’s Supreme Court nomination and subsequent invocation of “the nuclear option” to confirm Justice Gorsuch with a simple majority. See, e.g., J. Stephen Clark, Senators Can’t Be Choosers: Moratoriums on Supreme Court Nominations and the Separation of Powers, 106 KY. L.J. 337, 384 (2018) (arguing that the incident contributed to “the public impression that Supreme Court nominees are the mere partisan plants of their ideological champions”); Michael J. Gerhardt & Richard W. Painter, Majority Rule and the Future of Judicial Selection, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 263, 266 (“[B]locking Judge Garland’s nomination to the Court broke the patterns of more than 100 years . . . .”).
flected by the provision’s plain text and its history, is a resounding yes.

B. Ex parte McCordle and the Bounds of Congressional Authority

Decided in 1869, Ex parte McCordle still stands as the seminal Exceptions Clause decision. The case was a unique product of Reconstruction. In 1867, Congress had expanded the availability of federal habeas petitions to “all cases” where one was unlawfully detained under the Constitution, thereby permitting state prisoners for the first time to file for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Officials then arrested Mississippi newspaper editor William McCordle and detained him for trial in a military tribunal pursuant to the Military Reconstruction Act (MRA). But, ironically enough, McCordle sought to leverage the newfound federal habeas provision—itself designed to effectuate Reconstruction policies—to attack the MRA’s facial constitutionality. So with the express purpose of “sweeping the McCordle case from the docket by taking away the jurisdiction of the [C]ourt,” Congress repealed the expanded habeas statute via an inconsequential tax bill rider—one remarkably passed after oral argument. The Supreme Court thus had its first meaningful opportunity to consider the Exceptions Clause’s scope.

Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Chase opened by noting, “The first question necessarily is that of jurisdiction; for, if the [law passed after oral argument] takes away the jurisdiction defined by the [expanded federal habeas provision], it is useless, if not improper, to enter into any discussion of

33. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
37. Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 238.
38. Id. at 239 (alteration omitted) (italics added) (quoting Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2062 (1868)).
39. Id.; see Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44, 44 (1868).
other questions."40 Then, without ever reaching the merits, and in a brief four-page opinion, the Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.41 Explicitly relying on the Exceptions Clause, the Chief Justice observed, “The [expanded federal habeas provision], affirming the appellate jurisdiction of this court in cases of habeas corpus is expressly repealed. It is hardly possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive exception.”42 He continued to reason and hold, “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”43

McCardle had little else to say about the scope of Congress’s legitimate jurisdiction-stripping power. Importantly though, the Court noted, “We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”44 To be sure, one can plausibly read McCardle narrowly as a case enabling Congress to suspend certain habeas petitions from the Supreme Court’s purview,45 but without acknowledging any unconditional authority to remove an enactment’s lawfulness from the Court’s oversight altogether. However, an analysis of the broad language employed by the Supreme Court in later cases subverts this narrow reading. For example,

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42. Id. at 514 (italics omitted).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 18, at 905 (“More substantial doubts about the precedential value of McCardle stem from the fact that the jurisdiction-stripping statute sustained there did not foreclose all appellate review . . . .”).
in The “Francis Wright,” the Court said, “What [the Supreme Court’s appellate] powers shall be, and to what extent they shall be exercised, are, and always have been, proper subjects of legislative control.” Without stating any qualifications, the Court continued in sweeping terms to conclude that both “whole classes of cases” and “particular classes of questions” may “be kept out of the jurisdiction altogether.” Similarly, the Court has confirmed that “an uninterrupted series of decisions” establishes that the Supreme Court “exercises appellate jurisdiction only in accordance with the acts of Congress upon that subject.” And it has recently explained, “For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.” Therefore, although a narrow reading of McCardle has its supporters, for many the case “has long been read as giving Congress full control over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”

C. The Klein “Rule of Decision” Qualification

In 1872, Congress afforded the Supreme Court yet another opportunity to wrestle with the Exceptions Clause, albeit less...

46. 105 U.S. 381 (1882).
47. Id. at 386.
48. Id.
directly. The enigmatic decision of *United States v. Klein*\(^{53}\) followed in the wake of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863 (ACPA), another Civil War enactment that permitted federal officials to seize and sell abandoned or captured civilian property in states or territories rebelling against the Union.\(^{54}\) Nonetheless, some individuals whose property had been seized could still recover its value, provided they could demonstrate to a reviewing court that they had “never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion.”\(^{55}\)

Despite the express terms of the ACPA, in 1869, the Supreme Court in *United States v. Padelford*\(^{56}\) reasoned that the ACPA “requir[ed] such a liberal construction as will give effect to the beneficent intention of Congress.”\(^{57}\) It concluded that a presidential pardon of those in rebellious states fulfilled the ACPA’s statutory loyalty requirement, holding that after a pardon, “in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence.”\(^{58}\)

Congress, however, made clear that this result was not its intention. Shortly thereafter, it enacted a statute providing that without an express disclaimer of guilt, a presidential pardon would instead serve as “conclusive evidence that [a claimant] did take part in and give aid and comfort to the late rebellion” for purposes of the ACPA.\(^{59}\) Even more importantly, the statute declared that upon “proof of such pardon . . . the jurisdiction of the court in the case”—including that of the Supreme Court—“shall cease.”\(^{60}\) *Klein* held this latter proviso unconstitutional as violating the separation of powers and the President’s power to pardon.\(^{61}\) It explained that Congress cannot constitutionally wield its Exceptions Clause authority to “withhold appellate jurisdiction . . . as a means to an end.”\(^{62}\)

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53. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
54. See Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863, ch. 120, § 1, 12 Stat. 820, 820.
55. Id. § 3.
56. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
57. Id. at 538.
58. Id. at 542 (quoting *Ex parte Garland*, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
62. Id. at 145.
Now, there are two possible interpretations of the Court’s assertion here. Opponents of broad jurisdiction-stripping authority point to this statement and insist that *Klein* prohibits Congress from restricting appellate jurisdiction when doing so manifests a motivation to dictate substantive outcomes.63 But as discussed above, this is in extreme tension with *McCardle*, which plainly stated that the Court is “not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature.”64 What’s more, Chief Justice Chase authored both opinions only a few years apart, and nothing indicates that he had such a sudden change of heart as to the salience of legislative motive.

A second interpretation better reconciles *Klein*’s assertion with *McCardle*.65 By prohibiting jurisdiction stripping as “a means to an end,”66 Chief Justice Chase meant that a jurisdictional prohibition cannot be contingent upon some state of affairs, one which Congress strategically manipulates to direct its desired substantive outcome.67 This is because such a contingency is not so much an “exception” to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, but rather a “rule of decision” which functionally declares the government as victor in the litigation.68 This distinction logically follows from the *Klein* opinion, which declared that:

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64. Ex parte *McCardle*, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869).
65. Besides the “rule of decision” qualification, *Klein* can also be distinguished on the grounds that “Congress cannot limit the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in a manner that violates other constitutional provisions.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 63, at 169. “[R]estoration of property was expressly pledged” by the pardon at issue, and by denying any court jurisdiction to vindicate this right, Congress had unlawfully “change[d] the effect of [the] pardon.” *Klein*, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 148.
67. See id. at 145 (“If [Congress] simply denied the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of the power of Congress to make ‘such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction’ as should seem to it expedient.”); see also Patchak v. *Zinke*, 138 S. Ct. 897, 919 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1373 (1953) (citing *Klein* and suggesting that Congress may not grant federal courts jurisdiction in a particular case with the additional limitation that they “tell the Court how to decide it”).
68. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 405 (1980) (“[O]f obvious importance to the *Klein* holding was the fact that Congress was attempting to decide the controversy at issue in the Government’s own favor.”).
It is evident from [the statute] that the denial of jurisdiction to this court, as well as to the Court of Claims, is founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress. The court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given point, but when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to cease and it is required to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction. It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power.69

In other words, Congress does not legitimately exercise its Exceptions Clause authority just because it calls a statute “jurisdictional.” And Klein shows why. Unlike the statute in McCardle, which removed an entire class of cases from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the statute in Klein did first confer jurisdiction. However, some of those cases were contingently shielded from judicial review based on the presence of certain evidence, in an effort to dictate an outcome favoring the government.70 Under a commonsense definition of “jurisdiction,” this type of contingency does not act as an exception to the Court’s jurisdiction at all. Klein therefore fails to undercut McCardle’s view of Congress’s raw jurisdiction-stripping power over specific categories of cases. And because shielding a statute’s constitutionality from judicial review would not create a “rule of decision,” such a measure would fall within the ambit of McCardle rather than that of Klein.

Since Reconstruction, the Court has rarely had occasion to confront the Exceptions Clause; the speculative debate has instead raged on almost exclusively in academic circles.71 In 1996, the Supreme Court in Felker v. Turpin72 “temporarily sparked

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69. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (emphasis added).
70. See id. at 146–47; see also Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324 (2016) (noting that Congress cannot “attempt[] to direct the result” of a case).
71. The absence of precedent may be indicative of Congress’s hesitation to limit judicial review of constitutional issues without some especially pressing concern (for example, Reconstruction or the War on Terror). See Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping in a Time of Terror, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1193, 1193–94 (2007). Or it may just be the Court’s own fear of wading into such a contentious area. See David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2481 (1998) (“No issue has been more studiously avoided by the courts . . . than congressional control over jurisdiction of the federal courts.”).
hopes and fears that [it] would issue a rare pronouncement on the limits of Congress’s power.” But after granting certiorari and asking for briefs on Congress’s Exceptions Clause power, the Court ultimately dodged the issue. Nonetheless, the Court’s limited Exceptions Clause jurisprudence supports a broad conception of Congress’s authority to remove whole categories of cases from the Supreme Court’s purview. Subject only to the limitations of Klein and other constitutional provisions, the rule is simple: Congress “does not violate Article III when it strips federal jurisdiction over a class of cases.”

II. THE PLAIN TEXT PREVAILS

Although the Court has generally acquiesced to congressional jurisdiction-stripping efforts in the past, it has never had occasion to squarely confront the question that this Note proposes. That is, what would happen if Congress passed a statute reversing a Supreme Court decision and providing that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the law for conformance to the Constitution? In this Part, I argue that the Court would have

73. Velasco, supra note 52, at 673.
74. See James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (2000).
75. Felker, 518 U.S. at 661–62. In the opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that:
The Act does remove our authority to entertain an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a decision of a court of appeals exercising its “gatekeeping” function over a second petition. But since it does not repeal our authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus, there can be no plausible argument that the Act has deprived this Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article III, § 2.
Id. A three-member concurrence hinted that if Congress foreclosed the Court from hearing all habeas petition avenues, that might overstep its Exceptions Clause authority. See id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring) (“I write only to add that if it should later turn out that statutory avenues other than certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination were closed, the question whether the statute exceeded Congress’s Exceptions Clause power would be open.”).
76. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906 n.3 (2018) (plurality opinion). For example, Congress could not restrict members of a certain race from appealing to the Supreme Court. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection applies to the federal government). This is because the jurisdictional limitation would itself violate equal protection. But it is an entirely different matter when Congress strips the Court of jurisdiction to rule on the substantive validity of a statute.
77. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 906.
to dismiss any challenges to such a statute for want of jurisdiction. This is compelled by the text and history of the Exceptions Clause, as well as the structure of the Constitution. Remarkably then, the Clause provides Congress with a potential avenue to enact laws in direct opposition to the Supreme Court’s exposition of constitutional rights.

A. One Cannot Read Limitations into the Exceptions Clause

In the words of the late Justice Scalia, “The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.”78 Of course, the text of the Constitution often raises more questions than it provides answers.79 But unlike the open-textured language of most constitutional provisions, the Exceptions Clause is clear. Returning to the “critical language of Article III, § 2”:80

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.81

Before parsing the provision, it may be useful to read the Exceptions Clause once again, and independently determine the most natural reading without any influence from the analysis below.

As an initial matter, the phrase “[i]n all the other Cases before mentioned” refers to those classes of cases enumerated in the preceding Section, those which the Framers viewed as “the proper subjects of the national judicature.”82 Hence, the Constitution grants the Supreme Court “appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact” for specific categories of cases, such as those producing the familiar diversity jurisdiction or arising-under

80. Felker, 518 U.S. at 661.
82. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 16, at 480 (Alexander Hamilton); see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (enumerating categories of cases).
Next, a "regulation' in the latter part of the eighteenth century, as today, was a rule imposed to establish good order." Congress may necessarily prescribe rules of procedure or evidence under this provision. Given this ordinary meaning though, the ability of Congress to make "Regulations" neither adds to nor subtracts from the legislative branch's jurisdiction-stripping power.

However, the phrase “with such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make” modifies “appellate Jurisdiction,” and it thereby confers upon Congress a license to freely restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction as it sees fit. Simply put, there are no exceptions to this Exceptions Clause power. The language is simple and unambiguous, absolute and unqualified. Indeed, this plain meaning—that Congress has plenary authority over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction—is further supported by contemporaneous dictionaries. Just like today, those sources defined an "exception" as an “[e]xclusion from the things comprehended in a precept or position,” or similarly, as an “exclusion from the application of a general rule or description.” Applying those definitions, the Constitution first establishes a general rule: the Supreme Court “shall have appellate Jurisdiction” over “all the other [enumerated] Cases” not subject to the Court’s original jurisdiction. Then, the Exceptions Clause explicitly permits Congress to exclude any portions of this appellate jurisdiction as it “shall” deem proper. Plain and simple.

Nothing else in the Constitution "requires the availability of jurisdiction."83 Next, a "regulation' in the latter part of the eighteenth century, as today, was a rule imposed to establish good order." Congress may necessarily prescribe rules of procedure or evidence under this provision. Given this ordinary meaning though, the ability of Congress to make "Regulations" neither adds to nor subtracts from the legislative branch's jurisdiction-stripping power.

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Nothing else in the Constitution "requires the availability of jurisdiction."
Supreme Court review for particular types of claims." Hypothesis, and this means that Congress can legitimately enact a jurisdictional exception to shield challenges to a statute’s constitutionality from the Court.

Despite this clarity, two alternative textualist views have emerged in the literature. Neither is persuasive. First, some contend that “the exceptions are to the ‘appellate’ form, not to the ‘Jurisdiction’ itself.” These scholars allege that Congress may only shift categories of cases traditionally earmarked for the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to the Court’s original jurisdiction. But such a reading is unnatural. In fact, the Exceptions Clause is contained in a sentence that itself only references appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction. Not only that, but the plausibility of this theory suffers from several additional pitfalls. Most notably, it is squarely at odds with “the plain import of the words” as construed in Marbury v. Madison. For if the Exceptions Clause permitted Congress to perform such an appellate-original shift, then Marbury would have held the Judiciary Act of 1789 entirely constitutional upon review. A modern Supreme Court would be unlikely to abandon the well-established textual understanding of Chief Justice Marshall—especially in a case as foundational as Marbury—in favor of a directly opposing position. Furthermore, as described in the next Section, this appellate-original-shifting construction is undermined by both early historical practices of jurisdiction

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91. Note that although Congress may render Supreme Court review unavailable, other mechanisms for striking down jurisdiction-stripping statutes still exist. Alternative methods include—but are not limited to—congressional repeal, state court decisions, voting out supporters of the legislation, public backlash, and other grassroots social efforts. The Supreme Court should not be viewed “as a general haven for reform movements.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

92. Alex Glashausser, A Return to Form for the Exceptions Clause, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1383, 1402 (2010).

93. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

94. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803).

95. See id. (“[T]he plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases [the Supreme Court’s] jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original.”).
stripping by Congress, as well as the original understanding of the Exceptions Clause.96

Second, other scholars have attempted to argue that “Exceptions” was intended only to modify the word “Fact,” rather than the Court’s ultimate jurisdiction.97 Again, the grammatical structure disfavors this interpretation. Read more naturally, “both as to Law and Fact” simply clarifies the potential reach of the “appellate Jurisdiction” of the Supreme Court. The Exceptions Clause, by contrast, acts to permit Congress to cabin the scope of this jurisdiction—“both as to Law and Fact.” Moreover, this alternative reading is dispelled by the Federalist Papers,98 records from the Constitutional Convention,99 countless legal scholars,100 and most significantly, the First Congress preventing the Court from reviewing certain legal (meaning not factual) conclusions of state courts.101

But regardless of the Clause’s plain meaning, history has manifested that even the most unambiguous provisions have become distorted by layers of precedent,102 centuries of shifting

96. See infra Part II.B.
97. See Henry J. Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical Basis, 47 MINN. L. REV. 53, 68–69 (1962).
98. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton); infra Part II.B.
99. See Velasco, supra note 52, at 721 n.244 (“A prior draft of the Constitution provided simply that ‘[i]n all other cases before mentioned, it [i.e., Supreme Court jurisdiction] shall be appellate, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 186 (Max Farrand ed., 1911))).
101. The Supreme Court could only review decisions of state courts that ruled against a federal claim arising under the Constitution. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87.
102. For example, the First Amendment only provides that “Congress shall make no law” abridging the freedom of speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). Construed literally, the executive or judiciary could abridge the freedom of speech, but this has not proven the case. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 326 (2010) (“Courts, too, are bound by the First Amendment.”); cf. Sonja R. West, Suing the President for First Amendment Violations, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 321, 329 (2018) (arguing that courts should hold the President accountable under the First Amendment as it has other executive officials, but noting that “[t]he question of whether the First Amendment applies directly to the President . . . remains officially unresolved”).
values,\textsuperscript{103} and sometimes simple judicial necessity.\textsuperscript{104} As one scholar observed, “If we read the text of the Constitution in a straightforward way, American constitutional law ‘contradicts’ the text of the Constitution more often than one might think.”\textsuperscript{105} Therefore, my aim for the rest of this Part is to use historical evidence and the underlying structure of the Constitution to support a reading of the Exceptions Clause which is faithful to its plain text.

\textbf{B. History Reinforces Congress’s Sweeping Exceptions Clause Power}

On July 24, 1787, after concluding the initial round of debates at the Constitutional Convention, the delegates submitted the various resolutions they had approved to the Committee of Detail, a task force charged with “report[ing] a Constitution comfortable to the Resolutions passed by the Convention.”\textsuperscript{106} In its initial draft of the Exceptions Clause, the Committee of Detail captured the approved resolutions as follows: “in all the other cases before mentioned, it [the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction] shall be appellate, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make.”\textsuperscript{107} Notably, there are only two discrepancies between this draft and the final language enshrined in the Constitution. These include the replacement of “Congress” for “Legislature,” and the insertion of “both as to Law and Fact” to clarify the scope of “it” (the Court’s appellate

\textsuperscript{103} To illustrate, the “right to privacy” does not flow from any textual provision of the Constitution. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“What provision of the Constitution, then, does make this state law invalid? The Court says it is the right of privacy ‘created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.’ With all deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, or in any case ever before decided by this Court.”).

\textsuperscript{104} In \textit{Bolling v. Sharpe}, the Supreme Court held that the federal government could not discriminate on the basis of race in D.C. schools even though “[t]he Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states.” 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954).


\textsuperscript{106} Rossum, \textit{supra} note 100, at 392 (quoting 2 Max Farrand, \textit{The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787}, at 22, 46 (rev. ed. 1937)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Id.} (quoting FARRAND, \textit{supra} note 106, at 173) (internal quotation marks omitted).
jurisdiction). The former modification is merely semantic, and the latter was approved unanimously and with little discussion as a simple clarification of the Court’s potential jurisdictional reach. Because “[n]o questions were raised concerning Congress’ plenary power to make exceptions,” Professor Ralph Rossum resolves that “[t]he conclusion is inescapable: both the words chosen by the delegates and the discussion surrounding their choice of these words suggest an unlimited congressional power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”

Though this particular evidence from the Convention does support Professor Rossum, it is not decisive on the matter. Nevertheless, his conclusion is correct. In parallel with the text, both the original public meaning and history of the Exceptions Clause strongly indicate that Congress has the essentially unconditional authority to act as jurisdictional gatekeeper. The remainder of this Section will examine three additional sources buttressing this view: the Federalist Papers, historical practices of the First Congress, and the role state supreme courts played in the early Republic.

1. The Federalist Papers: Capturing the Views of the Original Public Meaning and Governmental Structure

“The Federalist Papers long have enjoyed a special reputation as an extremely important source of evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution,” both within the academic liter-

108. See id. at 392–93 (“James Wilson, the principal architect of the draft reported by the Committee of Detail, answered [a question of the meaning of “it"] that the committee meant ‘facts as well as law & Common as well as Civil law.’ No comments were forthcoming from other members of the Committee, presumably indicating their agreement with Wilson’s answer.” (footnote omitted) (quoting FARRAND, supra note 106, at 431)).

109. Id. at 393.


The opinion of the Federalist has always been considered as of great authority. It is a complete commentary on our constitution; and is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth. Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank, and the part two of its authors [Madison and Hamilton] performed in framing the constitution, put it very much in their power to explain the views with which it was framed.

ature as well as for the federal judiciary. Alexander Hamilton explained the breadth of the Exceptions Clause in *Federalist No. 80*. There, after enumerating “the particular powers of the federal judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution,” Hamilton argued that “it appears that [the powers] are all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed the structure of [the judicial] department and which were necessary to the perfection of the system.” Yet after attesting to the nobility of the proposed federal judiciary’s power, Hamilton then described the rationale for a major legislative check on the jurisdiction of the Court. He continued:

If some partial inconveniences should appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of [the jurisdictional powers] into the plan[,] it ought to be recollected that the national legislature will have ample authority to make such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. The possibility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid objection to a general principle, which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs and to obtain general advantages.

This stark expression of the legislature’s ability to restrain the Supreme Court and “obviate or remove” any “inconveniences” which may arise because of its jurisdiction reinforces the breadth of the Exceptions Clause authority. Indeed, in *Federalist No. 81*, Hamilton further argued that the exceptions power would “enable the government to modify [the Court’s appellate jurisdiction] in such a manner as will best answer the ends of public justice and security.” Even during the course of state conventions, ratifiers such as John Marshall shared Hamilton’s view and remarked that the jurisdictional “exceptions certainly go as far as the legislature may think proper for the interest and liberty of the people.”

111. See *Printz v. United States*, 521 U.S. 898, 910 (1997) (noting that the *Federalist Papers* are “usually regarded as indicative of the original understanding of the Constitution”).
113. Id. (emphases added).
115. Rossum, supra note 100, at 393 (quoting 3 *Debates on the Federal Constitution* 560 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Taken together, Hamilton’s insights demand substantial consideration insofar as they support Congress’s legitimate ability to remove the determination of a statute’s constitutionality from the Court’s purview. For in addition to bolstering a far-reaching understanding of the Exceptions Clause, the Federalist Papers also indicate the provision’s underlying purpose—to remove “inconveniences . . . connected with the incorporation of any of [the jurisdictional powers] into the plan.”116 By this view, if Congress deemed a statute overturning a Supreme Court decision as indispensable for maintaining public justice and security, then it could act to shield the statute from repeated Supreme Court overreach. And, in certain instances, doing so could promote the virtues of federalism117 or the protection of individual rights.118 Just as the Framers envisioned.

To be clear, it is highly unlikely that Hamilton intended to use the term “inconveniences” lightly in describing the Exceptions Clause’s remedial vision.119 Yet cabining unnecessary and undesirable judicial politicization is a fundamental aim of the Exceptions Clause. It provides a legislatively mandated “political question doctrine” of sorts in the form of jurisdiction stripping. And it can prevent nine (potentially five) elite lawyers from announcing politically charged rights found nowhere in our nation’s foundational document. In short, the Exceptions Clause “furnishes necessary legitimacy to the enterprise of judicial review . . . by recognizing that the ultimate authority over constitutional interpretation belongs not to the Court alone, but to ‘the People.’”120

Therefore, contrary to the views of Professor Laurence Tribe, it is submitted that the “de facto reversal, by means far less burdensome than those required for a constitutional amendment, of several highly controversial Supreme Court decisions”121

117. For instance, reversing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to leave it to the states to decide the right to an abortion.
118. For example, Congress could have used the Exceptions Clause to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), thereby obviating the need for Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
120. Leading Cases, supra note 20, at 285.
would constitute one of the most institutionally legitimate uses of the Exceptions Clause. Although Professor Tribe is correct that this power should rarely, if ever, be used, there exists a crucial difference between empowering judges to determine what the law is and permitting them unchecked to expound what the law should be. Such activism proved a grave issue of concern for the Founders. After all, barring the difficult processes in Article V, “by deciding [a] question under the Constitution, the Court removes it from the realm of democratic decision” altogether. When exercised improperly, this sort of judicial activism undermines the Court’s institutional legitimacy, and it disrespects the relative moral proximity of Congress to the people of the United States.

Further, it is precisely this worry that has often motivated Congress to begin considering jurisdiction-stripping proposals in the first place. For example, in an effort to overrule \textit{Miranda}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{122.} See \textit{id.} at 130–31; see also infra Part III.
\item \textbf{123.} Because of the inability of either camp to muster a three-fourths majority of states, for many polarizing issues such as abortion or gun rights, a constitutional amendment fails to provide a realistic check on an overtly activist Supreme Court, regardless of which way the Court swings on the issue.
\item \textbf{124.} See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (“Allowing judges to pick and choose between statutes risks transforming them from expounders of what the law is into policymakers choosing what the law should be.”).
\item \textbf{125.} One scholar has argued that Congress cannot “strip[] federal jurisdiction over amendment-based claims.” Joseph Blocher, \textit{Amending the Exceptions Clause}, 92 MINN. L. REV. 971, 977 (2008). But this theory lacks any textual basis whatsoever. No amendment even implicitly purports to trump the Exceptions Clause or alter the Court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, the presence of a substantive right embodied in an amendment is wholly consistent with the Supreme Court’s inability to hear certain cases calling into question the scope of that right. This is because lower federal courts or state courts can still adequately vindicate the amendment-based right in those cases.
\item \textbf{127.} \textit{But cf.} Tonja Jacobi, \textit{Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy}, 80 TENN. L. REV. 763, 769 (2013) (arguing that in upholding the Affordable Care Act, the “driving concern for Roberts [in \textit{National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius}, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)] was credibility—the institutional legitimacy of the Court, and, his own reputation and legacy, including the special role of the Chief Justice”).
\item \textbf{128.} Cf. \textit{Leading Cases}, supra note 20, at 285 (arguing that the Exceptions Clause provides a mechanism for “oversee[ing] the functioning of an unelected Supreme Court”).
\end{itemize}
Counteracting Marbury

v. Arizona's prophylactic regime, the Senate once proposed a bill that would have prohibited federal courts “to review or to reverse, vacate, modify, or disturb in any way, a rule of any trial court of any State in any criminal prosecution admitting in evidence as voluntarily made an admission or confession of any accused.” In simple terms, the act would have precluded the Court from using Miranda to exclude wholly voluntary confessions. Why would Congress (and the Framers) find this desirable? The proposed re-admissibility of Miranda-less but nevertheless voluntary confessions signifies an effort to “recalibrate” the Constitution in the wake of an activist Warren Court—to legislatively repeal a non-originalist right found nowhere in the Fifth Amendment’s text or history. Put differently, the Miranda decision arguably amounted to a de facto amendment—one well beyond the Court’s power—and Congress strove to leverage the Exceptions Clause to restore the constitutional status quo. It introduced but ultimately did not pass a failsafe check to prevent the alteration of constitutional meaning, one which would have accorded with the original understanding and intent of the Exceptions Clause. And, if the measure had passed, state courts and legislatures could have continued to safeguard rights under the federal Constitution and interpret the Fifth Amendment as it had been construed for nearly two centuries.

Such congressional curtailment of perceived judicial abuses comports with the system contemplated by the Framers—that our tripartite government is not simply one of separation of powers, but also of “checks and balances to reinforce that separation.” Ignoring the significance of checks and balances in

130. See id. at 467–68 (concluding that an accused person subject to custodial interrogation cannot voluntarily waive his right to remain silent without first being read his all-too-familiar Miranda rights).
131. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 187 (quoting GERALD GUNThER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 47 (13th ed. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. See infra Part II.B.3.
this framework and focusing exclusively on the Court’s vested power thereby leads opposing theories of the Exceptions Clause down a flawed and dangerous path.135 Sure, Hamilton opined that the judiciary was “the weakest of the three departments of power,”136 and so some may argue there exists little need for a legislative check on its opinions. But recognizing the fear of austere judicial aggrandizement into a policy-making entity, Hamilton tempered his assessment by adding: “I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive. For I agree, that ‘there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.’”137 Thomas Jefferson shared this sentiment, lamenting in 1823:

Experience . . . soon showed in what way [the judicial branch was] to become the most dangerous . . . [Federal judges had] sapped, by little and little, the foundations of the constitution, and worked [their] change by construction, before any one has perceived that that invisible and helpless worm has been busily employed in consuming its substance.138

To credit both Hamilton and Jefferson, a democracy should fear life-tenured and politically unaccountable judges willing to shift the constitutional goalposts. But by enabling Congress to rein in the Supreme Court and correct manifest errors by defining its appellate jurisdiction, the Exceptions Clause can actually add to the judiciary’s democratic legitimacy.139

Now, with a Court that has for better or worse declared itself “the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,”140 Hamilton’s reservation must be afforded respect. Otherwise, little exists to prevent unchecked judicial politicization. Little exists to mean-

135. See infra Part II.C (critiquing the “essential role” theory).
137. Id. at 464–65 (emphasis added) (quoting 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 181 (1748)).
139. See Black, supra note 90, at 846 (“Except for the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, every assumption of jurisdiction by every federal court since 1789 has been on the basis of an Act of Congress . . . . [This] is the rock on which rests the legitimacy of the judicial work in a democracy.”); see also Leading Cases, supra note 20, at 285.
fully ensure the “complete independence of the courts of justice [which] is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”\(^{141}\)

The amendment process is both arduous and reserved to the States, and so on polarizing issues where it may fail, what enables the still democratically accountable legislature to prevent Lochnerian\(^ {142}\) judicial abuse? The Exceptions Clause. It ingeniously provides a congressional guard rail—a “check”—to ensure the Supreme Court operates within its constitutional role. And as I will argue more fully below,\(^ {143}\) state courts act as a simultaneous judicial guard rail—a “balance”—to ensure that Congress likewise operates in accordance with the Constitution.

As such, respecting the Exceptions Clause’s breadth can prevent two of the coordinate branches—Congress and the courts—from violating the envisioned prerogatives of their co-equal counterparts. This “separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 . . . to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”\(^ {144}\)

2. **The First Congress: Reaffirming Broad Authority**

As with the Federalist Papers, “early congressional enactments ‘provide contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning.’”\(^ {145}\) Such “contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions.”\(^ {146}\) Because the First Congress in particular comprised

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142. See Richard A. Primus, *Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent*, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 244–45 (1998) (arguing that *Lochner v. New York*, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), “the infamous case in which the Supreme Court struck down a New York health and labor regulation limiting bakers’ workweeks to sixty hours,” is one of the “most reviled” cases in the constitutional “anti-canon” because of its judicial activism).
143. See infra Part II.B.3.
146. *Id.* (alteration omitted) (quoting *Myers*, 272 U.S. at 175) (internal quotation marks omitted).
many members from the Constitutional Convention and state ratifying conventions, its actions produce substantial insight into the original understanding of the Constitution.147

Tellingly, the Supreme Court has operated with its appellate jurisdiction mitigated or eliminated entirely in certain areas ever since the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789. Indeed, “[f]or a century, federal criminal cases were not generally reviewable in the Supreme Court.”148 And that is significant to this Note’s overarching inquiry. Just like a potential law that excludes, for example, the constitutionality of state abortion statutes from Supreme Court review, so too did this enactment of the First Congress exempt a complete category of cases from review based solely upon subject matter. In other words, the First Congress’s restriction indicates that the legislature could function as gatekeeper for the types of questions which may reach the Court.

Furthermore, the early Supreme Court could only review decisions of state supreme courts that ruled against (that is, not in favor of) a federal constitutional claim.149 This jurisdictional carve out remained in force even until World War I,150 and serves as powerful corroborative evidence regarding the scope of the Exceptions Clause.151 “It follows from this [historical practice] that Congress has the power by enactment of a statute to strike at what it deems judicial excess by delimitations of . . . the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.”152 This could very well entail eliminating the jurisdictional authority to examine a specific statute’s constitutionality.

3. **State Supreme Courts: Vindicating Due Process**

Opponents of jurisdiction stripping often urge that removing judicial review could violate the right to due process.153 That is,

148. Bator, supra note 90, at 1040.
149. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87.
151. Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327–28 (1936) (“A legislative practice such as we have here, evidenced not by only occasional instances; but marked by the movement of a steady stream for a century and a half of time, goes a long way in the direction of proving the presence of unassailable ground for the constitutionality of the practice . . . .”).
152. Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1005.
153. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 263–66.
due process would purportedly provide an internal constitutional constraint on restricting the Supreme Court’s ability to rule on a statute’s validity.

However, this contention overstates the importance of Supreme Court review. Because of our system of dual sovereignty, when Congress peels away a layer of protection by invoking its Exceptions Clause authority, multiple sublayers of judicial review still remain to vindicate constitutional rights. First, Congress may direct the inferior federal courts to hear those cases removed from the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Second, even absent judicial review in federal courts altogether, state constitutions—often containing similar if not identical language to their federal counterpart—still act as guardians of every individual’s right to due process. And third, the federal Constitution continues to provide a source of relief to all litigants, regardless of Congress’s decisions on whether to exercise the full extent of its Exceptions Clause power. This is because “state courts may assume subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal cause of action absent provision by Congress to the contrary or disabling incompatibility between the federal claim and the state-court adjudication.” Moreover, they generally must do so, and via the Supremacy Clause, “Judges in every State shall be bound [by the Constitution].” Practically speaking then, although Congress may not expressly declare a victor in the battle over a constitutional question, it may validly shift the battlefield to state courts.

Assuming state court availability, there is certainly no general due process right to Supreme Court review, for even federal litigants do not receive such as a matter of right. It is furthermore difficult to imagine that automatic federal court review of any sort is really “due” to anybody when: (1) the Exceptions Clause explicitly provides that the Court’s appellate jurisdic-

157. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947) (holding that state courts have a general duty to hear federal claims).
158. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
159. See Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, §§ 4, 6, 26 Stat. 826, 827–28 (removing certain appeals to the Supreme Court for litigants as a matter of right).
tion is subject to restrictions, and (2) given Congress’s authority to “ordain and establish” inferior tribunals, “[t]here can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.” As one scholar described:

That state courts might come to different substantive conclusions than the Supreme Court does not mean that they are disregarding the Constitution. Nowhere does the Constitution state that the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, or that the decisions of the Supreme Court, shall be the “supreme Law of the Land.” If jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, it must include the authority to decide the case wrongly. Corrections, if any, must come on appeal. State courts may decide cases wrongly—just as the Supreme Court may decide cases wrongly. But just as the latter is constitutionally acceptable, so must be the former.

By this view, when Congress enacts a jurisdiction-stripping provision leaving abortion’s legality to the states, restricting corporate election financing, permitting all voluntary confessions in criminal proceedings, curbing gun ownership, or expanding state regulatory freedoms under the dormant commerce clause, the unrestrained state courts have a positive—but wholly independent—duty to uphold both the state and federal constitutions. They would become the final arbiters of the law’s constitutionality. And that is perfectly okay.

Optimistically speaking, the state courts would decline Congress’s invitation to disregard Supreme Court precedent.

162. Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”).
163. Velasco, supra note 52, at 694–95 (footnotes omitted).
165. More than likely, the state supreme court—even in the absence of U.S. Supreme Court review—would follow its federal counterpart, both as a matter of arguably still binding precedent (via the Supremacy Clause) and as a matter of judicial respect. To prevent the potential dissolution of the Republic and send a strong message back to Congress, they should do so. However, nothing can stop the state supreme court from ruling contrary to Supreme Court precedent.
Yet reasonable state courts could disagree as to the weight they would have to afford federal precedent in such a unique situation. After all, Congress would have validly abrogated Supreme Court review on the issue precisely because it viewed an earlier decision of the Court as patently incorrect. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky accordingly notes, “The limit on federal court power might be perceived by some state legislatures as an open invitation to adopt laws disregarding Supreme Court precedents and some state courts, without the prospect of Supreme Court review, might sustain such statutes.” The point is, irrespective of which precedential position the state courts may take, they still act as perpetual safeguards from uninhibited legislative tyranny. Even if potentially cumbersome to litigate an issue in multiple states and despite the risk of a lack of uniformity, state courts unwaveringly serve to prevent legislatures from flatly disregarding any rights embodied in the Constitution.

Such a federalist design might even be desirable in certain instances. State courts are at least as independent from interference by Congress as the Supreme Court is, and so they may provide an even more suitable forum for the litigation of certain prickly political issues. Not only that, but when federal judging becomes unacceptably politicized, this alternative could prevent nine unelected individuals from unilaterally injecting their policy preferences into the inner workings of fifty disparate states. With this in mind, in describing the original

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166. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26, at 205.
167. See Hart, supra note 67, at 1401 (“In the scheme of the Constitution, [state courts] are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones.”).
168. See Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900, 912 (1982) (“[S]tate courts remain as independent as article III federal judges, because Congress has no power to regulate either their salary or tenure.”).
169. This intention is probably why the Framers did not allow for exceptions as to the original jurisdiction of the Court:

All questions in which they are concerned are so directly connected with the public peace, that, as well for the preservation of this as out of respect to the sovereignties they represent, it is both expedient and proper that such questions should be submitted in the first instance to the highest judicatory of the nation.

vision of jurisdiction contemplated by the Framers, Professor Herbert Wechsler stated that:

   Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial institution should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power; or, stated differently, how far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the state courts, bound as they are by the Constitution as “the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

In *Lockerty v. Phillips*, the Supreme Court similarly declared, “Article III left Congress free to establish inferior federal courts or not as it thought appropriate. It could have declined to create any such courts, leaving suitors to the remedies afforded by state courts, with such appellate review by this Court as Congress might prescribe.”

“‘To deny this position’ would undermine the separation of powers by ‘elevating the judicial over the legislative branch,’” which may have good reasons for delegating constitutional questions exclusively to the states. Whether one agrees with them, such were the choices of the Framers, and we will continue to be bound by those decisions until we, as a nation, leverage the amendment mechanism granted to us in Article V.

C. The “Essential Role” Theory

Although the text and history of the Exceptions Clause are clear, much of the recent scholarly commentary has sought to limit its scope. Perhaps most famously, Professor Henry Hart advocated for his own structural limiting principle: that “the exceptions must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.” Professor Hart conceded that his “essential role” test found neither textual nor precedential support, but argued that “whatever the difficulties

170. Wechsler, supra note 18, at 1005–06 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
171. 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
172. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
174. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
175. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 240–46 (1985); Clinton, supra note 100, at 753–54; Glashausser, supra note 92, at 1400–02.
176. Hart, supra note 67, at 1365.
of the test, they are less . . . than the difficulties of reading the Constitution as authorizing its own destruction.”177 Professor Leonard Ratner then sought to clarify Hart’s indeterminacy:

[The Court’s] essential appellate functions under the Constitution are: (1) to provide a tribunal for the ultimate resolution of inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of federal law by state and federal courts, and (2) to provide a tribunal for maintaining the supremacy of federal law when it conflicts with state law or is challenged by state authority.178

Despite the theory’s appeal as a prudential vision of how Congress should restrictively wield its authority,179 it lacks any meaningful basis for concluding why Congress cannot do so uninhibited.180 Nowhere does the “essential role” theory find any root within the four corners of the Constitution; rather, congressional reach under the Exceptions Clause is textually unqualified. The clause grants Congress the explicit power to remove categories of cases from the Court, and “[w]hen Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution.”181 This sphere plainly includes the authority to choose whether the Supreme Court can review a statute for its conformance to the Constitution.

In addition to these textual and precedential shortcomings, Professor Hart’s theory also neglects that the Court’s “judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction than in exercising firmly that which the Constitution and the laws confer.”182 As the Supreme Court has explained, “The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects.”183 Thus, the Constitution has rendered the Court’s appellate jurisdiction “wholly the creature of legisla-

177. Id.
178. Ratner, supra note 84, at 161.
179. See infra Part III.
180. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 168, at 906 (“Professor Hart’s comment could at best be characterized as conclusory and at worst as simply off-hand.”).
182. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869) (emphasis added).
tion.”184 To “create such jurisdiction in any case, two things must concur: the Constitution must give the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must supply the requisite authority.”185 Setting aside those cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction, the “essential role” of the Supreme Court is therefore singular. It is to adjudicate those disputes—and only those disputes—which Congress has deemed appropriate for it to resolve. Only in such instances will the “judicial duty” be “fitly performed.”186 Professor Hart’s misguided “essential role” limitation to the Exceptions Clause should accordingly be cast aside as “little more than constitutional wishful thinking.”187 Instead, the plain text prevails: Congress may shield a statute’s constitutionality entirely from Supreme Court review.188

III. POLICY CONCERNS RAISED BY SHIELDING A STATUTE FROM SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Throughout this exploration of the Exceptions Clause, I have argued that the clause confers upon Congress the near-plenary authority to curtail the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Given the provision’s history and text, this power includes the ability to prevent the Court from ruling on a statute’s facial constitutionality altogether. Yet as the Supreme Court and Spider-Man alike have preached, “[i]n this world, with great power there must also come—great responsibility.”189 In this final Part, I will argue that even if Congress could constitutionally weaponize the Exceptions Clause, it generally should not do so because of ancillary threats to institutional stability.

185. Id. (emphasis added); see Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119 (1847) (“By the constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court possesses no appellate power in any case, unless conferred upon it by act of Congress . . . .”); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 313–14 (1810) (similar); see also Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005) (“[A]bsence of jurisdiction altogether deprives a federal court of the power to adjudicate the rights of the parties.”).
186. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
188. Subject of course to internal constraints in the Constitution like equal protection.
A. The Exceptions Clause as a Contravention of Substantive Values

Despite Congress’s legitimate Exceptions Clause authority, principled legislative restraint is paramount lest the constitutional project disintegrate into the very form of despotism the Revolution sought to proscribe. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, the power vested in the American courts of “ruling on the unconstitutionality of laws still forms one of the most powerful barriers that has ever been raised against the tyranny of political assemblies.”\textsuperscript{[190]} But cutting down that anti-majoritarian barrier would quite simply threaten the most fundamental values embodied in the Constitution. It would allow a single branch to aggrandize the federal powers wisely distributed by the Framers among discrete entities.\textsuperscript{[191]}

With respect to wise policy, then, Professor Hart’s “essential role” theory warrants particular attention.\textsuperscript{[192]} Recall that the core responsibilities of the Supreme Court arguably include both the resolution of conflicting interpretations of federal law and ensuring the supremacy of federal law.\textsuperscript{[193]} Preventing the federal courts from reviewing a statute’s constitutionality would clearly undermine these twin goals. For although state courts may still provide effective redress, they could very well ignore Supreme Court precedent with impunity, and it has long been recognized that a national Constitution with uniform meaning would be lost without the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{[194]} Whatever value inherent in federalism, it would pervert the Constitution—the unifying emblem of our nation—should its fundamental privileges be conferred unequally by dint of sheer geographic coincidence.\textsuperscript{[195]} Thus, in supporting the “essential roles” theory,

\textsuperscript{[190]} Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 175 (Liberty Fund new ed. 2012) (1835).
\textsuperscript{[191]} Cf. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 16, at 320 (James Madison) (“It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”).
\textsuperscript{[192]} See generally Hart, supra note 67.
\textsuperscript{[193]} See Ratner, supra note 84, at 161.
\textsuperscript{[194]} Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 386 (1921) (“Different States may entertain different opinions on the true construction of the constitutional powers of Congress.”).
\textsuperscript{[195]} This is precisely why the Supreme Court often grants certiorari on circuit splits.
Professor Ratner described the Constitution’s overarching vision as follows:

The Constitution makes us one nation. It is the symbol of our shared purposes. If interpretation of that overriding document, which manifests our agreement on long term associational values, varies from state to state, respect for and confidence in the document is undermined. The nature of our governmental structure and its implications for all citizens become indistinct. Uncertainty and discontent proliferate.196

Professor Ratner’s warning is all the more pressing in light of the increasingly national identity of modern citizens.197 No longer do we define ourselves first and foremost by our state.198 Our confidence in the Constitution stems in large part from the fact that it applies equally to us all.199

Furthermore, the Constitution expresses a profound respect for individual liberties, especially those of minority groups incapable of political redress.200 Recklessly invoking the Exceptions Clause to undercut the judicial protection of valid minority interests would thereby violate a core tenet of constitutional law.201 Say what you will of the amorphous concept of the “spirit of the Constitution” as a legal argument. But as a practical matter, few would disagree that its use as an instrument of oppression by the majority is highly objectionable. After all, a defining characteristic of the Constitution is its careful construction aimed at “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty” for pos-

197. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Note, Against Diversity, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 1–2 (2000) (arguing that diversity jurisdiction is a historical relic and is no longer necessary because local bias has largely faded).
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
terity.\textsuperscript{202} It is in broad strokes an enduring venture which seeks to protect the most basic values cherished by society. And recognizing human frailty both in times of peril and in the prospect of power, the Founders deliberately made it exceedingly difficult to change. However, if an impassioned majority irresponsibly alters this Ulysses contract in the heat of the moment\textsuperscript{203}—as it could potentially do by shielding a statute’s constitutionality from the Court—the Constitution’s attempt to prophylactically tie the hands of future generations could ultimately fail.

\section*{B. The Exceptions Clause as a Political Weapon}

In addition to undermining substantive values embodied in the Constitution, reckless use of the Exceptions Clause as a partisan weapon by either Republicans or Democrats could also spell mutual destruction—both to the parties and to democracy itself. At the beginning of Part I, I suggested why the political repercussions of shielding a statute’s constitutionality from the Supreme Court have likely compelled Congress to refrain from using the power in the past. Then throughout Part II, I argued why the text, history, and system of checks and balances envisioned by the Framers nonetheless collectively permit Congress to do so. This final Section will bridge that historical disconnect. Suppose that either party in Congress finally chooses to break free of its historical restraint. Even if constitutionally valid, what practical consequences would this weaponization of the Exceptions Clause have for our democracy?

In their recent book, Professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt explain that “our system of checks and balances has worked pretty well—but not, or not entirely, because of the constitutional system designed by the founders. Democracies work best—and survive longer—where constitutions are reinforced by unwritten democratic norms.”\textsuperscript{204} Standing alone, the

\textsuperscript{202} U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mandating equal protection of the laws).

\textsuperscript{203} Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944) (upholding the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II), with Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (“Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—’has no place in law under the Constitution.’” (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting))).

\textsuperscript{204} STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 8 (2018).
Constitution is only words on some parchment; its continued practical strength depends almost entirely upon the conduct of its institutional actors. Accordingly, one of the most critical "soft guardrails of American democracy" is "forbearance, or the idea that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their institutional prerogatives," and that they should "resist[] the temptation to use their temporary control of institutions to maxim[ize] partisan advantage." When the Constitution contains an explicit provision subject to abuse like the Exceptions Clause, these soft democratic norms deliver an institutional source of shelter from governmental tyranny.

In the jurisdiction-stripping context, forbearance on Capitol Hill is therefore essential. By way of the *Citizens United* example introduced earlier, if the legislature sought to leverage the Exceptions Clause to overturn the Court’s decision and cap corporate election spending, this would directly interfere with the freedom and continuity of the electoral process. Regardless of one’s views on *Citizens United*, do we really want the current political party in power to have the final federal say on the scope of campaign speech protected by the First Amendment? Sure, state courts would act as an alternative outlet to adjudicate campaign speech claims. But in a national election—as for the presidency—few would tolerate an uneven constitutional floor of First Amendment protections. Indeed, what makes this destabilizing vision especially troubling is that under the façade of a constitutionally prescribed prerogative to control jurisdiction, overzealous Congress members would subvert democracy in an entirely lawful manner. The valid measure would, however, be patently antidemocratic—aimed


207. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

208. See supra Part II.B.3.

209. Note that state constitutional protections for campaign speech could concededly differ. See *Sutton*, supra note 155, at 16 (“State courts have authority to construe their own constitutional provisions however they wish. Nothing compels the state courts to imitate federal interpretations of the [U.S. Constitution].”).

210. Cf. *Levitsky & Ziblatt*, supra note 204, at 5 (“Many government efforts to subvert democracy are ‘legal,’ in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts.”).
counteracting partisan advantage and sidestepping the more democratic amendment process prescribed in Article V.

Moreover, if the Exceptions Clause is invoked irresponsibly in the first instance, future Congresses with a flipped majority could more forcefully cloak their strategic behavior as merely consistent with prior practice. Put differently, the opposing party could diffuse accountability for their own overstepping by decrying the schoolyard classic “they started it,” a phenomenon which America has witnessed and bemoaned in the Senate’s recent Supreme Court confirmation proceedings. These sorts of “[c]onstitutional hardball tactics are viewed by the other side as provocative and unfair because they flout ‘the “go without saying” assumptions that underpin working systems of constitutional government.’” It goes without saying that absent emergency, breaking constitutional and historic norms as simply a means for partisan ends threatens the long-term health of the political process and the two-party system. To return to the Federalist Papers once more, when Alexander Hamilton spoke to curbing “inconveniences” via the Exceptions Clause, he envisioned remedying unforeseen consequences arising from the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court by Article III. He assuredly did not mean leveraging the Exceptions Clause to dispel any inconveniences to a party’s factional political agenda.

211. See Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1430, 1439 (2018) (“If constitutional norms are constantly in flux and if perceived breaches trigger disapproval, as well as other possible sanctions, rational politicians will generally seek to describe their own strategic behavior as consistent with prior practice.” (footnote omitted)).


214. Cf. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 204, at 7–8 (explaining that another “soft guardrail[] of American democracy” is “mutual toleration, or the understanding that competing parties accept one another as legitimate rivals”).


Furthermore, that the scope of a constitutional right might seesaw haphazardly by dint of the party currently in power would frustrate constituents. It would diminish the already little remaining faith they have in Congress because of its reputation as an unnecessarily polarized institution.217 And this diminution could lead to marked instability in the electoral process.218 Therefore, Congress should continue to carefully consider these broader institutional factors before it enacts a constitutionality jurisdiction-stripping proposal; it should only institute such exceptions with overwhelming bipartisan support; it should seek the more palatable amendment process first before resorting to the Exceptions Clause; and it should altogether refrain from weaponizing jurisdiction stripping purely to promote political gain. No matter what the Constitution allows.

To return to this Note’s initial inquiry, it will hopefully now be apparent that because of unwavering state court availability, Congress at least could not enlist the Exceptions Clause to directly alter the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.219 That is to say, they could not do so entirely unchecked, because state courts would still possess the authority to hear claims regarding the statute’s lawfulness. Two qualifications should be noted though. First, with no Supreme Court review to stop them, state courts may unanimously rule the opposite way of the Court (or at least split in some manner) on a contentious issue. The party invoking the Exceptions Clause may thus realistically—but unwisely—embrace the potential to gain a partial political victory as an indirect consequence of its actions.

Second, Congress can always leverage the Exceptions Clause proactively—before the Court has spoken to an issue. Indeed, as McCardle suggests, when in doubt as to a measure’s constitutionality, Congress may even erase the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction after oral argument but before a final opinion has been handed down.220 To illustrate, suppose that Congress had seri-

217. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 13, at 1705 (discussing views on polarization and concluding that “[t]he current level of congressional polarization is the highest since the Civil War”).
219. See supra Part II.B.3.
ous reservations as to its authority to enact the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate. Before the Court’s disposition in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Congress thus could have legitimately decreed that no federal court could decide the constitutionality of the provision.

Regardless of one’s opinion on Obamacare, such weaponization of the Exceptions Clause as a tool to strong-arm signature legislation into force would be a short-term victory for one party and a long-term defeat for the Constitution and the American citizenry. For despite the proactivity of this jurisdiction stripping (which at least obviates the prudential risk of superseding the Supreme Court), the policy considerations above remain in full force. Firing this first shot would likely catalyze retaliatory action and incentivize the opposing political party to mirror the instigator’s strategy in passing its own future signature legislation. The people would decry hyperpartisanship and would have to cumbersomely litigate these measures in fifty state supreme courts, where disparate conclusions might proliferate. The Framers’ ingenious system of “checks and balances” could instead become one of “strikes and counterstrikes” as the Supreme Court wrestles back and forth with Congress for control. And ultimately, if carelessly employed by the legislature as a blunt instrument for short-term partisan advantage, the clause targeted at jurisdictional “Exceptions” may lamentably become the rule.

CONCLUSION

Marbury famously held that the Supreme Court acts as the final arbiter and expounder of the Constitution. Yet in describing the Court’s role in resolving difficult questions, Justice Robert Jackson also famously opined that:

222. 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (holding that the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was constitutional under the taxing power, but that the Act’s Medicaid expansion provision was unduly coercive to the states, and thus in contravention of the spending power).
223. See supra Part II.
224. An outcome that is particularly troublesome for a national healthcare scheme.
[R]eversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of [the Supreme Court’s] reversals . . . would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.225

That is, unless Congress employs its Exceptions Clause authority to say otherwise. The Supreme Court has certainly been wrong in the past,226 and the Framers humbly granted Congress this unique jurisdiction-stripping authority as a measure to correct judicial overreach either discordant with or unforeseen in the envisioned constitutional design. This Note has argued that both the plain text and historical understandings of the Exceptions Clause support Congress’s near-plenary power to do so, including the noteworthy ability to remove a statute’s facial constitutionality from the Court’s watchful eye. Although state courts would then provide an alternative forum to protect individual liberties from legislative tyranny, I have contended that Congress generally should not license this alternative as a policy matter. However, normative merits notwithstanding, one must accept that the Exceptions Clause power both exists and is of remarkable breadth. It provides a potential means by which Congress can overrule the Supreme Court without an amendment. And so ironically enough, the precise constitutional provision which Marbury relied on to invalidate a portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and thereby establish judicial review, is the very clause by which Congress may lawfully strip the Supreme Court of its future constitutional review authority.

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